Abstract
Tax revenue does not collect itself. Instead its collection invites several forms of dishonesty and malpractice: taxpayers may try to evade their legal liabilities, while tax inspectors may solicit bribes in order to connive at such evasion or, more generally, may abuse the authority with which they are entrusted. Firm evidence on the extent of such practices is naturally hard to come by. But anecdotal evidence abounds, and can be stunning.1 Moreover, any illusion that such practices are limited to developing countries has been dispelled by recent high profile cases in, for example, Italy and the UK. Not least, the Senate Hearings on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in autumn 1997 have raised in stark form the potential for abuse that lies in the considerable powers vested in tax collection agencies.
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