You are looking at 1 - 10 of 10 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
  • Financial crises x
  • Western Hemisphere x
  • Mathematics and Science x
Clear All Modify Search
International Monetary Fund
Ensuring the integrity of data and analysis is fundamental to the Fund’s ability to deliver on its mandate. As part of the Fund’s institutional safeguards review, a Working Group on Data and Analysis Integrity (WGDAI) was established to assess the possible need for changes in processes safeguarding the integrity of data and analysis at the Fund. The IMF primarily uses data supplied by its membership to fulfil its core mandate. The IMF has initiated and progressively enhanced a number of initiatives to help members prepare official data of adequate quality. Assessing data integrity and supporting countries’ efforts to achieve high standards has required a sustained commitment on the part of the Fund.
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
The coverage of risks has become more systematic since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC): staff reports now regularly identify major risks and provide an assessment of their likelihood and economic impact, summarized in Risk Assessment Matrices (RAM). But still limited attention is paid to the range of possible outcomes. Also, risk identification is useful only so much as to inform policy design to preemptively respond to relevant risks and/or better prepare for them. In this regard, policy recommendations in surveillance could be richer in considering various risk management approaches. To this end, progress is needed on two dimensions: • Increasing emphasis on the range of potential outcomes to improve policy design. • Encouraging more proactive policy advice on how to manage risks. Efforts should continue to leverage internal and external resources to support risk analysis and advice in surveillance.
Mr. Simon Johnson and Ms. Priscilla S Muthoora
In this paper, we review the role of the political economy in inclusive growth. We find that political economy forces on the demand and supply side have weakened redistribution over time and contributed to a new wave of populism. We document growing support for a rethink of the social contract to make growth more inclusive and discuss some of its broad elements.
International Monetary Fund. Legal Dept.


This volume comprises a selection of papers prepared in connection with a high-level seminar on Law and Financial Stability held at the IMF in 2016. It examines, from a legal perspective, the progress made in implementing the financial regulatory reforms adopted since the global financial crisis and highlights the role of the IMF in advancing these reforms and charting the course for a future reform agenda, including the development of a coherent international policy framework for resolution and resolution planning. The book’s unique perspective on the role of the law in promoting financial stability comes from the contribution of selected experts and representatives from our membership who share their views on this subject.

Ms. Deniz O Igan and Thomas Lambert
In this paper, we discuss whether and how bank lobbying can lead to regulatory capture and have real consequences through an overview of the motivations behind bank lobbying and of recent empirical evidence on the subject. Overall, the findings are consistent with regulatory capture, which lessens the support for tighter rules and enforcement. This in turn allows riskier practices and worse economic outcomes. The evidence provides insights into how the rising political power of banks in the early 2000s propelled the financial system and the economy into crisis. While these findings should not be interpreted as a call for an outright ban of lobbying, they point in the direction of a need for rethinking the framework governing interactions between regulators and banks. Enhanced transparency of regulatory decisions as well as strenghtened checks and balances within the decision-making process would go in this direction.
Jihad Dagher
Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.
Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Mr. Jonathan David Ostry, and Mr. Olivier D Jeanne
We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts-"ex ante" conditionality.
Mr. Ashoka Mody and Mr. Abdul d Abiad
Despite stops, gaps, and reversals, financial reforms advanced worldwide in the last quarter century. Using a new index of financial liberalization, we conclude that influential events shook the status quo, inducing both reforms and reversals, while learning, more so than ideology and country structure, shaped and sustained widespread reforms. Among shocks, a decline in global interest rates and balance of payments crises strengthened reformers; banking crises were associated with reversals, while new governments brought about both reforms and reversals. Learning occurred domestically-initial reforms raised the likelihood of further reforms-and through observing regional reform leaders. Among structural features, greater openness to trade appears to have increased the pace of financial reform.