Gustavo Adler, Camila Casas, Mr. Luis M. Cubeddu, Ms. Gita Gopinath, Ms. Nan Li, Sergii Meleshchuk, Ms. Carolina Osorio Buitron, Mr. Damien Puy, and Mr. Yannick Timmer
The extensive use of the US dollar when firms set prices for international trade (dubbed dominant currency pricing) and in their funding (dominant currency financing) has come to the forefront of policy debate, raising questions about how exchange rates work and the benefits of exchange rate flexibility. This Staff Discussion Note documents these features of international trade and finance and explores their implications for how exchange rates can help external rebalancing and buffer macroeconomic shocks.
Mr. Tobias Adrian, Mr. Dong He, Nellie Liang, and Mr. Fabio M Natalucci
This paper describes the conceptual framework that guides assessments of financial stability risks for multilateral surveillance, as currently presented in the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR). The framework emphasizes consistency in measuring financial vulnerabilities across countries and over time and offers a summary statistic to quantify aggregate financial stability risks. The two parts of the empirical approach—a matrix of specific vulnerabilities and a summary measure of financial stability risks—are distinct but highly complementary for monitoring and policymaking.
Mr. Tommaso Mancini Griffoli, Mr. Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Mr. Itai Agur, Mr. Anil Ari, Mr. John Kiff, Ms. Adina Popescu, and Ms. Celine Rochon
Digitalization is reshaping economic activity, shrinking the role of cash, and spurring new digital forms of money. Central banks have been pondering wheter and how to adapt. One possibility is central bank digital currency (CBDC)-- a widely accessible digital form of fiat money that could be legal tender. This discussion note proposes a conceptual framework to assess the case for CBDC adoption from the perspective of users and central banks. It discusses possible CBDC designs, and explores potential benefits and costs, with a focus on the impact on monetary policy, financial stability, and integrity. This note also surveys research and pilot studies on CBDC by central banks around the world.
Many studies have highlighted how failures of public corporations (otherwise known as state-owned enterprises) can result in huge economic and fiscal costs. To contain the risks associated with these costs, an effective regime for the financial supervision and oversight of public corporations should be put in place. This note discusses the legal, institutional, and procedural arrangements that governments need to oversee the financial operations of their public corporations, ensure accountability for their performance, and manage the fiscal risks they present. In particular, it recommends that governments should focus their surveillance on public corporations that are large in relation to the economy, create fiscal risks, are not profitable, are unstable financially, or are heavily dependent on government subsidies or guarantees.
Ms. Michaela Erbenova, Ms. Yan Liu, Mr. Nadim Kyriakos-Saad, Aledjandro Lopez Mejia, Jose Giancarlo Gasha, Mr. Emmanuel Mathias, Mr. Mohamed Norat, Ms. Francisca Fernando, and Ms. Yasmin Almeida
This paper focuses on the withdrawal of correspondent banking relationships (CBRs) in some jurisdictions post-global financial crisis. It describes existing evidence and consequences of the withdrawal of CBRs and explores drivers of this phenomenon drawing on recent surveys and select country information. While the withdrawal of CBRs has reached a critical level in some affected countries, which can have a systemic impact if unaddressed, macroeconomic consequences have not been identified so far at a global level. The paper presents responses from the international community to address this phenomenon, and explains the role that the IMF has been playing in this global effort, especially with regards to supporting member countries in the context of surveillance and technical assistance, facilitating dialogue among stakeholders, and encouraging data gathering efforts. The paper concludes by suggesting policy responses by public and private sector stakeholders needed to further mitigate potential negative impacts that could undermine financial stability, inclusion, growth and development goals.
Mr. Jörg Decressin, Mr. Raphael A Espinoza, Mr. Ioannis Halikias, Mr. Michael Kumhof, Mr. Daniel Leigh, Mr. Prakash Loungani, Mr. Paulo A Medas, Susanna Mursula, Mr. Antonio Spilimbergo, and Ms. TengTeng Xu
The paper studies the impacts of wage moderation in the euro area. Simulation results show that if a single euro area crisis-hit economy undertakes wage moderation, the impact on output is positive for that economy and for the entire euro area. If all crisis-hit economies undertake wage moderation together, their output still expands, albeit to a lesser degree. If the wage moderation is accompanied by cuts in policy interest rates by the central bank—and by quantitative easing once interest rates hit the zero lower bound—then output for the entire euro area expands as well.
Mr. Eugenio M Cerutti, Jihad Dagher, and Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
The recent global crisis highlighted the risks stemming from real estate booms. This has generated a growing literature trying to better understand the sources and the risks associated with housing and credit booms. This paper complements and supplements the previous work by (i) exploiting more disaggregated data on credit allowing us to dissociate between firm-credit and household (and in some cases mortgage) credit, and (ii) by taking into account the characteristics of the mortgage market, including institutional as well as other factors that vary across countries. This detailed cross-country analysis offers new valuable insights.
Ms. Zsofia Arvai, Mr. Ananthakrishnan Prasad, and Mr. Kentaro Katayama
As undiversified commodity exporters, GCC economies are prone to pro-cyclical systemic risk in the financial system. During periods of high hydrocarbon prices, favorable economic prospects make the financial sector keen to lend, leading to higher domestic credit growth and easier access to external financing. Fiscal policy is a very important tool for macroeconomic management, but due to the significant time lags and expenditure rigidities, it has not been a flexible enough tool to prevent credit booms and the build-up of systemic risk in the GCC. This, together with limited monetary policy independence because of the pegged exchange rate, means that macro-prudential policy has a particularly important role in limiting systemic risk in the financial system. This importance is reinforced by the underdeveloped financial markets in the region that provide limited risk management tools and shortcomings in crisis resolution frameworks. This paper will discuss the importance of macro-prudential policy in the GCC countries, look at the experience with macro-prudential policies in the boom/bust cycle in the second half of the 2000s, and use the broad frameworks being developed in the Fund and elsewhere to discuss ways existing frameworks and policy toolkits in the region can be strengthened given the characteristics of the GCC economies.
Mr. Olivier J Blanchard, Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, and Mr. Paolo Mauro
This is a Chinese translation of "Rethinking Macro Policy II" (SDN/13/03). This note explores how the economic thinking about macroeconomic management has evolved since the crisis began. It discusses developments in monetary policy, including unconventional measures; the challenges associated with increased public debt; and the policy potential, risks, and institutional challenges associated with new macroprudential measures. Rationale: The note contributes to the ongoing debate on several aspects of macroeconomic policy. It follows up on the earlier “Rethinking” paper, refining the analysis in light of the events of the past two years. Given the relatively fluid state of the debate (e.g., recent challenges to central bank independence), it is useful to highlight that while many of the tenets of the pre-crisis consensus have been challenged, others (such as the desirability of central bank independence) remain valid.