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International Monetary Fund
International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept.

IMF Country Report No. 23/122

David Amaglobeli
,
Mengfei Gu
,
Emine Hanedar
,
Mr. Gee Hee Hong
, and
Celine Thevenot
International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept.
Panama was hit hard by the covid-19 pandemic, but the recovery has been strong. GDP expanded by 15.3 percent in 2021 and a projected 9 percent in 2022. Inflation is low compared with other countries, in part the result of temporary subsidies on fuel and food. The fiscal deficit declined from 10½ percent of GDP in 2020 to 4 percent of GDP in 2022 and central government gross debt is estimated at 60 percent of GDP at end-2022. Banks are, on average, well capitalized and liquid. As insurance against external shocks, the IMF Executive Board approved a two-year Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) arrangement for 500 percent of quota, equivalent to US$2.7 billion (SDR 1.884 billion), on January 19, 2021.
Ms. Laura Valderrama
Housing market developments are in the spotlight in Europe. Over-stretched valuations amid tightening financial conditions and a cost-of-living crisis have increased risks of a sustained downturn and exposed challenging trade-offs for macroprudential policy between ensuring financial system resilience and smoothing the macro-financial cycle. Against this backdrop, this paper provides detailed considerations regarding how to (re)set macroprudential policy tools in response to housing-related systemic risk in Europe, providing design solutions to avoid unintended consequences during a tightening phase, and navigating the trade-offs between managing the build-up of vulnerabilities and the macro-financial cycle in a downturn. It also proposes a novel framework to measure the effectiveness of tools and avoid overlaps by quantifying the risks addressed by different macroprudential instruments. Finally, it introduces a taxonomy allowing to assess a country’s macroprudential stance and whether adjustments to current policy settings are warranted—such as the relaxation of capital-based tools and possibly some borrower-based measures in the event of a more severe downturn.
Hector Perez-Saiz
,
Ms. Longmei Zhang
, and
Roshan Iyer
While the global usage of currencies other than the U.S. dollar and the euro for cross-border payments remains limited, rapid technological (e.g. digital money) or geopolitical changes could accelerate a regime shift into a multipolar or more fragmented international monetary system. Using the rich Swift database of cross-border payments, we empirically estimate the importance of legal tender status, geopolitical distance, and other variables vis-Ă -vis the large inertia effects for currency usage, and perform several forecasting simulations to better understand the role of these variables in shaping the future payments landscape. While our results suggest a substantially more fragmented international monetary system would be unlikely in the short and medium term, the impact of new technologies remains highly uncertain, and much more rapid geopolitical developments than expected could accelerate the transformation of the international monetary system towards multipolarity.
Marijn A. Bolhuis
,
Mr. Jiaqian Chen
, and
Benjamin R Kett
We construct a new database which covers production and trade in 136 primary commodities and 24 manufacturing and service sectors for 145 countries. Using this new more granular data, we estimate spillover effects from plausible trade fragmentation scenarios in a new multi-country, multi-sector, general-equilibrium model that accounts for unique demand and supply characteristics of commodities. The results show fragmentation-induced output losses can be sizable, especially for Low-Income-Countries, although the magnitudes vary according to the particular scenarios and modelling assumptions. Our work demonstrates that not accounting for granular commodity production and trade linkages leads to underestimation of the output losses associated with trade fragmentation.
Ms. Laura Valderrama
,
Patrik Gorse
,
Ms. Marina Marinkov
, and
Petia Topalova
European housing markets are at a turning point as the cost-of-living crisis has eroded real incomes and the surge in interest rates has made borrowers more vulnerable to financial distress. This paper aims to (i) shed light on the risks in European housing markets, (ii) quantify household vulnerabilties, (iii) assess banking sector implications and (iv) examine policies’ effectiveness using simulations based on microdata from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) and EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC). Under the baseline IMF macroeconomic forecast, the share of households that could struggle to meet basic expenses could rise by 10 pps reaching a third of all households by end 2023. Under an adverse scenario, 45 percent of households could be financially stretched, representing over 40 percent of mortgage debt and 45 percent of consumer debt. The impact on the banking sector seems contained under the baseline forecast, though there are pockets of vulnerability. A 20 percent house price correction could deplete CET1 capital by 100-300 basis points. Fiscal measures, such as subsidies to the bottom income tercile, could save 7 percent of households from financial distress at an estimated cost of 0.8 percent of GDP.