The need to decarbonize international aviation and maritime has long been overlooked. The two sectors account for a small but rapidly growing share of global CO2 emissions, and could rise to as much as 15 to 40 percent by 2040. Pricing these emissions could help global climate policy in two ways. First, it could accelerate technological development while incentivizing efficiency, kick-starting the sectors’ transition to net zero while addressing the sectors’ hitherto favorable tax treatment. Second, pricing could raise up to $200 billion a year in revenues by 2035, which could be allocated to climate finance or other uses. There are significant political obstacles, however, notably reaching consensus on revenue allocation and managing price impacts, which are substantive for flight tickets but less so for shipped goods. Pricing variants, like ‘fee and rebate’ schemes (feebates), have lower price impacts but raise fewer revenues. This paper discusses these policies, using a new model to quantify impacts on fuel use, emissions, revenues, production and economic costs, and on vulnerable states.
The economy is embedded in, and dependent on, nature. Yet economic activity is degrading nature at an unprecedented pace. Interacting with climate change, nature loss and transformation generates significant threats to the global economy and financial system. However, work on the implications of nature-related risks for macroeconomic and financial sector policies remains at an early stage. This note seeks to contribute to this emerging policy space in three main ways: (i) it proposes a conceptual framework for understanding nature-related risks by mapping out macroeconomic transmission channels, emphasizing their impact on the economy and financial systems through “double materiality;” (ii) it conducts empirical analysis, finding that nearly 38 percent of bank loans of the 100 largest global banks are to harmful subsidies-dependent sectors and 44 percent are exposed to conservation areas under the Global Biodiversity Framework, and that industries most exposed to nature degradation are not well prepared to manage these risks; and (iii) it discusses takeaways for macroeconomic and financial sector policies and frameworks.
The global energy transition is affecting fossil fuel exporters from multiple angles. It is adding to longstanding uncertainties on relative movements of fossil fuel demand and supply—which impact fossil fuel-related exports, fiscal flows, investment and subsequently external and fiscal accounts, economic growth, and employment. While policymakers are very familiar with these challenges, they now also face expectations of a permanent decline in the long-run global demand for fossil fuels. Key factors that could determine country-level impacts include (i) the type of fossil fuel a country exports (ii) extraction costs and (iii) country characteristics. The monitoring and mitigation of fiscal risks will need to be stepped up. Fiscal policy also has a role in reducing domestic emissions, encouraging adoption of low-carbon technologies, and helping those most vulnerable to changes from the transition. Broader macroeconomic risks can be reduced by accelerating ongoing structural reforms that support alternative engines of growth. Low- or zero-carbon emission energy industries could offer new avenues that build on existing fossil fuel knowledge and infrastructure. Concurrently, improved financial regulation and supervision could reduce financial sector exposures. Finally, international coordination on the design and implementation of climate policy as well as international transfer schemes (financing and capacity development) could reduce uncertainties surrounding the transition path and associated adverse economic consequences.
The transition to a low-carbon economy, which is needed to mitigate climate change and meet the Paris Agreement temperature goals, has been affected by the supply chain and energy supply disruptions that originated during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the subsequent energy crisis and exacerbation of geopolitical tensions. These developments, and the broader context of the ongoing “polycrisis,” can affect future decarbonization scenarios. This reflects three main factors: (1) pullbacks in climate mitigation policies and increased carbon lock-in in fossil fuel infrastructure and policymaking; (2) the decreasing likelihood of continuous cost reduction in renewable energy technologies; and (3) the likely intensification of macroeconomic shocks amid increasing geoeconomic fragmentation, and the associated policy responses. In this context, the note assesses the implications of the polycrisis for hypothetical scenarios used to assess climate-related financial risks. Following an analysis of the channels through which these effects are likely to materialize over short- and long-term horizons and some policy implications, the note proposes potential adjustments to the design of the climate scenarios used by financial institutions, central banks, and financial sector supervisors and regulators within their risk management frameworks.