This paper presents a rule for foreign exchange interventions (FXI), designed to preserve financial stability in floating exchange rate arrangements. The FXI rule addresses a market failure: the absence of hedging solution for tail exchange rate risk in the market (i.e. high volatility). Market impairment or overshoot of exchange rate between two equilibria could generate high volatility and threaten financial stability due to unhedged exposure to exchange rate risk in the economy. The rule uses the concept of Value at Risk (VaR) to define FXI triggers. While it provides to the market a hedge against tail risk, the rule allows the exchange rate to smoothly adjust to new equilibria. In addition, the rule is budget neutral over the medium term, encourages a prudent risk management in the market, and is more resilient to speculative attacks than other rules, such as fixed-volatility rules. The empirical methodology is backtested on Banco Mexico’s FXIs data between 2008 and 2016.
Concentration risk is an important feature of many banking sectors, especially in emerging and
small economies. Under the Basel Framework, Pillar 1 capital requirements for credit risk do not
cover concentration risk, and those calculated under the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach
explicitly exclude it. Banks are expected to compensate for this by autonomously estimating and
setting aside appropriate capital buffers, which supervisors are required to assess and possibly
challenge within the Pillar 2 process. Inadequate reflection of this risk can lead to insufficient
capital levels even when the capital ratios seem high. We propose a flexible technique, based on
a combination of “full” credit portfolio modeling and asymptotic results, to calculate capital
requirements for name and sector concentration risk in banks’ portfolios. The proposed approach
lends itself to be used in bilateral surveillance, as a potential area for technical assistance on
banking supervision, and as a policy tool to gauge the degree of concentration risk in different
The objectives of this paper are: (1) to analyze an optimal portfolio rebalancing by a fund manager in response to a "volatility shock" in one of the asset markets, under sufficiently realistic assumptions about the fund manager's performance criteria and investment restrictions; and (2) to analyze the sensitivity of the equilibrium price of an asset to shocks originating in other fundamentally unrelated asset markets for a given mix of common investors. The analysis confirms that certain combinations of investment restrictions (notably short-sale constraints and benchmark-based performance criteria) can create additional transmission mechanisms for propagating shocks across fundamentally unrelated asset markets. The paper also discusses potential implications of recent and on-going changes in the investor base for emerging market securities for the asset price volatility.
We explore the link between international stock market comovement and the degree to which firms operate globally. Using stock returns and balance sheet data for companies in 20 countries, we estimate a factor model that decomposes stock returns into global, country-specific and industry-specific shocks. We find a large and highly significant link: on average, a firm raising its international sales by 10 percent raises the exposure of its stock return to global shocks by 2 percent and reduces its exposure to country-specific shocks by 1.5 percent. This link has grown stronger since the mid-1980s.
This paper extends my previous work by examining the relationship between monetary policy and exchange market pressure (EMP) in 32 emerging market countries. EMP is a gauge of the severity of crises, and part of this paper specifically analyzes crisis periods. Two variables gauge the stance of monetary policy: the growth of central bank domestic credit and the interest differential (domestic versus U.S. dollar). Evidence suggests that monetary policy plays an important role in currency crises. And, in most countries the shocks to monetary policy affect EMP in the direction predicted by traditional approaches: tighter money reduces EMP.
Using symmetric data sets of 92 weekly return observations before and after the introduction of the euro, the paper analyzes the impact of the new currency on the return structure of equity markets in the European Monetary Union. Variance decompositions, cluster analyses, and principle component analyses are used to explore the changes in the structural relations. European industry factors are found to have dramatically increased in importance with the launch of the single currency, and a new 'country-size' factor in European stock returns is detected. Furthermore, inner-European correlations are documented to have been reduced sharply with the start of the monetary union.
Models of “contagion” rely on market imperfections to explain why adverse shocks in one asset market might be associated with asset sales in many unrelated markets. This paper demonstrates that contagion can be explained with basic portfolio theory without recourse to market imperfections. It also demonstrates that “Value-at-Risk” portfolio management rules do not have significantly different consequences for portfolio rebalancing and contagion than other rules. The paper’s main conclusion is that portfolio diversification and leverage may be sufficient to explain why investors would find it optimal to sell many higher-risk assets when a shock to one asset occurs.
Ex-post deviations from uncovered interest parity (UIP) – realized differences between dollar returns on identical assets of different currencies – equal the real interest differential plus real exchange rate growth. Among industrialized countries, UIP deviations are largely explained by unanticipated real exchange rate growth, but among developing countries, real interest differentials are “where the action is.” This observation is due to the greater variability of inflation in developing countries, but may also stem from higher and more variable risks and capital controls in these countries. Also, among developing countries with moderate inflation, offsetting comovements of real interest differentials and real exchange growth support the sticky-price hypothesis.
This paper presents a statistical and economic interpretation of the low and often economically implausible risk aversion estimates obtained for fixed income assets throughout the finance literature. For a statistical interpretation, Monte Carlo simulations are used to demonstrate that specification errors introduce a serious downward bias in parameter estimates derived from the standard asset pricing model. For an economic interpretation, an international version of the asset pricing model is presented. The model suggests that by reducing the effect of country specific disturbances, an international measure of consumption growth yields more accurate risk aversion estimates than a national measure. The results of asset pricing tests suggest that risk aversion estimates derived from models constructed for the international measures are economically plausible and close to each other across eight industrialized economies. These results are robust for several asset returns.