A mechanism is proposed that aims to reduce the risk of a banking sector liquidity crisis—which is a quintessentially systemic event and thus the object of macroprudential policy—and moderate the effects of a crisis should one occur. The instrument would give banks more incentive to build up buffers of systemically liquid assets as a proportion of their total liabilities, yet these buffers would be usable in times of stress. The modalities of the instrument are considered with a view to making it effective, efficient, and robust.
Mrs. Poonam Gupta, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ms. Enrica Detragiache
Using aggregate and bank level data for several countries, the paper studies what happens to the banking system in the aftermath of a banking crisis. Contemporary crises are not accompanied by declines in aggregate bank deposits, and credit does not fall relative to output, although the growth of both deposits and credit slows down substantially. Output recovery begins in the second year after the crisis and is not led by a resumption in credit growth. Banks, including the stronger ones, reallocate their asset portfolio away from loans.