This paper studies private investment in India against the backdrop of a significant investment
decline over the past decade. We analyze the potential causes of weaker investment at the firm
level, using both firm-level financial statements and a novel dataset on firms’ investment project
decisions, and find that financial frictions have played a role in the slowdown. Firms with higher
financial leverage invest less, as do firms with lower earnings relative to their interest expenses.
Consistent with the notion of credit constraints leading to pro-cyclical investment, we also find
that firms with higher leverage are (i) less likely to undertake new investment projects, (ii) less
likely to complete investment projects once begun, and (iii) undertake shorter-term investment
Zineddine Alla, Mr. Raphael A Espinoza, and Mr. Atish R. Ghosh
This paper analyzes the use of unconventional policy instruments in New Keynesian setups in which the ‘divine coincidence’ breaks down. The paper discusses the role of a second instrument and its coordination with conventional interest rate policy, and presents theoretical results on equilibrium determinacy, the inflation bias, the stabilization bias, and the optimal central banker’s preferences when both instruments are available. We show that the use of an unconventional instrument can help reduce the zone of equilibrium indeterminacy and the volatility of the economy. However, in some circumstances, committing not to use the second instrument may be welfare improving (a result akin to Rogoff (1985a) example of counterproductive coordination). We further show that the optimal central banker should be both aggressive against inflation, and interventionist in using the unconventional policy instrument. As long as price setting depends on expectations about the future, there are gains from establishing credibility by using any instrument that affects these expectations.
This paper develops a model featuring both a macroeconomic and a financial friction that
speaks to the interaction between monetary and macro-prudential policies. There are two main
results. First, real interest rate rigidities in a monopolistic banking system have an asymmetric
impact on financial stability: they increase the probability of a financial crisis (relative to the
case of flexible interest rate) in response to contractionary shocks to the economy, while they
act as automatic macro-prudential stabilizers in response to expansionary shocks. Second, when
the interest rate is the only available policy instrument, a monetary authority subject to the same
constraints as private agents cannot always achieve a (constrained) efficient allocation and faces
a trade-off between macroeconomic and financial stability in response to contractionary shocks.
An implication of our analysis is that the weak link in the U.S. policy framework in the run up
to the Global Recession was not excessively lax monetary policy after 2002, but rather the
absence of an effective regulatory framework aimed at preserving financial stability.
Recent studies show that uncertainty shocks have quantitatively important effects on the real economy. This paper examines one particular channel at work: the supply of credit. It presents a model in which a bank, even if managed by risk-neutral shareholders and subject to limited liability, can exhibit self-insurance, and thus loan supply contracts when uncertainty increases. This prediction is tested with the universe of U.S. commercial banks over the period 1984-2010. Identification of credit supply is achieved by looking at the differential response of banks according to their level of capitalization. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, increases in uncertainty reduce the supply of credit, more so for banks with lower levels of capitalization. These results are weaker for large banks, and are robust to controlling for the lending and capital channels of monetary policy, to different measures of uncertainty, and to breaking the dataset in subsamples. Quantitatively, uncertainty shocks are almost as important as monetary policy ones with regards to the effects on the supply of credit.
This paper surveys dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with financial frictions in use by central banks and discusses priorities for future development of such models for the purpose of monetary and financial stability analysis. It highlights the need to develop macrofinancial models which allow analysis of the macroeconomic effects of macroprudential policy tools and to evaluate elements of the Basel III reforms as a priority. The paper also reviews the main approaches to introducing financial frictions into general equilibrium models.