One of the fundamental purposes of the IMF is to make its resources temporarily available to members experiencing balance of payments difficulties, easing the required balance of payments adjustment by attenuating it, and helping to “give confidence” by reconstituting gross international reserves. In a number of capital account crises, however, the magnitude and abruptness of the capital outflows has dwarfed available official financing, resulting in much sharper external adjustment than programmed (or than warranted by debt sustainability considerations) and significant economic dislocation.24 But even if available official financing attenuated external adjustment only to a limited extent once confidence was lost, IMF support can still help avoid the collapse of exchange rates and economic activity in the first place through crisis prevention.
Allen, M., C. Rosenberg, C. Keller, B. Setser, and N. Roubini, 2002, “A Balance Sheet Approach to Financial Crisis,” IMF Working Paper No. 02/210 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Ben-Akiva, M., and S. Lerman, 1987, Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and Application to Travel Demand (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).
Bird, G., and D. Rowlands, 2002, “Do IMF Programmes Have a Catalytic Effect on Other International Capital Flows?” Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 229–49.
Corsetti, G., B. Guimaraes, and N. Roubini, 2003, “International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF’s Catalytic Finance,” NBER Working Paper No. 10125 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
Cottarelli, C., and C. Giannini, 2002, “Bedfellows, Hostages, or Perfect Strangers? Global Capital Markets and the Catalytic Effect of IMF Crisis Lending,” IMF Working Paper No. 02/193 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Daseking, C., A. Ghosh, A. Thomas, and T. Lane, 2005, Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina, IMF Occasional Paper No. 236 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Eichengreen, B., P. Gupta, and A. Mody, 2005, “Sudden Stops and IMF Programs,” paper prepared for the Inter-American Seminar on Macroeconomics, Rio de Janeiro, December 3–4.
Eichengreen, B., K. Kletzer, and A. Mody, 2005, “The IMF in a World of Private Capital Markets,” IMF Working Paper No. 05/84 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Eichengreen, B., and A. Mody, 1998, “What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging-Market Debt: Fundamentals or Market Sentiment?” NBER Working Paper No. 6408 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
Everitt, B., 1993, Cluster Analysis (London: Edward Arnold, 3rd ed.).
Flood, R., and P. Garber, 1984, “Collapsing Exchange-Rate Regimes: Some Linear Examples,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 17 (August), pp. 1–13.
Flood, R., and N. Marion, 1998, “Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crisis Literature,” NBER Working Paper No. 6380 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
Ghosh, A., C. Christofides, J. Kim, L. Papi, U. Ramakrishnan, A. Thomas, and J. Zalduendo, 2005, The Design of IMF-Supported Programs, IMF Occasional Paper No. 241 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Ghosh, A., T. Lane, M. Schulze-Ghattas, A. Bulíř, J. Hamann, and A. Mourmouras, 2002, IMF-Supported Programs in Capital Account Crises, IMF Occasional Paper No. 210 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Gold,J., 1970, The Stand-By Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Haldane, A., 1999, “Private Sector Involvement in Financial Crises: Analytics and Public Policy Approaches,” Financial Stability Review (London: Bank of England),pp. 184–202.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2003, “Adapting Precautionary Arrangements to Crisis Prevention”; available via the Internet at www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/fac/2003/061103.htm.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2004, “Signaling by the Fund—A Historical Review”; available via the Internet at www.imf.org/external/np/ pdr/signal/2004/071604.htm.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2005, “Review of the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines”; available via the Internet at www.imf.org/external/np/ pp/eng/2005/030305.pdf.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2006a, “Precautionary Arrangements: Purposes and Performance”; available via the Internet at www.imf. org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/032306p.pdf.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2006b, “IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention”; available via the Internet at www.imf.org/ external/np/pp/eng/2006/032306.pdf.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007, “Fund Financial Support and Moral Hazard: Analytics and Empirics”; available via the Internet at www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2007/030207.pdf.
Kaminsky, G., C. Reinhart, 1999, “The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems,” American Economic Review, Vol. 89 (June), pp. 473–501.
Kim, J., 2006, “IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention: An Analytical Framework,” IMF Working Paper No. 06/156 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Krugman, P., 1979, “A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 311–25.
Mody, A., and D. Saravia, 2003, “Catalyzing Capital Flows: Do IMF-Supported Programs Work as Commitment Devices?” IMF Working Paper No. 03/100 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Morris, S., and H. S. Shin, 2005, “Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work?” revised version of Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1400 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University).
Obstfeld, M., 1994, “The Logic of Currency Crises,” Cahiers Économiques et Monétaires, No. 43, pp. 189–213.
Penalver, A., 2002, “How Can the IMF Catalyze Private Capital Flows? A Model” (unpublished; London: Bank of England).
Ramakrishnan, U., and J. Zalduendo, 2006, “The Role of IMF Support in Crisis Prevention,” IMF Working Paper No. 06/75 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Rodrik, D., 2006, “The Social Costs of Foreign Exchange Reserves,” paper prepared for the American Economic Association Meetings, January.
Rosenberg, C., I. Halikias, B. House, C. Keller, J. Nystedt, A. Pitt, and B. Setser, 2005, Debt-Related Vulnerabilities and Financial Crises: An Application of the Balance Sheet Approach to Emerging Market Countries, IMF Occasional Paper No. 240 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Roubini, N., and B. Setser, 2004, Bailouts or Bail-Ins? Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Markets (Washington: Institute for International Economics).
Zettelmeyer, J., 2000, “Can Official Crisis Lending Be Counterproductive in the Short Run?” Economic Notes, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 13–29.
International Monetary Fund Copyright © 2010-2025. All Rights Reserved.