Browse
Abstract
The war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia are exacerbating the divergence in recovery prospects for the Middle East and Central Asia (ME&CA). Despite better-than-expected upside momentum in 2021, the economic environment in 2022 is defined by extraordinary headwinds and uncertainties, particularly for commodity importers, with higher and more volatile commodity prices, rising inflationary pressures, faster-than-expected monetary policy normalization in advanced economies, and a lingering pandemic. Prospects for oil exporters in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have improved, while countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) region face a particularly challenging outlook given their linkages to Russia and Ukraine. Downside risks dominate the outlook and include a prolonged war and further sanctions on Russia, tighter-than-expected global financial conditions, possible deanchoring of inflation expectations, a sharper slowdown in China, and new pandemic outbreaks. Policymaking has become increasingly complex, with dwindling macro policy space to deal with these extraordinary shocks, amid high debt and inflation. Given divergent outlooks, policies will need to be calibrated carefully to country circumstances to manage uncertainties, maintain macroeconomic stability, and support the recovery while protecting the most vulnerable and ensuring food and energy security. Structural reforms have become even more urgent to prevent scarring from the pandemic and the war, and ensure a private sector-led and inclusive recovery, including by embracing digitalization and investing in a greener future.
Abstract
The war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia are exacerbating the divergence in recovery prospects for the Middle East and Central Asia (ME&CA). Despite better-than-expected upside momentum in 2021, the economic environment in 2022 is defined by extraordinary headwinds and uncertainties, particularly for commodity importers, with higher and more volatile commodity prices, rising inflationary pressures, faster-than-expected monetary policy normalization in advanced economies, and a lingering pandemic. Prospects for oil exporters in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have improved, while countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) region face a particularly challenging outlook given their linkages to Russia and Ukraine. Downside risks dominate the outlook and include a prolonged war and further sanctions on Russia, tighter-than-expected global financial conditions, possible deanchoring of inflation expectations, a sharper slowdown in China, and new pandemic outbreaks. Policymaking has become increasingly complex, with dwindling macro policy space to deal with these extraordinary shocks, amid high debt and inflation. Given divergent outlooks, policies will need to be calibrated carefully to country circumstances to manage uncertainties, maintain macroeconomic stability, and support the recovery while protecting the most vulnerable and ensuring food and energy security. Structural reforms have become even more urgent to prevent scarring from the pandemic and the war, and ensure a private sector-led and inclusive recovery, including by embracing digitalization and investing in a greener future.
Abstract
The war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia are exacerbating the divergence in recovery prospects for the Middle East and Central Asia (ME&CA). Despite better-than-expected upside momentum in 2021, the economic environment in 2022 is defined by extraordinary headwinds and uncertainties, particularly for commodity importers, with higher and more volatile commodity prices, rising inflationary pressures, faster-than-expected monetary policy normalization in advanced economies, and a lingering pandemic. Prospects for oil exporters in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have improved, while countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) region face a particularly challenging outlook given their linkages to Russia and Ukraine. Downside risks dominate the outlook and include a prolonged war and further sanctions on Russia, tighter-than-expected global financial conditions, possible deanchoring of inflation expectations, a sharper slowdown in China, and new pandemic outbreaks. Policymaking has become increasingly complex, with dwindling macro policy space to deal with these extraordinary shocks, amid high debt and inflation. Given divergent outlooks, policies will need to be calibrated carefully to country circumstances to manage uncertainties, maintain macroeconomic stability, and support the recovery while protecting the most vulnerable and ensuring food and energy security. Structural reforms have become even more urgent to prevent scarring from the pandemic and the war, and ensure a private sector-led and inclusive recovery, including by embracing digitalization and investing in a greener future.
Abstract
The war in Ukraine is casting a pall on Europe and its economy. Millions of innocent civilians have been displaced and thousands wounded or killed. For Europe’s economy, it has struck at a time when private consumption and investment are still below pre-pandemic trends, and the pandemic itself continues to weigh on activity. Large increases in commodity prices and continued supply-side disruptions are now pushing inflation to higher levels, cutting into household incomes and firm profits. New risks loom from escalating fighting and disruptions to critical energy flows. The main challenges for Europe’s policymakers are clear: caring for the refugees; helping vulnerable households and firms cope with higher spending on energy; beefing up energy security; and, together with social partners, ensuring that wage and price expectations remain well anchored.
Abstract
Just as uncertainty associated with COVID-19 pandemic was abating, Russia invaded Ukraine. Uncertainty endured, shifting from pandemic to war, affecting all countries but in different ways. Above-target inflation rates and inflation surprises have helped reducing debt-to-GDP ratios but such relief is often temporary. High uncertainty and marked divergences across countries require a tailored and agile fiscal policy response that is ready to adjust as the outlook becomes clearer. Fiscal policy will need to shift focus away from the exceptional pandemic-related measures as central banks increase interest rates to fight inflation. Emerging and developing economies that are net importers of energy and food will be hit the hardest by surging international prices. Many of these countries already experience scarring from the pandemic and have little fiscal space to tackle new spending pressures. Government should focus on those most affected by the crisis and priority areas. Ensuring greater resilience through investment in health, food, and energy security from cleaner sources has become even more urgent. Global cooperation to achieve these objectives is more important now than ever. As countries strive to promote an inclusive and green recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic—and formulate responses to the immediate impacts of increased energy prices—they face shared challenges to secure tax revenues, address inequalities, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. National tax policies are under pressure to deal with cross-border spillovers—one country’s action affects other countries. Chapter 2 discusses how international coordination on tax matters (i) reduces profit shifting by multinationals and tax competition between countries; (ii) improves tax enforcement by lifting the veil of secrecy to tackle tax evasion; and (iii) limits global warming. The current energy crisis reinforces the case for coordination among major emitters to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, urging countries to not allow near-term responses to detract efforts to establish credible policies for emissions reductions in the medium term.
Abstract
Fintech can increase efficiency and competition and broaden access to financial services. However, the fast growth of fintech firms into risky business segments—and their inadequate regulation and interconnectedness with the traditional financial system—can have financial stability implications. This chapter explores three key types of fintech to illustrate these risks: digital banks (“neobanks”), long-established fintech firms in the US mortgage market, and decentralized finance (“DeFi”). The chapter argues that policies targeting fintech and traditional financial firms proportionally are needed. In the case of DeFi, regulations should focus on the elements of the crypto ecosystem that enable it, such as stablecoin issuers and centralized exchanges.
Abstract
Fintech can increase efficiency and competition and broaden access to financial services. However, the fast growth of fintech firms into risky business segments—and their inadequate regulation and interconnectedness with the traditional financial system—can have financial stability implications. This chapter explores three key types of fintech to illustrate these risks: digital banks (“neobanks”), long-established fintech firms in the US mortgage market, and decentralized finance (“DeFi”). The chapter argues that policies targeting fintech and traditional financial firms proportionally are needed. In the case of DeFi, regulations should focus on the elements of the crypto ecosystem that enable it, such as stablecoin issuers and centralized exchanges.
Abstract
Chapter 1 looks at the implications of the war in Ukraine on the financial system. Commodity prices pose challenging trade-offs for central banks. Many emerging and frontier markets are facing especially difficult conditions. In China, financial vulnerabilities remain elevated amid ongoing stress in the property sector and new COVID-19 outbreaks. Central banks should act decisively to prevent inflation from becoming entrenched without jeopardizing the recovery. Policymakers will need to confront the structural issues brought to the fore by the war, including the trade-off between energy security and climate transition. Chapter 2 discusses the sovereign-bank nexus in emerging markets. Bank holdings of domestic sovereign bonds have surged in emerging markets during the pandemic. With public debt at historically high levels and the sovereign credit outlook deteriorating, there is a risk of a negative feedback loop that could threaten macro-financial stability. Chapter 3 examines the challenges to financial stability posed by the rapid rise of risky business segments in fintech. Policies that target both fintech firms and incumbent banks proportionately are needed.
Abstract
Fintech can increase efficiency and competition and broaden access to financial services. However, the fast growth of fintech firms into risky business segments—and their inadequate regulation and interconnectedness with the traditional financial system—can have financial stability implications. This chapter explores three key types of fintech to illustrate these risks: digital banks (“neobanks”), long-established fintech firms in the US mortgage market, and decentralized finance (“DeFi”). The chapter argues that policies targeting fintech and traditional financial firms proportionally are needed. In the case of DeFi, regulations should focus on the elements of the crypto ecosystem that enable it, such as stablecoin issuers and centralized exchanges.
Abstract
Fintech can increase efficiency and competition and broaden access to financial services. However, the fast growth of fintech firms into risky business segments—and their inadequate regulation and interconnectedness with the traditional financial system—can have financial stability implications. This chapter explores three key types of fintech to illustrate these risks: digital banks (“neobanks”), long-established fintech firms in the US mortgage market, and decentralized finance (“DeFi”). The chapter argues that policies targeting fintech and traditional financial firms proportionally are needed. In the case of DeFi, regulations should focus on the elements of the crypto ecosystem that enable it, such as stablecoin issuers and centralized exchanges.