China’s bond market is destined to play an increasingly important role, both at home and abroad. And the inclusion of the country’s bonds in global indexes will be a milestone for its financial market integration, bringing big opportunities as well as challenges for policymakers and investors alike. This calls for a good understanding of China’s bond market structure, its unique characteristics, and areas where reforms are needed. This volume comprehensively analyzes the different segments of China’s bond market, from sovereign, policy bank, and credit bonds, to the rapidly growing local government bond market. It also covers bond futures, green bonds, and asset-backed securities, as well as China’s offshore market, which has played a major role in onshore market development.
The Manual on Fiscal Transparency provides an authoritative account and explanation of the revised IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (‘the Code’). It expands and updates the 2001 edition of the Manual, which has been used by countries undertaking assessments of the transparency of their fiscal management practices (including so-called ‘fiscal ROSCs’), legislatures, civil society organizations, economists, and financial analysts. Numerous new examples of implementation of the Code by countries in all regions of the world and at different levels of development are included. The Manual, which reflects a public comment process, is also supplemented by the revised Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency. It identifies numerous benefits from fiscal transparency, including providing citizens with information to hold governments accountable for their policy choices, informing and improving the quality of economic policy decisions, highlighting potential risks to the fiscal outlook, and easing a country’s access to international capital markets.
In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade-from East Asia to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America-political interference in financial sector regulation helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial regulation, but also hindered regulators and supervisors from taking action against troubled banks. This paper investigates why, to fulfill their mandate to preserve financial sector stability, financial sector regulators and supervisors need to be independent-from the financial services industry as well as from the government-as well as accountable.
Mr. Olivier J Blanchard, Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, and Mr. Paolo Mauro
This is a Chinese translation of "Rethinking Macro Policy II" (SDN/13/03). This note explores how the economic thinking about macroeconomic management has evolved since the crisis began. It discusses developments in monetary policy, including unconventional measures; the challenges associated with increased public debt; and the policy potential, risks, and institutional challenges associated with new macroprudential measures. Rationale: The note contributes to the ongoing debate on several aspects of macroeconomic policy. It follows up on the earlier “Rethinking” paper, refining the analysis in light of the events of the past two years. Given the relatively fluid state of the debate (e.g., recent challenges to central bank independence), it is useful to highlight that while many of the tenets of the pre-crisis consensus have been challenged, others (such as the desirability of central bank independence) remain valid.