Comments: Mexico as a Benchmark Case
Author:
Guillermo Ortiz Martínez https://isni.org/isni/0000000404811396 International Monetary Fund

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Language:
English
Print Publication Date:
18 Dec 2000
Keywords:
BOOK; crisis; financing; exchange rate; market; financial system; IMF policy advice; IMF Policy recommendation; IMF reform; emerging market crisis; emerging market country; Exchange rates; Emerging and frontier financial markets; Capital flows; Currencies; Global; Asia and Pacific; East Asia; Europe; Southeast Asia; equilibrium exchange rate; market participant; IMF support package; confidence crisis; Mexico crisis; Exchange rate flexibility; Inflation; Commercial banks

Abstract

Ito’s paper starts with the premise that the IMF’s programs for Asia have been a failure, without setting a benchmark for what a successful IMF program is. I would like to propose such a benchmark, the 1995 Mexican program that, to many analysts, was successful in confronting what has been called the first crisis of the twenty-first century. Table 1 summarizes the main macroeconomic aggregates in Mexico and Asia during the IMF programs.

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Cover Reforming the International Monetary and Financial System
Reforming the International Monetary and Financial System
ISBN:
9781557758354
Publication Date:
18 Dec 2000
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781557758354.071
Pages:
448
Front Matter
Part I. Key Issues of Reform
Part II. Maintaining Stability Under High Capital Mobility
3 The Euro, Yen, and Dollar: Making the Case Against Benign Neglect
Comments: Let Exchange Rates Float
Comments: Foreign Exchange Origins of Japan’s Liquidity Trap
Comments: The Case for Benign Neglect
4 Moderating Fluctuations in Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies
Comments: Lessons from the Czech Experience
Comments: Emerging Market Crises: Origins and Remedies
Comments: Who Is to Blame for the Crises?
Comments: Policy Options for Capital Importers
5 When Capital Inflows Suddenly Stop: Consequences and Policy Options
comments: The Balance Between Adjustment and Financing
Comments: The Balance Between Structural and Macroeconomic Adjustment
Comments: Can the Right Balance Be Achieved?
Comments: On Dysfunctional Adjustment and Financing
6 Is Greater Private Sector Burden Sharing Impossible?
Comments: Private Sector Participation in Crisis Prevention and Resolution
Comments: On Debt Management and Collective-Action Clauses
Comments: More Private Sector Involvement and Less Official Financing
Comments: Private Sector Burden Sharing
Part III. The Role of the International Monetary Fund
Part IV. Conclusion
Back Matter