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International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
The coverage of risks has become more systematic since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC): staff reports now regularly identify major risks and provide an assessment of their likelihood and economic impact, summarized in Risk Assessment Matrices (RAM). But still limited attention is paid to the range of possible outcomes. Also, risk identification is useful only so much as to inform policy design to preemptively respond to relevant risks and/or better prepare for them. In this regard, policy recommendations in surveillance could be richer in considering various risk management approaches. To this end, progress is needed on two dimensions: • Increasing emphasis on the range of potential outcomes to improve policy design. • Encouraging more proactive policy advice on how to manage risks. Efforts should continue to leverage internal and external resources to support risk analysis and advice in surveillance.
International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept., International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, &, and Review Department
This paper is part of the workplan on the 15th General Review of Quotas (15th Review). The paper provides a two-pillar framework for assessing the adequacy of Fund resources, building on the staff paper discussed by the Board in March 2016. The second pillar of the framework is qualitative in nature. The paper also provides information to support a discussion on the mix of Fund resources.
International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept., International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, &, and Review Department
This paper provides background for initial considerations on the appropriate size of the Fund’s overall lending capacity over the medium term. The paper reviews developments in the demand for Fund resources during the global crisis. The paper also argues that the global economy is changing in fundamental ways, with implications for the size of the Fund. Against this background, the analysis suggests that the current overall lending capacity of the Fund should be seen as a minimum. Additional resources would be needed if the Fund were to introduce changes to its lending framework. While the financing structure of the Fund should be largely quota-based, staff sees a strong case for continuing to backstop quota resources with a standing borrowing facility. Maintaining the Fund’s current overall lending capacity would require swift action by the membership.
International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept., International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, &, and Review Department
The paper revisits the two-pillar framework for assessing the adequacy of Fund resources. Responding to Directors suggestions, the quantitative pillar is updated to include alternative assumptions and to provide a longer-term perspective on likely resource needs. While quantitative estimates are generally somewhat lower after factoring in the alternative assumptions, these reductions are more than outweighed when the analysis is extended through the middle of the next decade, recognizing that the outcome of the 15th Review will likely determine permanent Fund resources through at least the middle of the next decade. The updated qualitative pillar analysis highlights reforms since the global financial crisis and discusses uncertainties in the global environment. It also provides an assessment of the general impact of the various qualitative considerations. Taken together, the two pillars continue to make a case for at least maintaining existing Fund resources. Against this background, the simulations in the paper cover three illustrative sizes for quota increases (50, 75, and 100 percent), centered on broadly maintaining Fund resources, assuming the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) is maintained at its current level and Bilateral Borrowing Agreements (BBAs) expire.
Mr. Itai Agur
The deferred recognition of COVID-induced losses at banks in many countries has reignited the debate on regulatory forbearance. This paper presents a model where the public's own political pressure drives regulatory policy astray, because the public is poorly informed. Using probabilistic game stages, the model parameterizes how time consistent policy is. The interaction between political motivations and time consistency is novel and complex: increased policy credibility can entice the politically-motivated regulator to act in the public's best interest, or instead repel it from doing so. Considering several regulatory instruments, the paper probes the nexus of political pressure, perverse bank incentives and time inconsistent policy.
International Monetary Fund
Finance & Development, June 2020
International Monetary Fund
Finance & Development, June 2020
International Monetary Fund
Finance & Development, June 2020