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You are looking at 1 - 10 of 121 items for :

  • Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies x
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Cover IMF Working Papers
Deconstructing ESG Scores: How to Invest with your own Criteria?
Torsten Ehlers, Ulrike Elsenhuber, Kumar Jegarasasingam, and Eric Jondeau
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) scores are a key tool for asset managers in designing and implementing ESG investment strategies. They, however, amalgamate a broad range of fundamentally different factors, creating ambiguity for investors as to the underlying drivers of higher or lower ESG scores. We explore the feasibility and performance of more targeted investment strategies based on specific ESG categories, by deconstructing ESG scores into their granular components. First, we investigate the characteristics of the various categories underlying ESG scores. Not all types of ESG categories lend themselves to more focused strategies, which is related to both limits to ESG data disclosure and the fundamental challenge of translating qualitative characteristics into quantitative measures. Second, we consider an investment scheme based on the exclusion of firms with the lowest scores in a given category of interest. In most cases, this strategy allows investors to substantially improve the ESG category score, with a marginal impact on financial performance relative to a broad stock market benchmark. The exclusion results in regional and sectoral biases relative to the benchmark, which may be undesirable for some investors.We then implement a “best-in-class” strategy by excluding firms with the lowest category scores and reinvesting the proceeds in firms with the highest scores, maintaining the same regional and sectoral composition. This approach reduces the tracking error of the portfolio and slightly improves its risk-adjusted performance, while still yielding a large gain in the targeted ESG category score.
Keywords:
Sustainable investment; ESG ratings; ESG investing; Negative screening; Best-in-class screening; ESG score; ESG category; headline ESG; ESG data disclosure; Corporate social responsibility; Greenhouse gas emissions; Labor force; North America; Global; Europe
Cover Policy Papers
Applications To Become Holders of SDRS
International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept. and International Monetary Fund. Legal Dept.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved on February 8, 2023 the applications of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the Development Bank of Latin America (known as Corporacion Andina de Fomento or CAF), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) to become prescribed holders of Special Drawings Rights (SDRs). The SDR is an international reserve asset created by the IMF to supplement the reserves of IMF members that participate in the SDR Department. The IMF’s Articles of Agreement authorize the IMF to prescribe (i.e., approve) as holders of SDRs (i) non-members, (ii) members that are not participants in the SDR Department; (iii) institutions that perform functions of a central bank for one or more IMF member countries, and (iv) other official entities (which all five entities approved on February 8 are). Prescribed holders may acquire, hold and use SDRs in transactions by agreement and in operations. Approval of these five institutions brings the number of prescribed holders to twenty.

Keywords:
SDR channeling option; terms and conditions; Fund member; Reserve assets; Investment banking; Caribbean
Cover Policy Papers
Applications To Become Holders of SDRS
International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept. and International Monetary Fund. Legal Dept.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved on February 8, 2023 the applications of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the Development Bank of Latin America (known as Corporacion Andina de Fomento or CAF), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) to become prescribed holders of Special Drawings Rights (SDRs). The SDR is an international reserve asset created by the IMF to supplement the reserves of IMF members that participate in the SDR Department. The IMF’s Articles of Agreement authorize the IMF to prescribe (i.e., approve) as holders of SDRs (i) non-members, (ii) members that are not participants in the SDR Department; (iii) institutions that perform functions of a central bank for one or more IMF member countries, and (iv) other official entities (which all five entities approved on February 8 are). Prescribed holders may acquire, hold and use SDRs in transactions by agreement and in operations. Approval of these five institutions brings the number of prescribed holders to twenty.
Keywords:
transparency policy; IMF decision; members channeling SDRS; SDR market; SDRS channeling; Reserve assets; Multilateral development institutions; Investment banking; Operational risk; Freely usable currencies; Caribbean; West Africa
Cover IMF Working Papers
Front Matter
Mr. Kosha Modi, Mr. Nicola Pierri, Mr. Yannick Timmer, and Mr. Maria Soledad Martinez Peria
Keywords:
Financial inclusion; Investment banking
Cover IMF Working Papers
Quantitative Easing and Credit Rating Agencies
Nordine Abidi, Matteo Falagiarda, and Ixart Miquel-Flores
This paper investigates the behaviour of credit rating agencies using a natural experiment in monetary policy. We exploit the corporate QE of the Eurosystem and its rating-based specific design which generates exogenous variation in the probability for a bond of becoming eligible for outright purchases. We show that after the launch of the policy, rating activity was concentrated precisely on the territory where the incentives of market participants are expected to be more sensitive to the policy design. Our findings contribute to better assessing the consequences of the explicit reliance on CRAs ratings by central banks when designing monetary policy. They also support the Covid-19 monetary stimulus, and in particular the waiver of private credit rating eligibility requirements applied to recently downgraded issuers.
Keywords:
Credit Rating Agencies; Monetary Policy; Quantitative Easing; eligibility requirement; rating activity; behaviour of credit rating agencies; rating Agency Disclaimer; eligibility frontier; Bonds; Bond ratings; Corporate bonds; Credit ratings; Unconventional monetary policies; Global; Middle East and Central Asia