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Goal-Independent Central Banks

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Source: Goal-Independent Central Banks : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate

Volume/Issue: 2006/256

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Christopher Crowe

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 November 2006

ISBN: 9781451865165

Keywords: coalition formation, treatment effects, monetary policy, central bank, inflation aversion, independent central bank, Noncooperative Games, Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures

A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. A...

Goal-Independent Central Banks
			: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate

Goal-Independent Central Banks : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate »

Volume/Issue: 2006/256

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Christopher Crowe

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 November 2006

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451865165.001

ISBN: 9781451865165

Keywords: coalition formation, treatment effects, monetary policy, central bank, inflation aversion, independent central bank, Noncooperative Games, Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures

A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. A...