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Cover IMF Working Papers
The Impact of Foreign Bank Deleveraging on Korea
Ms. Sonali Jain-Chandra, Min Jung Kim, Sung Ho Park, and Jerome Shin
Korea was hit hard by the 2008 global financial crisis, with the foreign bank deleveraging channel coming prominently into play. The global financial crisis demonstrated that a sharp deleveraging can be transmitted to emerging markets through the bank lending channel to a slowdown in credit growth. The analysis finds that a sharp decline in external funding led to relatively modest decline in domestic credit by Korean banks, due to concerted policy efforts by the government in 2008. Impulse responses from a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model calibrated to Korea shows that it appears better prepared to handle such shocks relative to 2008. Indeed, Korea is much more resilient to such shocks due to the efforts by the authorities, which has led to the strengthening of external buffers, such as higher foreign exchange reserves and bilateral and multilateral currency swap arrangements.
Keywords:
WP; exchange rate; Global banks; liquidity shock; cross-border lending; credit supply; domestic bank; panel regression; capitalized bank; exposure to Korea; Foreign banks; Global financial crisis of 2008-2009; Bank credit; Domestic credit; Housing; Global; Asia and Pacific; Europe
Cover IMF Working Papers
Regulatory Cycles: Revisiting the Political Economy of Financial Crises
Jihad Dagher
Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.
Keywords:
WP; central bank; financial market; political economy; banking sector; Financial Regulation; Financial Crises; Boom-Bust Cycles; Glass-Steagall Act; financial bubble; ruling party; share price; joint stock; crony capitalism; plain vanilla; stock index; bubble company; joint-stock bank; incumbent governments policy; government sponsorship; Housing; Global financial crisis of 2008-2009; Banking crises; Global; South America