Chapter 11 International Bailouts, Moral Hazard, and Conditionality
Author:
Olivier D Jeanne
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Language:
English
Print Publication Date:
03 Apr 2006
Keywords:
SEM; IMF program; country; IMF-supported program; program implementation; IMF effort; current account ratio; Current account; Capital flows; Private capital flows; Fiscal stance; Global; Sub-Saharan Africa; East Asia; Africa; Europe; lending cycle; crisis lending; repayment record; IMF interest rates; IMF support; Moral hazard; Loans; Financial safety nets; Market interest rates

Abstract

The large international bailouts of the 1990s have been criticized for generating moral hazard at the expense of the global taxpayer. We argue that this criticism is misleading because international bailouts create either no or very few costs to the international community. Instead, the problem is that bailouts may be used to facilitate bad domestic policies, thus creating moral hazard at the expense of domestic taxpayers. Ensuring that this does not happen may require a shift toward ex ante conditionality, in the sense that the availability and size of official crisis lending need to be conditional on government policies before the crisis.

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ISBN:
9781589063617
Publication Date:
03 Apr 2006
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781589063617.072
Pages:
292

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