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Mr. John Kiff, Michael Kisser, and Miss Liliana B Schumacher
Credit rating agencies face a difficult trade-off between delivering both accurate and stable ratings. In particular, its users have consistently expressed a preference for rating stability, driven by the transactions costs induced by trading when ratings change frequently. Rating agencies generally assign ratings on a through-the-cycle basis whereas banks' internal valuations are often based on a point-in-time performance, that is they are related to the current value of the rated entity's or instrument's underlying assets. This paper compares the two approaches and assesses their impact on rating stability and accuracy. We find that while through-the-cycle ratings are initially more stable, they are prone to rating cliff effects and also suffer from inferior performance in predicting future defaults. This is because they are typically smooth and delay rating changes. Using a through-the-crisis methodology that uses a more stringent stress test goes halfway toward mitigating cliff effects, but is still prone to discretionary rating change delays.
Mr. Arnoud W.A. Boot and Mr. Lev Ratnovski
We study the effects of a bank's engagement in trading. Traditional banking is relationship-based: not scalable, long-term oriented, with high implicit capital, and low risk (thanks to the law of large numbers). Trading is transactions-based: scalable, shortterm, capital constrained, and with the ability to generate risk from concentrated positions. When a bank engages in trading, it can use its ‘spare’ capital to profitablity expand the scale of trading. However, there are two inefficiencies. A bank may allocate too much capital to trading ex-post, compromising the incentives to build relationships ex-ante. And a bank may use trading for risk-shifting. Financial development augments the scalability of trading, which initially benefits conglomeration, but beyond some point inefficiencies dominate. The deepending of the financial markets in recent decades leads trading in banks to become increasingly risky, so that problems in managing and regulating trading in banks will persist for the foreseeable future. The analysis has implications for capital regulation, subsidiarization, and scope and scale restrictions in banking.
Douglas Elliott and Mr. Andre O Santos
This study assesses the overall impact on credit of the financial regulatory reforms in Europe, Japan, and the United States. Long-term cost estimates are provided for Basel III capital and liquidity requirements, derivatives reforms, and higher taxes and fees. Overall, average lending rates in the base case would rise by 18 bps in Europe, 8 bps in Japan, and 28 bps in the United States. These results are similar to the official BIS assessments of Basel III and an OECD analysis, but lower as a result of including expense cuts and reductions in the returns required by investors. As a result, they are markedly lower than those of the IIF.
Mr. Andre O Santos and Douglas Elliott
Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.
Mr. Daniel C Hardy
The level of a bank‘s capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: banks may vie with one another to signal confidence in their prospects by keeping capitalization low, and banks‘ creditors often cannot distinguish among them - tendencies that can be seen across banks and across time. Prudential policy is warranted to help offset these tendencies.
Mr. R. John Irwin and Mr. Timothy C Irwin
ROC and CAP analysis are alternative methods for evaluating a wide range of diagnostic systems, including assessments of credit risk. ROC analysis is widely used in many fields, but in finance CAP analysis is more common. We compare the two methods, using as an illustration the ability of the OECD’s country risk ratings to predict whether a country will have a program with the IMF (an indicator of financial distress). ROC and CAP analyses both have the advantage of generating measures of accuracy that are independent of the choice of diagnostic threshold, such as risk rating. ROC analysis has other beneficial features, including theories for fitting models to data and for setting the optimal threshold, that we show could also be incorporated into CAP analysis. But the natural interpretation of the ROC measure of accuracy and the independence of ROC curves from the probability of default are advantages unavailable to CAP analysis.
Mr. Aditya Narain, Ms. Inci Ötker, and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu

Abstract

The IMF, with the Bank for International Settlements and the Financial Stability Board, has been at the forefront of discussions on reform of the global financial system to reduce the possibility of future crises, as well as to limit the consequences if they do occur. The policy choices are both urgent and challenging, and are complicated by the relationship between sovereign debt and risks to the banking sector. Building a More Resilient Financial Sector describes the key elements of the reform agenda, including tighter regulation and more effective supervision; greater transparency to strengthen market discipline and limit incentives for risk taking; coherent mechanisms for resolution of failed institutions; and effective safety nets to limit the impact on the financial system of institutions viewed as "too big to fail." Finally, the book takes a look ahead at how the financial system is likely to be shaped by the efforts of policymakers and the private sector response.

International Monetary Fund
In March 2009, the Fund established a new Framework Administered Account to administer external financial resources for Selected Fund Activities (the “SFA Instrument”). The financing of activities under the terms of the SFA Instrument is implemented through the establishment and operation of subaccounts. This paper requests Executive Board approval to establish the Government of Canada Subaccount for Selected Fund Activities (the "Subaccount") under the terms of the SFA Instrumen