Sovereign debt crises coincide with deep recessions. I propose a model of sovereign debt that rationalizes large contractions in economic activity via an aggregate-demand amplification mechanism. The mechanism also sheds new light on the response of consumption to sovereign risk, which I document in the context of the Eurozone crisis. By explicitly separating the decisions of households and the government, I examine the interaction between sovereign risk and precautionary savings. When a default is likely, households anticipate its negative consequences and cut consumption for self-insurance reasons. Such shortages in aggregate spending worsen economic conditions through nominal wage rigidities and boost default incentives, restarting the vicious cycle. I calibrate the model to Spain in the 2000s and find that about half of the output contraction is caused by default risk. More generally, sovereign risk exacerbates volatility in consumption over time and across agents, creating large and unequal welfare costs even if default does not materialize.
Ms. Deniz O Igan, Hala Moussawi, Alexander F. Tieman, Ms. Aleksandra Zdzienicka, Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, and Mr. Paolo Mauro
We track direct public interventions and public holdings in 1,114 financial institutions over the period 2007–17 in 37 countries based on publicly available information. We use aggregate official data to validate this new dataset and estimate the fiscal impact of interventions, including the value of asset holdings remaining in state hands at end-2017. Direct public support to financial institutions amounted to $1.6 trillion ($3.5 trillion including guarantees), with larger amounts allocated to lower capitalized and less profitable banks. As of end-2017, only a few countries had fully divested the initial support they provided during the crisis. Public holdings were divested faster in better capitalized, more profitable, and more liquid banks, and in countries where the economy recovered faster. In countries where the government stake remained high relative to the initial intervention, private investment and credit growth were slower, financial access, depth, efficiency, and competition were worse, and financial stability improved less.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This article is an overview of existing deposit insurance in the European Union. There are various national deposit schemes that form the source of insurance. The schemes come up with various coverage, contributions, and fund sizes. The recent financial crisis has brought about a change in the coverage system. The main intention of this insurance is to enhance financial stability. The role of this insurance varies both within the EU and worldwide. This insurance is important to sustain financial integration and internal functioning.
Mr. Claus Puhr, Mr. Andre O Santos, Mr. Christian Schmieder, Salih N. Neftci, Mr. Benjamin Neudorfer, Mr. Stefan W. Schmitz, and Mr. Heiko Hesse
A framework to run system-wide, balance sheet data-based liquidity stress tests is presented. The liquidity framework includes three elements: (a) a module to simulate the impact of bank run scenarios; (b) a module to assess risks arising from maturity transformation and rollover risks, implemented either in a simplified manner or as a fully-fledged cash flow-based approach; and (c) a framework to link liquidity and solvency risks. The framework also allows the simulation of how banks cope with upcoming regulatory changes (Basel III), and accommodates differences in data availability. A case study shows the impact of a "Lehman" type event for stylized banks.
We use the rise and dispersion of sovereign spreads to tell the story of the emergence and escalation of financial tensions within the eurozone. This process evolved through three stages. Following the onset of the Subprime crisis in July 2007, spreads rose but mainly due to common global factors. The rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008 marked the start of a distinctively European banking crisis. During this key phase, sovereign spreads tended to rise with the growing demand for support by weakening domestic financial sectors, especially in countries with lower growth prospects and higher debt burdens. As the constraint of continued fiscal commitments became clearer, and coinciding with the nationalization of Anglo Irish in January 2009, the separation between the sovereign and the financial sector disappeared.
This paper investigates the degree of bank competition in the euro area, the U.S. and U.K. before and after the recent financial crisis, and revisits the issue whether the introduction of EMU and the euro have had any impact on bank competition. The results suggest that the level of bank competition converged across euro area countries in the wake of the EMU. The recent global financial crisis led to a fall in competition in several countries and especially where large credit and housing booms had preceded the crisis..
While the use of public resources is critical to cushion the impact of the financial crisis on the euro-area economy, it is key that the entailed fiscal costs not be seen by markets as undermining fiscal sustainability. From this perspective, to what extent do movements in euro area sovereign spreads reflect country-specific solvency concerns? In line with previous studies, the paper suggests that euro area sovereign risk premium differentials tend to comove over time and are mainly driven by a common time-varying factor, mimicking global risk repricing. Since October 2008, however, there is evidence that markets have become progressively more concerned about the potential fiscal implications of national financial sectors' frailty and future debt dynamics. The liquidity of sovereign bond markets still seems to play a significant (albeit fairly limited) role in explaining changes in euro area spreads.
This report is focused on the impact of the financial crisis on the Austrian economy and the financial sector, the authorities’ policy responses, and macrofinancial linkages and spillovers. The financial sector has been expanding rapidly, mostly outside Austria. This has brought substantial benefits, but also increased risks and vulnerabilities. Maintaining financial stability will be essential for ensuring macroeconomic stability, fiscal sustainability, and a return to growth, while also having important spillovers to regional financial stability. Austria traditionally benefits from a low unemployment rate compared with the euro area.
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.
This 2002 Article IV Consultation highlights that after decelerating sharply in 2001, economic growth in Austria is projected to strengthen gradually during 2002, parallel to the expected improvement in the global economic climate. Real GDP growth is projected to average 1 percent in 2002, supported by a recovery in investor confidence and strong competitiveness. Despite the recent increase, the unemployment rate remains one of the lowest in Europe at about 4 percent. The government intends to stick to its fiscal adjustment plan in 2002.