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An Incentive Approach to Identifying Financial System Vulnerabilities

An Incentive Approach to Identifying Financial System Vulnerabilities »

Volume/Issue: 2000/211

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Jingqing Chai , and R. Johnston

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 December 2000

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451874839.001

ISBN: 9781451874839

Keywords: asymmetric information, market structure, incentive assessments, financial system, moral hazard, deposit insurance, risk taking

This paper underscores the importance of the assessment of incentives of the main agents in a financial system as a key element in the analysis of financial system vulnerability and the surveillance over the financ...

Optimal Fiscal Policy and Government Provision of Contingent Liabilities
			: The Example of Government Loan and Deposit Guarantees.

Optimal Fiscal Policy and Government Provision of Contingent Liabilities : The Example of Government Loan and Deposit Guarantees. »

Volume/Issue: 1989/84

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): International Monetary Fund

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 12 October 1989

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451954333.001

ISBN: 9781451954333

Keywords: social security, bonds, deposit insurance, government bonds

The optimal provision of loan guarantees or deposit insurance is examined in the context of an overlapping generations model. It is demonstrated that even in the face of a market imperfection that precludes diversi...

Sovereign Insurance and Program Design
			: What is Optimal for the Sovereign?

Sovereign Insurance and Program Design : What is Optimal for the Sovereign? »

Volume/Issue: 2006/64

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Miguel Messmacher

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 March 2006

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451863246.001

ISBN: 9781451863246

Keywords: International Financial Architecture, deposit insurance, financial system, international finance, International Economic Order, International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, International Lending and Debt Problems, International Policy Coordination and Transmission,

The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign...

An Incentive Approach to Identifying Financial System Vulnerabilities

An Incentive Approach to Identifying Financial System Vulnerabilities »

Source: An Incentive Approach to Identifying Financial System Vulnerabilities

Volume/Issue: 2000/211

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Jingqing Chai , and R. Johnston

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 December 2000

ISBN: 9781451874839

Keywords: asymmetric information, market structure, incentive assessments, financial system, moral hazard, deposit insurance, risk taking

This paper underscores the importance of the assessment of incentives of the main agents in a financial system as a key element in the analysis of financial system vulnerability and the surveillance over the financ...

Optimal Fiscal Policy and Government Provision of Contingent Liabilities

Optimal Fiscal Policy and Government Provision of Contingent Liabilities »

Source: Optimal Fiscal Policy and Government Provision of Contingent Liabilities : The Example of Government Loan and Deposit Guarantees.

Volume/Issue: 1989/84

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): International Monetary Fund

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 12 October 1989

ISBN: 9781451954333

Keywords: social security, bonds, deposit insurance, government bonds

The optimal provision of loan guarantees or deposit insurance is examined in the context of an overlapping generations model. It is demonstrated that even in the face of a market imperfection that precludes diversi...

Sovereign Insurance and Program Design

Sovereign Insurance and Program Design »

Source: Sovereign Insurance and Program Design : What is Optimal for the Sovereign?

Volume/Issue: 2006/64

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Miguel Messmacher

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 March 2006

ISBN: 9781451863246

Keywords: International Financial Architecture, deposit insurance, financial system, international finance, International Economic Order, International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, International Lending and Debt Problems, International Policy Coordination and Transmission,

The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign...