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Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns

Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns »

Source: Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns

Volume/Issue: 2003/57

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Ben Lockwood , and Eric Le Borgne

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 March 2003

ISBN: 9781451847796

Keywords: Career Concern, Elections, Citizen Candidate, Experimentation, Tournaments, Political Business Cycles, election, voters, probability, voting

This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between an incumbent officeholder and the electorate, where the officeholder is initially uninformed about her ability. If officeholder effort and abil...

Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power

Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power »

Source: Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power

Volume/Issue: 2007/91

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Eric Le Borgne , and Gauti Eggertsson

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 April 2007

ISBN: 9781451866551

Keywords: Delegation, Elections, Career Concerns, Learning-by-doing, Insulation, public opinion, inflation, central bank, monetary policy, political economy

This paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution. It formalizes the rationales for delegation highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and by Blind...

A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence

A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence »

Volume/Issue: 2003/144

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Gauti Eggertsson , and Eric Le Borgne

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 2003

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451856460.001

ISBN: 9781451856460

Keywords: Central Bank Independece, Career Concerns, Elections, Experimetation, inflation, monetary policy, central bank, average inflation, Structure, Scope

We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dyna...

Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns

Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns »

Volume/Issue: 2003/57

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Ben Lockwood , and Eric Le Borgne

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 March 2003

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451847796.001

ISBN: 9781451847796

Keywords: Career Concern, Elections, Citizen Candidate, Experimentation, Tournaments, Political Business Cycles, election, voters, probability, voting

This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between an incumbent officeholder and the electorate, where the officeholder is initially uninformed about her ability. If officeholder effort and abil...

Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power

Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power »

Volume/Issue: 2007/91

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Eric Le Borgne , and Gauti Eggertsson

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 April 2007

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451866551.001

ISBN: 9781451866551

Keywords: Delegation, Elections, Career Concerns, Learning-by-doing, Insulation, public opinion, inflation, central bank, monetary policy, political economy

This paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution. It formalizes the rationales for delegation highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and by Blind...

A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence

A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence »

Source: A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence

Volume/Issue: 2003/144

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Gauti Eggertsson , and Eric Le Borgne

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 2003

ISBN: 9781451856460

Keywords: Central Bank Independece, Career Concerns, Elections, Experimetation, inflation, monetary policy, central bank, average inflation, Structure, Scope

We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dyna...