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International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, and & Review Department
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, and & Review Department
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
Modern Fund surveillance needs to be more targeted, topical and timely, better interconnected and better informed. Modernizing surveillance will likely require additional resources, although estimates are highly uncertain at this stage. The paper offers a tentative costing of new proposals with significant budgetary implications. Other proposals could rely on optimizing processes, while others are underway and funded separately; the resource implications of yet others are being picked up in context of other workstreams. Estimates do not include short-term transition costs or pressures on support services and are subject to a significant degree of uncertainty. A flexible approach to implementing the new modalities, characterized by experimentation and learning-by- doing—a “sandbox” for new modalities—is proposed.
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
This note presents key results from the surveys of country authorities, IMF Executive Directors (EDs), and mission chiefs (MCs) to inform the Comprehensive Surveillance Review (CSR). Key takeaways and cross-cutting themes that emerge are Trends, Policy Challenges, Surveillance Priorities, Surveillance modalities and Traction.
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, &, and Review Department

The paper undertakes a triage of backlog of open actions in Management Implementation Plans responding to recommendations by the Independent Evaluation office.

International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department

Abstract

The October 2019 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) identifies the current key vulnerabilities in the global financial system as the rise in corporate debt burdens, increasing holdings of riskier and more illiquid assets by institutional investors, and growing reliance on external borrowing by emerging and frontier market economies. The report proposes that policymakers mitigate these risks through stricter supervisory and macroprudential oversight of firms, strengthened oversight and disclosure for institutional investors, and the implementation of prudent sovereign debt management practices and frameworks for emerging and frontier market economies.

Eric Monnet and Mr. Damien Puy
Why did monetary authorities hold large gold reserves under Bretton Woods (1944–1971) when only the US had to? We argue that gold holdings were driven by institutional memory and persistent habits of central bankers. Countries continued to back currency in circulation with gold reserves, following rules of the pre-WWII gold standard. The longer an institution spent in the gold standard (and the older the policymakers), the stronger the correlation between gold reserves and currency. Since dollars and gold were not perfect substitutes, the Bretton Woods system never worked as expected. Even after radical institutional change, history still shapes the decisions of policymakers.