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Mr. Thomas J Sargent, Mr. George Hall, Mr. Martin Ellison, Mr. Andrew Scott, Mr. Harold James, Ms. Era Dabla-Norris, Mark De Broeck, Mr. Nicolas End, Ms. Marina Marinkov, and Vitor Gaspar

Abstract

World War I created a set of forces that affected the political arrangements and economies of all the countries involved. This period in global economic history between World War I and II offers rich material for studying international monetary and sovereign debt policies. Debt and Entanglements between the Wars focuses on the experiences of the United States, United Kingdom, four countries in the British Commonwealth (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Newfoundland), France, Italy, Germany, and Japan, offering unique insights into how political and economic interests influenced alliances, defaults, and the unwinding of debts. The narratives presented show how the absence of effective international collaboration and resolution mechanisms inflicted damage on the global economy, with disastrous consequences.

Mr. Hamid R Tabarraei, Abdelaziz Rouabah, and Olivier Pierrard
We examine the spillover effects between sovereigns and banks in a model with a heterogeneous banking system. An increase in sovereign’s default risk affects financial intermediaries through two channels in this model. First, banks’ funding costs might increase, inducing higher interest rates on loans and bonds and a cut back in these assets. Second, financial regulator’s risk-weighted asset framework would assign higher weights to lower quality assets, implying a portfolio rebalancing and more deleveraging. While capital adequacy requirements weaken the impact of shocks emerging from the real economy, they amplify the effect of shocks on banks’ balance sheets.
Mr. Seung M Choi, Ms. Laura E. Kodres, and Jing Lu
This paper examines whether the coordinated use of macroprudential policies can help lessen the incidence of banking crises. It is well-known that rapid domestic credit growth and house price growth positively influence the chances of a banking crisis. As well, a crisis in other countries with high trade and financial linkages raises the crisis probability. However, whether such “contagion effects” can operate to reduce crisis probabilities when highly linked countries execute macroprudential policies together has not been fully explored. A dataset documenting countries’ use of macroprudential tools suggests that a “coordinated” implementation of macroprudential policies across highly-linked countries can help to stem the risks of widespread banking crises, although this positive effect may take some time to materialize.
Mr. Anil Ari
I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and slow recovery from crises. When banks' investment decisions are not contractible, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, high funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank net worth, leading to a persistent drop in investment and output. I bring the model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-capitalized banks in defaultrisky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantified using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010-2016. Policy interventions face a trade-off between alleviating banks' funding conditions and strengthening risk-taking incentives. Liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate adverse equilibria.
Zoltan Jakab, Pavel Lukyantsau, and Mr. Shengzu Wang
The GPM project is designed to improve the toolkit for studying both own-country and cross-country linkages. This paper creates a special version of GPM that includes the four largest Euro Area (EA) countries. The EA countries are more vulnerable to domestic and external demand shocks because adjustments in the real exchange rate between EA countries occur more gradually through inflation differentials. Spillovers from tight credit conditions in each EA country are limited by direct trade channels and small confidence spillovers, but we also consider scenarios where banks in all EU countries tighten credit conditions simultaneously.