A well-designed regional tax treaty to which developing countries are signatories will include provisions securing minimum withholding taxes on investment income and technical service fees, a taxing right in respect of capital gains from indirect offshore transfers, and guarding against-treaty shopping. A tax treaty policy framework–national or regional–that specifies the main policy outcomes to be achieved before negotiations commence would enable developing countries with more limited expertise and lower capacity for tax treaty negotiations to avoid concluding problematic tax treaties. This note provides guidance for members of regional economic communities in the developing world on what should and should not be included in a regional tax treaty and how to design on a common tax treaty policy framework for use in negotiations of bilateral tax treaties with nonmembers.
This guidance note describes how to use the Excel-based template developed by the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) of the IMF accompanying the note “How to Design a Fiscal Strategy in a Resource-Rich Country.” This template uses data inputs to generate simulations of fiscal policy dynamics. It helps IMF teams and country authorities in RRCs analyze trade-offs associated with alternative fiscal strategies for the use of public resource wealth. Visualizing these trade-offs and assessing their sensitivity to underlying macroeconomic assumptions can help inform policymakers on the most appropriate fiscal strategy, given country-specific circumstances.
This How to Note provides operational guidance for policymakers and IMF staff teams on designing—or revising—a fiscal strategy in resource-rich countries (RRC). Properly managed, resource revenue can support fiscal sustainability and development and equity objectives. Resource revenues also create significant stabilization challenges for fiscal policy because of their size, uncertainty, volatility, and finite nature. The guidance in this note is intended to be general and applicable to RRCs with a range of income levels, resource endowments, and macroeconomic contexts. It is designed primarily to help policymakers analyze the trade-offs associated with alternative fiscal paths and select the right fiscal strategy, given country-specific circumstances.
Well-developed cash management aims to improve government operational efficiency and facilitates better service delivery by ensuring liquidity to meet payment obligations as they fall due. Liquidity, however, comes at a cost. Governments can reduce the cost of maintaining liquidity by proactively managing their cash balance at an appropriate level and prudently investing any excess liquidity. This note discusses the policy framework and processes that governments should put in place to identify, guide, and govern the investment of their surplus cash resources.
Maintaining a cash buffer has emerged as a risk management tool for government cash and debt management. During budget execution, there is considerable cash flow volatility and timing mismatches concerning revenue collections and expenditures, debt inflows, and debt service. Cash balance management aims to address these mismatches and to ensure availability of liquidity in government bank accounts. From a debt management perspective, holding an appropriate level of cash balance serves to mitigate funding risk. Effective cash balance management is even more critical when there is heightened uncertainty about the magnitude and timing of cash flows, as seen during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. This note discusses the role of the cash buffer for managing cash balances and offers practical approaches to developing a policy framework, considering the risk mitigation objectives and the cost of carry.
Luc Eyraud, Andrew Hodge, Mr. John Ralyea, and Julien Reynaud
This note discusses how to design subnational fiscal
rules, including how to select them and calibrate
them. It expands on the guidance provided at the
national level on rule selection and calibration in IMF
(2018a) and IMF (2018b). Thinking on subnational
fiscal rules is still evolving, including their effectiveness
(for example, Heinemann, Moessinger, and Yeter 2018;
Kotia and Lledó 2016; Foremny 2014), and this note
only provides a first analysis based on international
experiences and the technical assistance provided by
the IMF. Main findings are summarized in Box 1.
The note is divided into five sections. The first
section defines fiscal rules. The second section discusses
the rationale for subnational rules. The third section
provides some guidance on how to select the appropriate
rule(s) and whether they should differ across
individual jurisdictions. The fourth section explores
the issue of flexibility by looking at how rules should
adjust to shocks. Finally, the last section focuses on the
“calibration” of the rules.