Browse

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 98 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
  • International Lending and Debt Problems x
  • Investments: Bonds x
Clear All Modify Search
International Monetary Fund. Statistics Dept.
At the request of the Central Bank of Uruguay (BCU), and with the support of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Western Hemisphere Department (WHD), a monetary and financial statistics (MFS) technical assistance (TA) mission from the IMF’s Statistics Department (STA) visited Montevideo during February 3-14, 2020. The main objectives of the mission were to: (i) review available source data for other financial corporations (OFC); in particular, insurance corporations (IC), pension funds (PF), and credit administration companies (CAC); and (ii) compile standardized monetary statistics for OFC (report form SRF 4SR) in line with the 2016 Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide (MFSMCG). The officials met during the mission are listed in Appendix I.
International Monetary Fund. Statistics Dept.
At the request of the Central Bank of Uruguay (BCU), and with the support of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Western Hemisphere Department (WHD), a monetary and financial statistics (MFS) technical assistance (TA) mission from the IMF’s Statistics Department (STA) visited Montevideo during February 3-14, 2020. The main objectives of the mission were to: (i) review available source data for other financial corporations (OFC); in particular, insurance corporations (IC), pension funds (PF), and credit administration companies (CAC); and (ii) compile standardized monetary statistics for OFC (report form SRF 4SR) in line with the 2016 Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide (MFSMCG). The officials met during the mission are listed in Appendix I.
Mr. Francisco Roch and Francisco Roldán
We analyze how concerns for model misspecification on the part of international lenders affect the desirability of issuing state-contingent debt instruments in a standard sovereign default model à la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). We show that for the commonly used threshold state-contingent bond structure (e.g., the GDP-linked bond issued by Argentina in 2005), the model with robustness generates ambiguity premia in bond spreads that can explain most of what the literature has labeled as novelty premium. While the government would be better off with this bond when facing rational expectations lenders, this additional source of premia leads to welfare losses when facing robust lenders. Finally, we characterize the optimal design of the state-contingent bond and show how it varies with the level of robustness. Our findings rationalize the little use of these instruments in practice and shed light on their optimal design.
Charles Cohen, S. M. Ali Abbas, Myrvin Anthony, Tom Best, Mr. Peter Breuer, Hui Miao, Ms. Alla Myrvoda, and Eriko Togo
The COVID-19 crisis may lead to a series of costly and inefficient sovereign debt restructurings. Any such restructurings will likely take place during a period of great economic uncertainty, which may lead to protracted negotiations between creditors and debtors over recovery values, and potentially even relapses into default post-restructuring. State-contingent debt instruments (SCDIs) could play an important role in improving the outcomes of these restructurings.