Allan Dizioli, Daniel Rivera Greenwood, and Aneta Radzikowski
This paper introduces a simple, frequently and easily updated, close to the data epidemiological model that has been used for near-term forecast and policy analysis. We provide several practical examples of how the model has been used. We explain the epidemic development in the UK, the USA and Brazil through the model lens. Moreover, we show how our model would have predicted that a super infectious variant, such as the delta, would spread and argue that current vaccination levels in many countries are not enough to curb other waves of infections in the future. Finally, we briefly discuss the importance of how to model re-infections in epidemiological models.
Mr. Dmitry Gershenson, Frederic Lambert, Luis Herrera, Grey Ramos, Mrs. Marina V Rousset, and Jose Torres
Despite some improvement since 2011, Latin America and the Caribbean continue to lag behind other regions in terms of financial inclusion. There is no clear evidence that fintech developments have supported greater financial inclusion in LAC, contrary to what has been observed elsewhere in the world. Case studies by national policy experts suggest that barriers to entry in the financial sector, along with a constraining regulatory environment, may have hindered a faster adoption of fintech. However, fintech development seems to have accelerated in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and with the support of recent policy initiatives.
Classical theories of monetary economics predict that real stock returns are negatively correlated with inflation when monetary policy is countercyclical. Previous empirical studies mostly focus on a small group of developed countries or a few countries with hyperinflation. In this paper, I examine the stock return-inflation relation under different monetary policy regimes and conditions using an expanded dataset of 71 economies. Empirical evidence suggests that the stock return-inflation relation is partially driven by monetary policy. If a country’s monetary authority conducts a more countercyclical monetary policy, the stock return-inflation relation becomes more negative. In addition, the results differ by monetary policy framework. In exchange rate anchor countries, stock markets do not respond to monetary policy cyclicality. In inflation targeting countries, stock markets react more strongly to inflation. A key contribution of this paper is to classify inflation targeters by their behaviors, and illustrate that behavior matters in shaping market perceptions: markets react to inflation and monetary policy cyclicality when central banks are able to control inflation within their target bands. In this case markets are sensitive to inflation dynamics when inflation is above the announced target bands. Finally, when monetary policy is constrained by the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB), a structural break is introduced and real stock returns no longer respond to inflation and monetary policy cyclicality.
Mr. Adolfo Barajas, Woon Gyu Choi, Ken Zhi Gan, Pierre Guérin, Samuel Mann, Manchun Wang, and Yizhi Xu
After a steady increase following the global financial crisis, private nonfinancial sector leverage rose further during the COVID-19 on the back of easy financial conditions induced by unprecedented policy support. We investigate the empirical relationships between increased leverage, financial conditions, and macro-financial stability in a sample of major advanced and emerging market economies. We find that loose financial conditions contribute to leverage buildups and generate an intertemporal tradeoff: financial stability risk is lessened in the near term but exacerbated in the medium term. The tradeoff is amplified during credit booms, when debt service burdens are particularly high, or when the share of foreign currency debt is high in emerging markets. Selected macroprudential tools can arrest leverage buildups and mitigate the tradeoff.
Policymakers across countries have been seeking to strengthen the institutional framework to control fiscal costs and feedback effects to the real economy generated by bank failures. On a cross-section of countries, we find evidence that suggests that bank supervisors’ intervention in bank failures may be positively associated with some aspects of the administrative and regulatory framework. Our results appear to hold also during times of financial instability. Finally, we find some evidence that the same institutional features may be associated with lower fiscal outlays during banking crises.
Oya Celasun, Jungjin Lee, Mr. Mico Mrkaic, and Mr. Allan Timmermann
This paper examines the performance of World Economic Outlook (WEO) growth forecasts for 2004-17. Short-term real GDP growth forecasts over that period exhibit little bias, and their accuracy is broadly similar to those of Consensus Economics forecasts. By contrast, two- to five-year ahead WEO growth forecasts in 2004-17 tend to be upward biased, and in up to half of countries less accurate than a naïve forecast given by the average growth rate in the recent past. The analysis suggests that a more efficient use of available information on internal and external factors—such as the estimated output gap, projected terms of trade, and the growth forecasts of major trading partners—can improve the accuracy of some economies’ growth forecasts.
This paper reviews the approaches to systemic risk analysis in 32 central bank financial stability reports (FSRs). We compare and contrast the systemic risk analysis in FSRs with the IMF Article IV staff reports, noting that Article IV staff reports and FSRs frequently pick up analytical content from each other. All reviewed FSRs include a systemic risk assessment, which has not always been the case in Article IV staff reports. Also, compared to Article IV staff reports, on average, FSRs tend to cover a wider range of financial risks and vulnerabilities and tend to have more extensive discussions of the policy mix to mitigate systemic risk. In these assessments, FSRs utilize sophisticated analytical tools, such as stress tests and growth-at-risk, more frequently than Article IV staff reports. We emphasize that a central bank FSR typically presents a rich resource that IMF country teams can leverage, as already done by some, in forming their independent view about systemic risk.