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Katharina Bergant
Using supervisory loan-level data on corporate loans, we show that banks facing high levels of non-performing loans relative to their capital and provisions were more likely to grant forbearance measures to the riskiest group of borrowers. More specifically, we find that risky borrowers are more likely to get an increase in the overall limit or the maturity of a loan product from a distressed lender. As a second step, we analyse the effectiveness of this practice in reducing the probability of default. We show that the most common measure of forbearance is effective in the short run but no forbearance measure significantly reduces the probability of default in the long run. Our evidence also suggests that forbearance and new lending are substitutes for banks, as high shares of forbearance are negatively correlated with new lending to the same group of borrowers. Taken together, these findings can help policy makers shape surveillance and regulation in a future recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic.
International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept.
"The Ninth Periodic Monitoring Report (PMR) on the Status of Management Implementation Plans (MIPs) in Response to Board-Endorsed Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) Recommendations assesses the progress made over the last year on actions contained in two “new” MIPs arising from recent IEO evaluations, and another seven for which individual management actions were classified as “open” in the Eighth PMR. Overall, 42 of the 96 actions included in the Ninth PMR remain open, representing roughly the same proportion as the previous PMR. A 25 percent net increase in open management actions over the past year is accounted for by 24 new actions from two MIPs, and 16 actions that have been implemented over the period. There is positive traction on the last four MIPs, but older actions appear challenging to implement. Better progress has been made with the implementation of the actions contained in recent MIPs. Fourteen of the actions implemented since the Eighth PMR relate to MIPs approved after October 2015, while only two actions (out of 24) from earlier MIPs were implemented. Improvements in the follow-up process approved by the Board in October 2015 have contributed to speedier implementation of recent actions, but some challenges remain. There are lingering challenges with defining measures of success for numerous actions, but accountabilities are now clearer and many actions are at advanced stages at the time of the Board’s discussion of the MIPs. This PMR introduces indicators to support the process for resolving challenges with long-standing actions. Despite the slower progress with the older actions, significant advances have been made over the past year in several key areas. These include: protocols for engaging the IEO; risk management and analysis; the mainstreaming of macrofinancial surveillance; an overarching strategy on data and statistics; guidance on cooperation with other organizations, including Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs); improvements in External Stability Assessments; and ongoing analytical work on surveillance and program, including macrostructural issues, emerging topics, and debt sustainability analysis. On the other hand, progress has been slower on macro forecasting, outward spillovers, and cross-country knowledge sharing."
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
The SSM (SSM) has made a solid start. Set up a little over three years ago, the SSM has developed into a coherent banking supervision mechanism operating across the 19 Euro Area Member States. Banking supervision at the European Central Bank (ECB) is underpinned by a clear mandate and independence from government or industry interference in individual supervisory decisions. Its well-defined supervisory methodology and processes—complemented by committed staff—have laid the foundations for more forward-looking, pre-emptive, and evenhanded supervision. This is a noteworthy achievement for the Euro Area.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
The FSAP team undertook a thorough top-down stress testing analysis using end-2017 data. This note covers the methodology and results of the scenario-based solvency tests, the single factor sensitivity tests, and the liquidity tests. The stress test exercise was carried out on a sample of major euro area banks supervised by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The analysis is heavily dependent on comprehensive and granular supervisory data on individual banks’ positions shared by the European Central Bank (ECB). While FSAP results are not directly comparable to the 2018 EU-wide stress test results due to differences in scenarios, methodologies, and objectives, they provide an assessment of the system-wide resilience of the euro area banking sector at the current juncture.
International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept.
This paper reviews the adequacy of the Fund’s precautionary balances, using the framework approved by the Board in 2010. The review takes place on the standard two-year cycle and assesses developments since the last review in 2016.
Rima Turk-Ariss
Concerns about excessive variability in bank risk weights have prompted their review by regulators. This paper provides prima facie evidence on the extent of risk weight heterogeneity across broad asset classes and by country of counterparty for major banks in the European Union using internal models. It also finds that corporate risk weights are sensitive to the riskiness of an average representative firm, but not to a market indicator of a firm’s probablity of default. Under plausible yet severe hypothetical scenarios for harmonized risk weights, counterfactual capital ratios would decline significantly for some banks, but they would not experience a shortfall relative to Basel III’s minimum requirements. This, however, does not preclude falling short of meeting additional national supervisory capital requirements.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This Technical Note discusses the findings and recommendations made in the Financial Sector Assessment Program for Ireland in the areas of banking supervision and observance of the Basel core principles. The effective operational implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is well established in Ireland, and all authorities are actively engaged and committed to the new supervisory framework led by the European Central Bank. The SSM has further strengthened the prudential regulation and supervision of banks since the time of the 2013 assessment. The transition to the operational implementation of the SSM has not resulted in major gaps in banking supervision, but some transitional challenges remain.
Kentaro Asai
This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the impact of bonus caps on banks’ risk taking. In the model, labor market price adjustments can offset the direct effects of bonus caps. The calibrated model suggests that bonus caps are only effective when bank executives’ mobility is restricted. It also suggests, irrespective of the degree of labor market mobility, bonus caps simultaneously reduce risk shifting by bank executives (too much risk taking because of limited liability), but aggravate underinvestment (bank executives foregoing risky but productive projects). Hence, the welfare effects of bonus caps critically depend on initial conditions, including the relative importance of risk shifting versus underinvestment.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This paper provides detailed assessment of observance on the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. The current assessment took place during a period of continuing development and transition. It is based on the assessors’ understanding of the current state of the supervisory approach, but also incorporates, where relevant, the available information about changes expected in the near future. Stress testing has become a critical supervisory tool that encourages firms and supervisors to adopt a more forward-looking view on the strength of their balance sheets and resilience to shocks. The emphasis on stress testing has encouraged firms to strengthen their internal analytical and risk-management capabilities.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This paper discusses how Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) stress test assesses the resilience of the banking sector as a whole rather than the capital adequacy of individual institutions. The FSAP approach to stress testing is essentially macroprudential: it focuses on resilience of the broader financial system to adverse macro-financial conditions rather than on resilience of individual banks to specific shocks. This test ensures consistency in macroeconomic scenarios and metrics across firms to facilitate the assessment of the banking system as a whole. The stress test analysis is intended to help country authorities to identify key sources of systemic risk in the banking sector and inform macroprudential policies to enhance its resilience to absorb shocks.