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International Monetary Fund
The Fund, as Trustee of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT or Trust),entered into an amendment of the 2010 borrowing agreement with Danmarks Nationalbank, and new borrowing agreements with the Norwegian Ministry of Finance representing the Kingdom of Norway and the Sveriges Riksbank (hereafter Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, respectively), by which the counterparties will provide new resources to the Loan Accounts of the PRGT in the total amount of SDR 1.1 billion (see attachments). The augmentation under the amendment and the two new agreements are the first three loan contributions to be concluded in the context of the current Board-endorsed effort to raise SDR 11 billion in new PRGT loan resources. These amendment and new agreements became effective on November 17, 2016.
Boriana Yontcheva
This paper presents a dynamic game of strategic delegation between a principal and an agent. The principal can choose between two organizational designs: a traditional hierarchy where she retains authority over the choice of projects to be implemented or a delegation where she allows her agent to select the project. The key objectives of this model are to identify the long-run determinants of the principal’s choice and verify the impact of the authority allocation on the agent’s effort levels and on the principal’s payoffs. We apply the model to the relationships between institutional donors and nongovernmental organizations.
International Monetary Fund. External Relations Dept.
The Web edition of the IMF Survey is updated several times a week, and contains a wealth of articles about topical policy and economic issues in the news. Access the latest IMF research, read interviews, and listen to podcasts given by top IMF economists on important issues in the global economy. www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/home.aspx
Mr. John Norregaard and Ms. Valerie Reppelin
This paper examines the relative merits of two dominant economic instruments for reducing pollution—”green” taxes and tradable permits. Theoretically, the two instruments share many similarities, and on balance, neither seems preferable to the other. In practice, however, most countries have relied more on taxes than on permits to control pollution. The analysis suggests a number of lessons to be learned from country experiences regarding the design and implementation of both instruments. While many, particularly European countries, currently have long-term programs involving environmental taxes, a willingness to experiment with tradable permits seems to be growing, especially given the Kyoto protocol emission targets.