This paper studies the aid allocation of European nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Once population is controlled for, poverty consistently appears as the main worldwide determinant of NGO aid allocation. NGOs do not respond to strategic considerations. Their funding source does not seem to exert a great influence on their aid allocation decision. We also find differences across regions. Militarization and the political nature of the regime of the recipient country affect aid allocation in the Middle East. Life expectancy influences aid allocation in countries in the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East.
This paper presents a dynamic game of strategic delegation between a principal and an agent. The principal can choose between two organizational designs: a traditional hierarchy where she retains authority over the choice of projects to be implemented or a delegation where she allows her agent to select the project. The key objectives of this model are to identify the long-run determinants of the principal’s choice and verify the impact of the authority allocation on the agent’s effort levels and on the principal’s payoffs. We apply the model to the relationships between institutional donors and nongovernmental organizations.