This paper presents Selected Decisions and Selected Documents’ Third Issue of the IMF. Dealings in paper money and coins are deemed to be ‘other exchange transactions’ within the meaning of Article IV, Section 3, whether or not the importation and exportation of such money and coins to and from the country of origin are subject to restrictions. The IMF does not object to exchange rates which are within 2 percent of parity for spot exchange transactions between a member's currency and the currencies of other members taking place within the member's territories, whenever such rates result from the maintenance of margins of no more than 1 percent from parity for a convertible, including externally convertible, currency. The Executive Directors interpret the Articles of Agreement to mean that steps which are necessary to protect a member from unemployment of a chronic or persistent character, arising from pressure on its balance of payments, are among the measures necessary to correct a fundamental disequilibrium; and that in each instance in which a member proposes a change in the par value of its currency to correct a fundamental disequilibrium the IMF will be required to determine, in the light of all relevant circumstances, whether in its opinion the proposed change is necessary to correct the fundamental disequilibrium.
This paper analyses several IMF’s selected decisions of the Executive Board and selected documents. Each member shall furnish to the IMF the data necessary to determine its net official holdings of gold and United States dollars. The usability of gold or dollars for the payment of the gold subscription is not necessary to constitute “holdings.” It has been decided to recommend to the Board of Governors, where a member presents, for reasons which it shall submit to the IMF, that its reserves should not be reduced by an immediate 25 percent gold payment, that such member shall be permitted in accordance with an appropriate resolution to have its quota increased in five annual installments, with the right to accelerate the payment of such installments. In June 1947, the IMF issued a statement recommending to its members that they take effective action to prevent external transactions in gold at premium prices, because such transactions tend to undermine exchange stability and to impair monetary reserves.
This paper explains various selected decisions of the IMF’s Executive Directors. The IMF has examined certain problems relating to the adjustment of its holdings of fluctuating currencies and to transactions and computations involving such currencies and has come to several conclusions. The IMF does not intend to apply the rules set forth in in the section II to its holdings of members' currencies having fluctuating rates when there is no practical interest for the IMF or members to do so. Whenever the IMF revalues its holdings of a fluctuating currency under paragraph 3, it will establish an account receivable or an account payable in respect of the amount of the currency payable by or to the member under Article IV, Section 8. Despite the improvement in the payments position of many members, sound gold and exchange policy of members continues to require that to the maximum extent practicable, gold should be held in official reserves rather than go into private hoards.
1. This agreement, which is entered into by the United Nations pursuant to the provisions of Article 63 of its Charter, and by the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter called the Fund), pursuant to the provisions of Article X of its Articles of Agreement, is intended to define the terms on which the United Nations and the Fund shall be brought into relationship.
Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 2(d), it is decided that members that have, or will, become participants in the Special Drawing Rights Department between January 1, 1978 and December 31, 1978 and have informed the Fund that they wish to receive allocations of special drawing rights during the third basic period shall receive allocations in accordance with the Resolution of the Board of Governors on allocations of special drawing rights for the third basic period.
After consultation with the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, the representative rate for the ECU in terms of the SDR under Article XIX, Section 7(a) and Rule O–2 shall be obtained by using the reciprocal of the U.S. dollar equivalent of the ECU as calculated and published by the European Commission and the SDR equivalent of one US. dollar as calculated and published by the Fund for the same day. If both these rates for the U.S. dollar are not available for the same day, the rates for the next preceding day on which both rates are available will be used. The rate determined by this method shall be applied in connection with a transfer of SDRs as part of the settlement of a member’s debt with the European Monetary Cooperation Fund. The European Monetary Cooperation Fund and the Fund will consult concerning any change in the method of calculating the representative rate for the ECU in terms of the SDR.
Pursuant to Article XXX(f), and after consultation with the members concerned, the Fund determines that until further notice the deutsche mark, French franc, Japanese yen, pound sterling, and U.S. dollar are freely usable currencies.
That the Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund are invited, at the request of the Governor for the United States of America, to interpret the Articles of Agreement, pursuant to Article XVIII*(a), as to whether the authority of the Fund to use its resources extends beyond current monetary stabilization operations to afford temporary assistance to members in connection with seasonal, cyclical, and emergency fluctuations in the balance of payments of any member for current transactions, and whether the Fund has authority to use its resources to provide facilities for relief, reconstruction, or armaments, or to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital on the part of any member.**
The Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund interpret the Articles of Agreement to mean that authority to use the resources of the Fund is limited to use in accordance with its purposes to give temporary assistance in financing balance of payments deficits on current account for monetary stabilization operations.