The Fund’s decision on the New Arrangements to Borrow (the “NAB”), as amended, (the “NAB Decision”) is subject to renewals not later than 12 months before the end of each NAB period, with the current period set to expire on November 16, 2017. The NAB Decision was last renewed for a five-year period in November 2012. Pursuant to paragraph 19(a) of the NAB Decision, the Executive Board is to take a decision on the renewal no later than twelve months before the end of the NAB Decision, i.e., by November 16, 2016.1 Once a decision on renewal is taken, the new NAB period would become effective on November 17, 2017. In renewing the NAB Decision, the Fund and NAB participants are to review the functioning of the NAB Decision and, in particular, the experience with the procedures for activation. Modifications of the NAB Decision could be made at the time of renewal.
Comprehensive analysis and management of fiscal risks can help ensure sound fiscal public finances and macroeconomic stability. This has been underscored by the global financial crisis and the more recent collapse in commodity prices, which starkly illustrate the vulnerability of public finances to risk. Indeed, over the past quarter century, governments experienced on average an adverse fiscal shock of 6 percent of GDP once every 12 years, with some of the largest stemming from financial crises.
Countries need a more complete understanding of these potential threats to their fiscal position. Existing fiscal risk disclosure and analysis practices tend to be incomplete, fragmented, and qualitative in nature. A more comprehensive and integrated assessment of the potential shocks to government finances, in the form of a fiscal stress test, can help policymakers simulate the effects of shocks to their central forecasts and their implications for government solvency, liquidity, and financing needs. Comprehensive, reliable, and timely fiscal data covering all public entities, stocks, and flows are a necessary foundation for such analysis.
Countries should also enhance their capacity to mitigate and manage fiscal risks. Fiscal risk management practices are often blunt, ad hoc, and too focused on imposing limits on the creation of exposures. Countries need to expand their toolkits for fiscal risk management and adopt the use of instruments to transfer, share, or provision for risks. In doing so, countries need to weigh the possible benefits from reducing their exposure to shocks against the financial and other costs of the policies that may be needed.
Finally, countries should make greater use of probabilistic forecasting methods when setting long-run objectives and medium-term targets for fiscal policy. The paper illustrates how simple probabilistic tools can be used to map the uncertainty around medium-term trajectories for public debt. In combination with fiscal stress tests, these tools can provide valuable information regarding the probabilities that a country will stay within the debt ceilings embedded in their fiscal rules.
The Fund is playing an important role in supporting improvements in fiscal risk analysis and management among its members. This includes technical assistance in constructing public sector balance sheets; developing institutions and capacity to identify specific fiscal risks and to quantify their potential impact; undertaking fiscal stress tests; and integrating risks into the design of medium-term fiscal targets.
This note covers considerations that can guide the staff’s policy advice on the use of a broad range of macroprudential tools. It discusses the transmission and likely effectiveness of these tools in mitigating systemic risks and the set of indicators that can be used in surveillance to assess the need for changes in macroprudential policy settings. This note is a supplement to the Staff Guidance Note on Macroprudential Policy.
This note provides guidance to facilitate the staff’s advice on macroprudential policy in Fund surveillance. It elaborates on the principles set out in the “Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy,” taking into account the work of international standard setters as well as the evolving country experience with macroprudential policy. The main note is accompanied by supplements offering Detailed Guidance on Instruments and Considerations for Low Income Countries
This paper proposes reforms to the discount rates used by the Bank and the Fund to (a) calculate the present value (PV) of the external debt of low-income countries (LICs) in debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) and (b) to calculate the grant element of individual loans. Consistent with the conclusions of the March 2013 review of the Fund’s debt limits policy, the paper proposes a single uniform discount rate to be used for these related operational purposes. It has been prepared as a joint product of Bank and Fund staff, with the exception of the decision, which is Fund-specific.
This paper reviews past trends in public pension spending and provides projections for 27 advanced and 25 emerging economies over 2011–2050. In constructing these projections, the paper incorporates the impact of recent pension reforms and highlights the key assumptions underlying these projections and associated risks. The paper also presents reform options to address future pension spending pressures in the advanced and emerging economies. These reforms—mainly increasing retirement ages, reducing replacement rates, or increasing payroll taxes—are discussed in the context of their role in fiscal consolidation, and their implications for both equity and economic growth. In addition, the paper examines the challenge of emerging economies of expanding coverage in a fiscally sustainable manner
The most recent decade has seen a growing presence of banks headquartered in advanced economies (AEs) expanding into emerging markets (EMs). These expansions have brought some benefits to both home and host countries, but the global financial crisis has also unmasked significant vulnerabilities inherent in such relationships.
In keeping with past cross-cutting themes papers, this paper focuses on the experiences of four medium-sized ?home countries,? each with significant retail banking links to EMs—Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain. These countries were chosen because of their banks' diverse approaches to EM expansion (including the centralization of their funding models) and equally diverse crisis outcomes (fears over Eastern European exposures resulted in extraordinary policy efforts to maintain bank lending), providing fertile ground for analysis and for drawing lessons in the future.