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Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power

Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power »

Source: Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power

Volume/Issue: 2007/91

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Eric Le Borgne , and Gauti Eggertsson

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 April 2007

ISBN: 9781451866551

Keywords: Delegation, Elections, Career Concerns, Learning-by-doing, Insulation, public opinion, inflation, central bank, monetary policy, political economy

This paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution. It formalizes the rationales for delegation highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and by Blind...

Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power

Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power »

Volume/Issue: 2007/91

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Eric Le Borgne , and Gauti Eggertsson

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 April 2007

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451866551.001

ISBN: 9781451866551

Keywords: Delegation, Elections, Career Concerns, Learning-by-doing, Insulation, public opinion, inflation, central bank, monetary policy, political economy

This paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution. It formalizes the rationales for delegation highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and by Blind...