Several key political obstacles to economic reform have been identified in what has become a burgeoning literature on the political economy of reform. The overriding focus of this literature is on how political leaders can implement and sustain economic reforms in the face of formidable opposition from those who will lose the most from these reforms initially—usually the population at large and strong sectoral and organized interest groups. The recommended remedies are aimed at reducing or eliminating popular opposition to reform, often by sequencing reforms to identify winners and compensate losers or by building coalitions of winners (Table 8.1).
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