Browse

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 23 items for :

  • Archived Series x
  • Madagascar, Republic of x
  • Refine By Language: English x
Clear All
International Monetary Fund. Research Dept.

IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, all the countries of former French West Africa1 and of former French Equatorial Africa,2 and also Cameroon, the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar), and Togo, have become members of the International Monetary Fund. Except for Guinea, which established its own central bank and national currency on March 1, 1960, and Mali, which did the same on July 1, 1962, the currencies circulating in all these countries, as well as those circulating in the Comoro Islands, the Island of Réunion, and the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, bear the name CFA franc. (The initials formerly stood for Colonies Françaises d’Afrique and now stand for Communauté Financière Africaine.) In these various countries and territories, however, CFA francs are issued by six different central banks or institutes of issue, and the one issued by each of these is legal tender only in the area in which it is issued. It is possible therefore to distinguish six different CFA francs:

RATTAN J. BHATIA and DEENA R. KHATKHATE

Recent literature on economic development has focused considerable attention on the process of financial intermediation and its impact on growth.1 It has been argued that an increase in financial intermediation, as denoted by the ratio of financial assets of all kinds to gross national product (GNP), necessarily accompanies growth, although causal relationship has not always been explicitly postulated. Numerous empirical studies have analyzed cross-sectional and time-series data to support this argument.2 Based on the existence of this relationship, policy recommendations tend to be oriented toward encouraging financial savings by such means as higher real interest rates and expanding the financial network in the less developed countries. The main purpose of this paper is to find out how far financial intermediation has progressed with economic growth in selected African countries and whether it has been instrumental in generating development. In other words, an attempt is made to see whether financial intermediation is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for economic growth.

Rasheed O. Khalid

From the Foreword to the first issue: “Among the responsibilities of the International Monetary Fund, as set forth in the Articles of Agreement, is the obligation to ‘act as a center for the collection and exchange of information on monetary and financial problems,’ and thereby to facilitate ‘the preparation of studies designed to assist members in developing policies which further the purposes of the Fund.’ The publications of the Fund are one way in which this responsibility is discharged. “Through the publication of Staff Papers, the Fund is making available some of the work of members of its staff. The Fund believes that these papers will be found helpful by government officials, by professional economists, and by others concerned with monetary and financial problems. Much of what is now presented is quite provisional. On some international monetary problems, final and definitive views are scarcely to be expected in the near future, and several alternative, or even conflicting, approaches may profitably be explored. The views presented in these papers are not, therefore, to be interpreted as necessarily indicating the position of the Executive Board or of the officials of the Fund.” The authors of the papers in this issue have received considerable assistance from their colleagues on the staff of the Fund. This general statement of indebtedness may be accepted in place of a detailed list of acknowledgments. Subscription: US$6.00 a volume or the approximate equivalent in the currencies of most countries. Three numbers constitute a volume. Single copies may be purchased at $2.50. Special rate to university libraries, faculty members, and students: $3.00 a volume; $1.00 a single copy. Subscriptions and orders should be sent to: THE SECRETARY International Monetary Fund 19th and H Streets, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20431

Hannan Ezekiel and Chandrakant Patel

THE JAPANESE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS in the postwar period began to show a tendency to fluctuate in 1953, when it moved abruptly into deficit. Between 1952 and 1958, there were two cycles in Japan’s balance of payments. These cycles were examined in considerable detail by Narvekar,1 who brought out, on the basis of annual data, the interrelations between the domestic and international factors that were reflected in these movements in Japan’s external balance. The present paper traces the fluctuations in Japan’s balance of payments since 1959 and examines some of their characteristics. For this purpose, it draws on quarterly data on Japan’s balance of payments now available for the period beginning 1961 and estimated by the authors for 1959 and 1960. However, it does not attempt to relate these fluctuations in detail to developments in domestic or international demand and supply conditions.

Mr. G. Russell Kincaid, K. Burke Dillon, Mr. Maxwell Watson, and Ms. Chanpen Puckahtikom

Abstract

The number of debt restructurings has increased sharply since the emergence of widespread payments difficulties in 1982. In that year, only 7 bank and 6 official restructuring agreements or temporary deferments were negotiated; in 1984, there were 21 and 13 respectively. Moreover, a substantial portion of the recent new private lending being made to developing countries has been coordinated under restructuring arrangements.

Mr. Jorge P. Guzmán and Mr. Michael G. Kuhn

Abstract

This paper reviews recent developments in multilateral official debt restructuring during 1988 and 1989.1 This period was marked by two significant trends: debtor countries increasingly relied on debt reschedulings through the Paris Club and official creditors further adapted their policies in response to protracted problems in the most heavily indebted low-income countries.2

Mr. G. Russell Kincaid, K. Burke Dillon, Mr. Maxwell Watson, and Ms. Chanpen Puckahtikom

Abstract

No formal framework existed for conducting commercial bank debt negotiations when the serious problems of major debtor countries became evident during the course of 1982. Earlier bank debt restructurings were sporadic, involved relatively small amounts, and posed less serious difficulties for bank management and for the international financial system. The problems emerging in 1982 required procedures to restructure large volumes of debt due to hundreds of creditor banks, and to help resolve issues of burden sharing among private and official creditors. Moreover, both creditor banks and authorities in debtor countries needed a framework to facilitate the maintenance of short-term bank exposure during and after debt restructuring and to reach agreement where appropriate on commitments of new money.

Mr. Jorge P. Guzmán and Mr. Michael G. Kuhn

Abstract

From 1976 through 1989, 50 debtor creditors concluded 150 multilateral rescheduling agreements with official creditors for a cumulative cash-flow relief of nearly $110 billion.4 During the first half of the 1980s, Paris Club creditors consolidated $19 billion in 46 reschedulings for 21 countries. Activity in the Paris Club more than doubled during the second half, as 45 debtor countries obtained 93 rescheduling agreements and the amount consolidated by official creditors more than quadrupled to $85 billion.

Mr. G. Russell Kincaid, K. Burke Dillon, Mr. Maxwell Watson, and Ms. Chanpen Puckahtikom

Abstract

This section describes the principal features of official multilateral debt restructurings that took place during 1983–84, particularly in comparison with agreements reached during the preceding eight-year period from 1975. It documents the sharp increase in the number of reschedulings and focuses on notable recent developments, especially the trend toward an easing in the repayment terms for some countries that have had successive reschedulings. It also addresses issues relating to multiyear debt restructurings by official creditors with reference to the recent MYRA for Ecuador.

Mr. Jorge P. Guzmán and Mr. Michael G. Kuhn

Abstract

Official creditors have provided cash-flow relief to a large number of low-income countries through Paris Club reschedulings. SAF- and ESAF-eligible countries account for half of the Paris Club rescheduling countries but were involved in nearly two thirds of the reschedulings since 1976, as most of these countries had repeatedly sought relief from the Paris Club (Chart 6). Generally the reschedulings for these countries were more comprehensive in coverage and percentage of debts rescheduled than those for other creditors. However, given the protracted nature of their balance of payments problems, many of these countries experienced serious difficulties in adhering to the repayment schedules from previous agreements, largely because, as creditors recognized, the repeated application of standard terms over a long period had not provided an adequate response to the medium-term debt-servicing problems of the poorest and most heavily indebted countries.