Abstract

Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), 217, 225

Index

  • Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), 217, 225

    • establishment of, 243

  • Ad hoc obligations, 95n57

  • AML/CFT requirements. See Antimoney laundering and combating the financing of terrorism requirements

  • Antideflationary monetary policy, 174

  • Antimoney laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements, 225, 264, 277

    • FATF on, 233, 267

    • for Islamic banking, 232–34

  • Arab Monetary Fund, 208

  • Asian financial crisis of 1990s, 133–34 IMF in, 252

  • Assessment, rights of, 110

  • Asset management industry, regulatory reform and, 6

  • Asset separation, 19–20

  • Asset structure, in Islamic banking, 213f

  • Attribution, principle of, 163

  • Australian Transaction Reports, 264

  • Bail-in bonds, 89

  • Bail-in strategies, 19

    • advantages of, 37

    • bail-outs compared with, 85–86

    • for bank failure, 72

    • bridge, 92

    • closed-bank, 20

    • defining, 85–86

    • execution of, 94–95

    • FSB on, 85–86

    • indirect, 92

    • Islamic banking and, 232

    • loss absorption and, 20–21

    • MREL and, 20

    • open-bank, 20, 92

    • in regulatory reform, 33–50

    • SIFIs and, 38–48

    • statutory, 115

    • total loss absorbing capacity and, 38–48

  • Bail-outs bail-in strategy compared with, 85–86

    • defining, 85–86

  • Balance sheet structure, in Islamic banking, 211–12, 227

  • Banco de la Republica, 161

  • Banco Spirito Santo, 66

  • Bank failure, bail in strategy for, 72

  • Bank financing, for corporate debt restructuring, 126

  • Bank for International Settlements, 146

    • IFSB and, 247

  • Banking credit, formal companies using, 136t

  • Banking Reform Act 2013, 33

  • Banking Secrecy Act, 278

  • Banking Union, 64

    • establishment of, 12

    • pillars of, 12–13

    • Single Rulebook and, 13

  • Bank of England (BoE), 32, 158, 179

    • on exit strategies, 38

    • independence of, 185

    • Resolution Paper of, 36–37

    • resolution strategies of, 33

    • on valuations, 38

  • Bank of England Act 1998, 185n37

  • Bank of Portugal, 66

  • Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), 11, 13, 32

    • amendments to, 89

    • Article 45, 46

    • Article 45(12), 63

    • Article 55, 67

    • Article 66(3), 65

    • Article 66(4), 66

    • Article 66(5), 66

    • on cross-border resolution, 75

    • EBA and, 58

    • in EU resolution framework, 14

    • European Commission on, 47

    • Key Attributes for Effective Resolution and, 58–59

    • MREL and, 46, 62–63

    • safeguards, 22

    • SRM and, 14n18

    • TLAC and, 46

  • Bankruptcy, 175

    • corporate debt restructuring and, 126

    • in Mexico, 131n3

    • nonperforming loans and, 125

  • Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11, 36

  • Bankruptcy Court, US, 197

  • Bank supervisor liability in France, 178

    • in Germany, 177–78

    • international standards on, 180

    • in Italy, 178–79

    • United Kingdom, 179

  • Barbados, 261

  • Basel 2.5 framework, publication of, 237

  • Basel Committee, 188

    • on Banking Supervision, 31, 73

    • Cross-Border Resolution Group, 74

    • historical background of, 236–37

    • international regulation and, 236–39

    • on Islamic Finance, 203

    • Market Risk Amendment to Capital Accord, 237

    • Pillar 3 framework, 94

  • Basel Core Principles, 225, 239

  • Basel I framework, 8, 237

  • Basel II framework, 8

    • Islamic finance and, 199–201

    • publication of, 237

    • Basel III framework, 8, 8n8, 91, 264

    • on discount window, 200

    • goals of, 238

    • IFSB and, 202

    • on liquidity, 200

    • publication of, 238

    • Sharī’ah governance and, 201

  • BoE. See Bank of England

  • Bonds, bail-in, 89

  • Boston Consulting Group, 267 Brazil, 160–61

  • Brexit, 28, 33

  • Bridge bail-in strategy, 92

  • Bridge bank, 19–20

  • Brown, Gordon, 185

  • BRRD. See Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive

  • Capital adequacy ratio (CAR), 212

    • in Islamic banking, 214f

  • Capital instruments ranking, 21–22

  • Capital requirements directive (CRD), 11, 13, 152

    • Article 2(5), 150

    • of ECB, 148

  • Capital requirements regulation (CRR), 11, 13, 152

    • Article 4(1)(1), 148

    • of ECB, 148

  • Capital structure liabilities, in cross- border resolution, 86

  • CAR. See Capital adequacy ratio

  • CBRG. See Cross Border Resolution Group

  • CBRs. See Correspondent banking relationships

  • Central banks of Chile, 164–65

    • classical debates on, 163

    • during financial crisis of 2008, 143

    • financial stability task of, 160, 173–74

    • formal independence of, 183

    • formal mandate, 176–77

    • independence of, 162–65, 182–83

    • in Latin America, 158–59

    • liability of, 176–82

    • major financial crises and, 174

    • mandate, 173

    • monetary policy of, 185–86

    • monetary stability and, 162–65, 173–74

    • objectives of, 173–76

    • operational independence of, 183–85

    • of Peru, 164

    • reputational risk and, 182

    • systemic risk and, 166

  • Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) clearing services, 117

    • cross-border resolution and, 119–20

    • default management processes and, 118

    • equity write-down and, 115–16

    • FMIs and, 114

    • FSB on, 113–14

    • governing of, 119

    • home jurisdiction, 120

    • ISDA on, 118n84

    • under Key Attributes for Effective Resolution, 112, 114

    • legal frameworks for resolution of, 115

    • limited recourse provisions and, 117

    • loss allocation rules, 111–14

    • mutuality principle among, 115

    • netting sets and, 117–18

    • nondefault losses, 114–15

    • participants, 109n8

    • PFMI on, 119

    • recovery and resolution arrangements, 109n9, 111–16

    • Resolution Guidance, 113n38

    • resolution regime development, 114—15, 118

    • role of, 107

    • rulebook, 108, 115n54, 116, 119

    • shareholders, 114

    • silo structures and, 117

    • special resolution regimes for, 108, 108n8

    • structural elements of, 116–18

    • systemic importance of, 107–8

    • transparency and, 114–15

    • waterfall, 109–11

  • Central Reserve Bank of Peru, 167

  • Charities, 280

  • Chile central bank of, 164–65

    • financial stability councils of, 164

    • macroprudential powers in, 162–65

  • China, shadow banks in, 5

  • Chrysler, 257

  • Claim priority, in corporate debt restructuring, 130

  • Classical carve-out, in Latin America, 165–67

  • Clean holding company requirements, of TLAC, 40

  • Closed-bank bail-in, 20

  • CMGs. See Crisis management groups

  • COAGs. See Cooperation agreements

  • Comity, 96n61

  • Commercial codes, from Ottoman empire, 197

  • Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1075, 59

  • Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1450, 62–63

  • Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), historical background of, 241

  • Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure, 265

  • Common Equity Tier 1, 238

  • Concordat, 239

  • Conflict resolution, 245–46

  • Constitutional Court of Colombia, 161n10

  • Consumer prices, monetary policy and, 173n30

  • Consumer protection, in Islamic banking, 218, 222

  • Continuity of services, 118n85

  • Contractual cross-border recognition, 96–97

  • Contractual recognition clauses cross-border resolution and, 66–67

    • International Swaps and Derivatives Association on, 67

  • Cooperation agreements (COAGs), 71

  • Cooperation architecture, EU resolution framework and, 58–59

  • Cooperation mandate, cross-border resolution and, 70–71

  • Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Basel Committee, 225

    • issuing of, 239

    • revision of, 239

  • Core Principles for Islamic Finance Regulation

    • application of, 247–48

    • launching of, 205

  • Corporate debt economic growth and, 252–54

    • financial stability and, 252–54

    • insolvency laws and, 254–57

    • out-of-court procedures and, 254–57

  • Corporate governance frameworks, in Islamic banking, 217–18

  • Corporate sector, financial sector and, 130–31

  • Correspondent banking communication in, 269

    • defining, 261

    • impact of, 262–66

    • regulatory frameworks in, 270

    • supervisory frameworks in, 270

    • trends in, 262–66

  • Correspondent banking relationships (CBRs), 261

    • drives of pressures, 266–68

    • FATF on, 271

    • FSB on, 265, 268

    • IMF on, 267–68

    • industry solutions for, 268–71

    • policy responses to, 268–71

    • withdrawal from, 266, 267

  • Corruption, 257–58

  • Council Decision 98/415/EC, 145n51

  • Council of the European Union, 10 in decision-making, 18–19

  • CPPs. See Central clearing counterparties

  • CPSS. See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems

  • CRD. See Capital requirements directive

  • Creditor hierarchies cross-border resolution and, 79–80 under insolvency laws, 89

  • Criminal law, insolvency law and, 258

  • Crisis management groups (CMGs) COAG support of, 71

    • in cross-border recognition, 98

    • cross-border resolution and, 81

    • in European Union, 23

    • G-SIBs and, 56

    • non-binding memoranda of, 59

  • Critical functions, FSB on, 84n4

  • Cross-border effectiveness, 96–98

  • Cross-border insolvency, 77n76

  • Cross-border recognition CMGs in, 98

    • contractual, 96–97

    • cost allocation, 98–99

    • home-host cooperation in, 98–99

    • statutory, 96–97

  • Cross-border resolution bankrupt, 84–86

    • BRRD on, 75

    • capital structure liabilities in, 86

    • CCPs and, 119–20

    • challenges in, 77–81

    • CMGs and, 81

    • conditions for, 95

    • contractual recognition clauses and, 66–67

    • cooperation mandate and, 70–71, 80

    • creditor hierarchies and, 79–80

    • early termination rights and, 97–98

    • effectiveness of, 79–80

    • enforcement of, 71–72

    • EU and, 57

    • evolution of, 101

    • features of enforcement mechanisms, 76–77

    • firms impacted by, 100

    • FSB on, 83–84

    • funding in, 95

    • in global dimension, 64–65

    • implementation of, 65–66, 77–81

    • international approach to, 55–58

    • interpretation of, 80

    • Key Attributes for Effective Resolution and, 69–77, 87–88

    • legal mechanisms for enforcement of, 74

    • middle ground approach to, 73–74

    • MPOE and, 61

    • operating liabilities in, 86

    • operational continuity in, 95

    • operational structures and, 100

    • paradigm shifts in, 84–86

    • planning, 101

    • preferred strategies for, 60–62

    • recognition of, 74–75, 80–81

    • ring fencing and, 62–64

    • SPOE and, 61 support for, 75–76

    • territorial approach to, 73

    • in TLAC, 87–95

    • too-big-to-fail syndrome and, 55–56

    • toolkit, 86–99

    • universal approach to, 73

  • Cross Border Resolution Group (CBRG), 31

  • CRR. See Capital requirements regulation

  • Culture, 7–8

  • Debasement of currency, 186

  • Debt restructuring, 255

    • achievement of, 126

    • bank financing for, 126

    • bankruptcy and, 126

    • claim priority in, 130

    • company viability and, 126

    • consequences of failure to, 131

    • debt instruments for, 126

    • global strategy for, 126–29

    • hybrid systems for, 129

    • informal, 128–29

    • international contributions to, 133–35

    • key features of robust systems for, 129

    • in Latin America, 137

    • legal framework for, 131–32

    • mechanism design for, 130–32

    • in Mexico, 127n7, 135–40

    • miscellaneous incentives in, 132

    • out-of-court, 128–29

    • problems with, 125 state role in, 132–33

    • systemic crisis and, 127–28

    • World Bank on, 129

    • See also Corporate debt

  • Decision-making, 183, 189

    • Council of the European Union in, 18–19

    • European Commission in, 18–19

    • NRAs and, 17

  • Dedollarization, 168

  • Default losses, nondefault losses and, 115

  • Default management processes, CCPs and, 118

  • Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD), 11, 13

  • De-risking consequences of, 278

    • defining, 275–76

    • drivers of, 278

    • evidence of, 276–77

    • FATF on, 276

    • IMF on, 276

    • responses to, 278–79

  • Derivatives, OTC, 107

  • DGSD. See Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive

  • DIP financing development, 147

    • in Mexico, 137–40

  • Directive 2001/24/EC, 59, 65

  • Directive 2014/59/EU, Article 45, 88n83

  • Discount window, Basel III framework on, 200

  • Discriminatory actions, 73n3

  • Dodd-Frank Act, 30, 34, 91 «26, 158 costs under, 50 FDIC and, 71 «3

  • Duel liability standard, 181–82

  • Early termination rights, cross-border resolution and, 97–98

  • Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, 263

  • EBA. See European Banking Authority

  • ECB. See European Central Bank Economic Constitution, 157

  • Economic growth, corporate debt and, 252–54

  • EEA. See European Union/European Economic Area

  • ELA. See Emergency liquidity assistance

  • EMDEs. See Emerging markets and developing economies

  • Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), 146«18, 219

  • Emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), 3 IMF on, 4–5 regulatory reform and, 4

  • Equity write-down, CCPs and, 115–16

  • ESAs. See European Supervisory Agencies

  • ESCB. See European System of Central Banks

  • ESRB. See European System Risk Board

  • EU. See European Union

  • EU resolution framework

    • BRRD in, 14

    • components of, 14

    • cooperation architecture and, 58–59

    • SRM in, 14

  • European Banking Authority (EBA), 11, 146, 147, 188

    • BRRD and, 58

    • Framework Cooperation Arrangement of, 57n5

  • European Central Bank (ECB), 10, 188

    • advisory tasks of, 146

    • authority of, 149–50

    • CRD of, 148–49

    • CRR of, 148–49

    • ESRB and, 150

    • in euro area, 152

    • financial stability task of, 144–55

    • Governing Council, 146–47

    • independence of, 152–53

    • macroprudential powers of, 148–49, 158

    • microprudential powers of, 150–52

    • new functions of, 152–53

    • objectives of, 143–44

    • oversight of, 147

    • price stability task of, 144–55

    • separation principle of, 153–55

    • SSM and, 151, 158

    • supervisory mandate of, 151

    • synergies and tensions in functions of, 148–49

    • weaknesses of monetary policy of, 153n40

  • European Commission, 10

    • on BRRD, 47

    • in decision-making, 18–19

    • in financial crisis of 2008, 147

    • Proposal of Directive, 63–64

  • European Convention of Human Rights, 37, 180

  • European Court of Justice, 178

  • European Deposit Insurance Fund, 13

  • European Deposit Insurance Scheme, 13

  • European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, 147

  • European Monetary Union, 175n13

  • European resolution colleges, establishment of, 23–24

  • European Securities Markets Authority, 147

  • European Supervisory Agencies (ESAs), 11

  • European System of Central Banks (ESCB) Article 14.4 of statute of, 147

    • enforcement powers of, 149

    • objective of, 144

    • secondary tasks of, 145

    • TFEU on, 144–45

  • European System of Financial Supervision, 147

    • establishment of, 11

  • European System Risk Board (ESRB), 146, 148

    • amendments to, 149n26

    • ECB and, 150

    • enforcement powers of, 149

  • European Treaty, 57

  • European Union (EU) crisis management groups in, 23

    • cross-border resolution and, 57

    • financial crisis of 2008 response of, 32, 57

    • harmonization within, 79–80 on MREL, 39

  • European Union/European Economic Area (EEA), 73

  • Eurosystem on financial stability, 146

    • objectives of, 144, 146

    • oversight of, 146n17

  • Ex ante cooperation agreements, for G-SIFIs, 71

  • Exchange rate volatility, 168

  • Executive Session, SRB, 17–18

    • Exit strategies BoE on, 38

    • FDIC on, 38

    • SPOE in, 35

  • Failure resolution, 85

  • FATF. See Financial Action Task Force

  • Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 29, 43, 180

    • Dodd-Frank Act and, 71 n3

    • on exit strategies, 38

    • under OLA, 31

    • on resolution strategies, 36

  • Federal Deposit Insurance Fund, 13

  • Federal Reserve, 96n44

    • SIFIs and, 47

    • on TLAC, 40

    • Federal Reserve Rule, 40, 43

    • restrictiveness of, 41

  • Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 232

    • on AML/CFT requirements, 233, 267

    • on CBRs, 271

    • on de-risking, 276

    • on financial institutions, 233

    • on money laundering, 233

    • Recommendations of, 233

  • Financial Conduct Authority, 38

  • Financial crisis of 2008 central banks during, 143

    • EU response to, 32, 57

    • European Commission in, 147

    • international responses to, 30

    • origins of, 28–29

    • reforms after, 3, 28

    • regulation during, 28

    • SIFIs in, 28

    • UK response to, 32–33

    • US response to, 30–32

  • Financial market infrastructure (FMI), 117n33

    • access to, 118n35

    • CCPs and, 114

    • implementation guidance of, 108n2

    • PFMI on, 119n36

  • Financial Market Supervisory Authority, 71 n3

  • Financial Policy Committee, 158

  • Financial sector, corporate sector and, 130–31

  • Financial Sector Assessment Programs, 4, 239, 265–66

  • Financial Services Act 2012, 32

  • Financial Services Authority, 179

  • Financial stability of central banks, 160, 173–74

    • of ECB, 144–55

    • enhanced focus on, 147–48

    • of Eurosystem, 146

    • monetary policy and, 163

    • preservation of, 145 n12

    • value of, 145

  • Financial stability, corporate debt and, 252–54

  • Financial Stability Board (FSB), 3–4, 6, 23, 30, 55–56, 181n26

    • on bail-in strategy, 85–86

    • on CBRs, 265, 268

    • on CCPs, 113–14

    • on critical functions, 84n4

    • on cross-border resolution, 83–84

    • goals of, 240

    • history of, 240

    • in international regulation, 240

    • on Islamic banking, 247

    • on Key Attributes for Effective Resolution, 78, 83–84

    • objectives of, 39

    • on shadow banks, 240

    • on SIFIs, 39–40

    • Supervisory Intensity and Effectiveness work stream of, 7

    • term sheets, 92n27

    • on TLAC, 39–40

    • on TLAC Standard, 56

    • trend monitoring by, 265

    • See also Key Attributes for Effective Resolution, FSB

  • Financial Stability Committee, 158

  • Financial stability councils of Chile, 164

    • in Latin America, 159–61

    • in Peru, 161

  • Financial Stability Oversight Council, 158

  • FMI. See Financial market infrastructure

  • Foreign Bank Organization, 64–65

  • Foreign resolutions, 75–76

  • Formal independence, of central bank, 183

  • Framework Cooperation Arrangement, of EBA, 57n5

  • France, 47

    • bank supervisor liability in, 178

  • Fraud, 257–58

  • Friedman, Milton, on inflation, 186

  • FSB. See Financial Stability Board

  • Functional approach, 245

  • G10. See Group of 10

  • G20. See Group of 20

  • García-Escribano, Mercedes, 168

  • General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), 165, 166, 167n31

  • General Motors, 257

  • Germany, 89

    • bank supervisor liability in, 177–78

  • Gharar, 199, 226

  • Global Economy Meeting, 241 Global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), 23, 39–40

    • CMGs and, 56

    • entities within, 91

    • failure of, 56

    • MPOE for, 90

    • public disclosures, 94n32

    • securities, 94

    • TLAC and, 88n14

  • Global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs), 69

    • ex ante cooperation agreements for, 71

  • Going-concern capital, 238

  • Goldman Sachs v. Novo Banco, 66, 80n21

  • Government bonds, 175n12

    • defining, 182n20

    • See also the State

  • Group of 10 (G10), 236, 241

  • Group of 20 (G20), 6–7, 107

  • G-SIBs. See Global systemically important banks

  • G-SIFIs. See Global systemically important financial institutions

  • Haircutting initial margin, 110

    • variation margin gains, 110

  • Harmonization, 65

    • within EU, 79–80

    • between resolution regimes, 78

  • Helicopter money, 174n11

  • Holding companies, 91 n26

  • Home-host cooperation, in cross-border recognition, 98–99

  • Hong Kong Special Administration Region, 75

  • Huertas, Thomas, 55

  • Human resources, in international regulation, 245–46

  • Hyperinflation, in Peru, 168

  • IADI. See International Association of Deposit Insurers

  • IFSB. See Islamic Financial Services Board

  • Ijara, 212

  • IMF. See International Monetary Fund

  • India, insolvency law in, 256

  • Indirect bail-in strategy, 92

  • Inflation, Friedman on, 186

  • Inflation shocks, 185

  • Informal restructuring, 128–29

  • Information sharing, 270

  • Initial margin defining, 109n9

    • haircutting, 110

  • Insolvency law criminal law and, 258

    • defining, 258

    • n India, 256

  • Insolvency laws, 48

    • corporate debt and, 254–57

    • creditor hierarchy under, 89

    • cross-border, 77n16

    • formal, 254–55

    • NCWOL and, 255–56

    • out-of-court procedures and, 254–57

    • SIFIs and, 29

    • See also Mexican Insolvency Law

  • Insolvency regime, key features of, 129–30

  • Instituto Federal de Especialistas de Concursos Mercantiles, 136n8

  • Integrated approach, 245–46, 246n29

  • International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), historical background of, 241–42

  • International Association of Insurance Providers, 199

  • International Association of Restructuring Insolvency & Bankruptcy Professionals, 135, 254

  • International cooperation, SRB and, 23–24

  • International Monetary Fund (IMF), 73, 263–66

    • Article IV consultations of, 271

    • in Asian financial crisis of 1990s, 252

    • on CBRs, 267–68

    • on de-risking, 276

    • on EMDEs, 4–5

    • Financial Sector Assessment Programs, 4

    • on Islamic finance, 197

    • as legal phenomenon, 156

    • on middle ground approach, 74

    • monitoring conducted by, 244–45

    • Policy Paper, 266

    • on rule of law, 157

    • on shadow banks, 5

  • International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 193, 241

  • International regulation Basel Committee and, 236–39

    • consistent implementation of, 246

    • FSB in, 240

    • functional approach to supervision of, 245

    • human resources in, 245–46

    • IFSB in, 243

    • implementation challenges in, 244–48

    • integrated approach to supervision of, 245—46, 246n29

    • Islamic banking and, 242–44, 247–48

    • monitoring, 244–45

    • practical application of standards in, 246—47

    • resolution regimes in, 240

    • timely implementation of, 246

    • twin peaks approach to supervision of, 245–46, 246n29

  • International standards, of bank resolution, 188–89

  • International Swap Dealers Association, 78 on safeguards, 79

  • International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), 36, 97

    • on CCPs, 118n34

    • on contractual recognition clauses, 67

  • Investment risk reserve (IRR), 212

  • IOSCO. See International Organization of Securities Commissions

  • Iran, 198

  • IRR. See Investment risk reserve

  • ISDA. See International Swaps and Derivatives Association

  • Islamic banking AML/CFT requirements for, 232–34

    • assets by country, 210f

    • asset structure, 213f

    • bail-in strategies and, 232

    • balance sheet structure in, 211–12, 227

    • banking products in, 227–28

    • benefits of, 224n1

    • capital adequacy ratio in, 214f

    • concentration of, 211

    • consumer protection in, 218, 222

    • conventional banking and, 221, 226–28

    • corporate governance frameworks in, 217–18

    • corporate structure in, 211–12, 226

    • defining, 224

    • financial soundness of, 212–13

    • financing in, by instrument, 213f

    • financing structure in, by sector, 213f

    • FSB on, 247

    • growth of, 208

    • institutional arrangements in, 230

    • international regulation and, 242–44, 247–48

    • Islamic jurisprudence in, 226

    • Key Attributes for Effective Resolution on, 228

    • legal frameworks for, 224–25, 228–32

    • liability structure in, 213f

    • licenses for, 221

    • liquid asset ratio in, 214f

    • liquidity management in, 219–20

    • market share of, 210f

    • maturities in, 219n13

    • nonperforming financing in, 214f

    • outlook of, 212–13

    • purchase-and-assumption in, 231–32

    • recent developments in, 209–14

    • regulatory frameworks, 214–16

    • resolution framework in, 220

    • resolution powers and tools, 231

    • resolution triggers in, 230–31

    • return on assets in, 214f

    • safety nets in, 229 scale of, 209–11

    • shares of global assets in, 210f

    • Sharī’ah governance in, 201

    • supervisory frameworks in, 216–17, 222

    • systemic importance of, 209

  • Islamic capital markets, 204–5

  • Islamic finance Basel Committee on, 203

    • Basel II framework and, 199–201

    • Core Principles for Islamic Finance Regulation, 205

    • distinctive qualities of, 195–96

    • IMF on, 197

    • liquidity in, 200

    • regulatory challenges in, 196–97

    • structure of, 210f

    • transparency in, 196–97

    • World Bank on, 205

  • Islamic Financial Services Act, 229

  • Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 193, 225

    • adoption of standards of, 221

    • Bank for International Settlements and, 247

    • Basel III framework and, 202

    • establishment of, 243

    • expected new standards, 199f

    • implementation challenges, 204f

    • implementation progress, 201–6

    • implementation surveys, 201 f, 202

    • in international regulation, 243

    • major focuses of, 200f

    • medium-term agenda of, 203–6

    • Quantitative Impact Survey, 201

    • Revised Capital Adequacy Standard, 200

    • role of, 243

    • on Sharī’ah, 194–95

    • Stability Forum, 205

    • standards by timeline, 203f

    • standard-setting by, 198–201

    • Strategic Performance Plan, 203–5

    • World Bank and, 247

  • Islamic Financial Stability Forum, 205

  • Islamic jurisprudence, in Islamic banking, 226

  • Italy, bank supervisor liability in, 178–79

  • Jakarta Initiative, 253

  • Kechichian case, 178

  • Key Attributes for Effective Resolution, FSB, 7, 30, 31, 83n3, 107–8

    • on bank resolution, 188–89

    • BRRD and, 58–59

    • CCPs under, 112, 114

    • cross-border resolution and, 69–77, 87–88

    • FSB on, 78, 83–84

    • implementation of, 78, 83–84

    • on Islamic banking, 228

    • objectives of, 240

    • on safeguards, 79

    • stabilization powers in, 87–88

    • on transparency, 119n36

    • wind-down powers in, 88

  • King, Mervyn, 55

  • Kotnik case, 66

  • Larosière, Jacques de, 147

  • Larosière Report, 147, 150

  • Latin America central banks in, 158–59

    • classical carve-out in, 165–67

    • corporate debt restructuring in, 137

    • financial stability councils in, 159–61

    • macroprudential exemptions in, 165–67

    • macroprudential powers in, 160t, 162–69

  • Lawson, Nigel, 185

  • Legal-entity-driven processes, 117

  • Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, UNCITRAL, 134

  • Ley de Concursos Mercantiles, 125, 135

  • Liability structure, in Islamic banking, 213f

  • Limited recourse provisions, CCPs and, 117

  • Liquidity asset ratio in Islamic banking, 214f

    • Basel III framework on, 200

    • emergency liquidity assistance, 146n18

    • in Islamic finance, 200

    • management in Islamic banking, 219–20

    • of SIFIs, 48

  • Long-term debt, of SIFIs, 38–39

  • Loss absorption, bail-in and, 20–21

  • Loss allocation rules, CCP, 111–14

    • waterfall and, 110

    • Luxembourg, 22

  • Macroprudential exemptions, in Latin America, 165–67

  • Macro Prudential Forum, 158

  • Macroprudential powers in Chile, 162–65

    • of ECB, 148, 158

    • implementation of, 167–69

    • in Latin America, 160t, 162–69

    • in Peru, 162–65, 167–69

  • Macroprudential supervision defining, 172

    • independence in, 186–87

    • regulation of, 172, 187–88

    • scope of, 171–72

    • stricto sensu, 188

    • systemic risk and, 187

  • Major financial crises, central banks and, 174

  • Market Risk Amendment to Capital Accord, Basel Committee, 237

  • Matsushita, Mitsuo, 165–66

  • Mediation Panel, 154

  • Mexicana case, 135

  • Mexican Insolvency Law

    • Article 37, 138

    • Article 43, 138

    • Article 75, 138–39

    • Article 224, 139

    • key features of, 255

    • Probability of Default in, 139

    • Severity of Loss in, 139

  • Mexico, 125, 280 bankruptcy in, 131 n3

    • companies and credit in, 136–37

    • corporate debt restructuring in, 127n1, 135–40

    • DIP financing in, 137–40

    • financial crisis in, 131 n4 NPLs in, 253

  • Microprudential powers, of ECB, 150–52

  • Middle ground approach to cross-border resolution, 73–74

    • IMF on, 74

  • Minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), 88

    • bail-in and, 20

    • BRRD and, 46, 62–63

    • establishment of, 15 EU on, 39

    • setting of, 59

    • TLAC and, 46

  • Misfeasance, 179

  • Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, UNCITRAL, 134

  • Monetary policy antideflationary, 174

    • of central banks, 185–86

    • consumer prices and, 173n10

    • debasement of currency through, 186

    • of ECB, 153n40

    • financial stability and, 163

    • independence in conduct of, 185–86

    • systemic risk and, 187

  • Monetary stability central banks and, 162–65, 173–74

    • ordoliberalism on, 162

  • Money laundering, 205

    • FATF on, 233

    • See also Antimoney laundering and combating the financing of terrorism requirements

  • MPOE. See Multiple point of entry

  • MREL. See Minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities

  • Mudarabah, 212, 215, 219

  • Multiple point of entry (MPOE) cross-border resolution and, 61

    • for G-SIBs, 90

    • SIFIs and, 34

  • Murabahah, 212, 219n13

  • Musharakah, 212, 215

  • National Banking and Securities Commission, 279

  • National Bank of Greece v. Metliss, 96, 96n39

  • National competent authorities (NCAs), 147

  • National resolution authorities (NRAs), 10

    • decision-making and, 17

    • resolution tools of, 19

    • safeguards, 21

    • SRB and, 15–19

  • National Sharī’ah board (NSB), 217

  • NCAs. See National competent authorities

  • NCWOL. See No creditor worse off than in liquidation

  • Netting sets, CCPs and, 117–18

  • No creditor worse off than in liquidation (NCWOL), 88, 113n18

    • determination of, 117

    • insolvency laws and, 255–56

    • violation of, 94

  • Nondefault losses CCPs and, 114–15

    • default losses and, 115

  • Nonperforming financing, in Islamic banking, 214f

  • Nonperforming loans (NPL) bankruptcy and, 125

    • in Mexico, 253

    • recognition of, 253

  • Nonprofit organizations (NPOs), 264

  • NPL. See Nonperforming loans

  • NPOs. See Nonprofit organizations

  • NRAs. See National resolution authorities

  • NSB. See National Sharī’ah board

  • Occupy movement, 28

  • OLA. See Orderly Liquidation Authority De Oliveira, Cristiano de, 160–61

  • Open-bank bail-in, 20, 92

  • Operating liabilities in cross-border resolution, 86

    • subordination to, 88–89

    • TLAC and, 88–89

  • Operational continuity, in cross-border resolution, 95

  • Operational independence of central bank, 183–85

    • degrees of, 184

    • scope of, 184–85

  • Operational structures cross-border resolution and, 100

    • rationalization of, 100

  • Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), 30, 34, 35

    • FDIC under, 31

  • Ordoliberalism, 157 on monetary stability, 162

  • OTC derivatives. See Over-the-counter derivatives

  • Ottoman empire, commercial codes from, 197

  • Out-of-court procedures consensus in, 254

    • corporate debt and, 254–57

    • insolvency laws and, 254–57

    • the state in, 255

  • Out-of-court restructuring, 128–29

  • Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, 107

  • Pacific Alliance, 161

  • Par condicio creditoris, 130

  • Pari passu treatment, 22, 89

  • Peer reviews, 244

  • PER. See profit equalization reserves Perception-based surveys, 262

    • global, 263

    • regional, 263–66

  • Peru central bank of, 164

    • economy of, 168

    • financial stability councils in, 161

    • hyperinflation in, 168

    • macroprudential powers in, 162–65, 167–69

  • Peru-United States Free Trade Agreement, 166

  • Peter Paul case, 177

  • PFMI. See Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures

  • Plenary Session, SRB, 17–18

  • Presidential election of 2016, 28

  • Price stability task, of ECB, 144–55

  • Principle of attribution, 163

  • Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, 134

  • Principles for Cross-Border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions, 57

  • Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI), 109n9, 110–11

    • CCPs and, 119

    • development of, 241

    • on FMIs, 119n96

  • Principle 1, 119n36

  • Principle 4, 110n14

  • Profit equalization reserves (PER), 212

  • Profit-sharing investment accounts (PSIAs), 211

  • Prudential Regulation Authority, 179

  • PSIAs. See Profit-sharing investment accounts

  • Public officials, the state and, 133

  • Public policy, 77, 77n16

  • Qar, 220

  • Quantitative easing, 174

  • Realpolitik, 158

  • Reattribution, 162

  • Recapitalization, 40–41

  • Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program, 8

    • establishment of, 244

  • Regulatory reform, 3

    • asset management industry and, 6

    • bail-in in, 33–50

    • compression of, 8

    • EMDEs and, 4

    • financial deepening and, 4–5

    • financial inclusion and, 4–5

    • gaps in, 9

    • monitoring, 9

    • process of, 28–30

    • shadow banks in, 5

    • systemic risk and, 6

    • too-big-to-fail syndrome and, 6–7

  • Reorganisation measures, 65

  • Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes, 244

  • Reputational risk, central banks and, 182

  • Resolution colleges establishment of, 23 European, 23–24

  • Resolution entities defining, 90 TLAC and, 90–91

  • Resolution groups, TLAC and, 90–91

  • Resolution regimes, harmonization between, 78

  • Resolution strategies of BoE, 33 FDIC on, 36 in UK, 33

  • Resolution tools of NRAs, 19 of SRB, 19

  • Resolvability conditions, 95

  • Respondent banks capacity of, 269–70

    • communication with, 269 defining, 261

  • Restricted investment accounts (RIA), 216

  • Restructuring actions, 20

  • Retakāul, 209

  • Return on assets, in Islamic banking, 214f

  • Revised Capital Adequacy Standard, IFSB, 200

  • RIA. See Restricted investment accounts

  • Riba, 226, 231

  • Ring fencing, 42

    • adverse consequences of, 55

    • cross-border resolution and, 62–64

  • Risk reassessment, 280

  • Risk sharing, 212

  • Risk-weighted assets framework, 8–9

  • Rule of law defining, 157 IMF on, 157

  • Safeguards, BRRD, 22

  • Sainz, Alejandro, 137 Sale of business tools, 19–20

  • Sapin 2 law, 47

  • Satmex case, 135

  • SDIS. Sharī’ah-compliant deposit insurance schemes

  • Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 36

  • Separation principle, of ECB, 153–55

  • Shadow banks in China, 5

    • drivers of, 5

    • financial development and, 5

    • FSB on, 240

    • IMF on, 5

    • in regulatory reform, 5

  • Shareholders CCP, 114 rights of, 94n35

  • Sharī’ah advisory board, 195

  • Sharī’ah-compliant deposit insurance schemes (SDIS), 220

  • Sharī’ah governance, 200

    • Basel III framework and, 201

    • compliance with, 229–30, 247

    • IFSB on, 194–95

    • in Islamic banking, 201

    • noncompliance with, 217

    • strengthening, 221–22

  • Sharī’ah test, toxic assets and, 195

  • SIFIs. See Systemically important financial institutions

  • Silo structures, CCPs and, 117

  • Single liability standard, 180–81

    • Single point of entry (SPOE), 34

    • BoE and, 36–38

    • corporate structure and, 61

    • cross-border resolution and, 61

    • exit strategy in, 35

    • summary of, 35–36

    • support for, 76

    • United Kingdom and, 36–38

  • Single Resolution Board (SRB), 10, 60

    • appeal panel, 22

    • establishment of, 14–15

    • Executive Session in, 17–18

    • functioning of, 14–15

    • international cooperation and, 23–24

    • NRAs and, 15–19

    • Plenary Session in, 17–18

    • resolution tools of, 19

    • SRM and, 17

  • Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), 10, 60

    • Article 21, 21

    • BRRD and, 14n48

    • establishment of, 12–13, 148

    • in EU resolution framework, 14

    • functioning of, 14–15, 17

    • safeguards, 21 SRB and, 17

  • Single Rulebook applications of, 13

    • Banking Union and, 13

    • establishment of, 11–12

    • main texts of, 13

  • Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Article 5 of, 149

    • Article 6(4) of, 152n37

    • Article 6 of, 152n38

    • Article 25, 154

    • Article 25(5), 154

    • Article 41 of, 151

    • Article 71, 152n37

    • Article 72, 152n37

    • ECB and, 151, 158

    • establishment of, 12–13, 148

    • Recital 55 of, 155

    • Recital 65 of, 154n42

  • Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), 261, 265

  • Special resolution regimes, for CCPs, 108, 108n6

  • SPOE. See Single point of entry

  • SRB. See Single Resolution Board

  • SRM. See Single Resolution Mechanism

  • SSM. See Single Supervisory Mechanism

  • Stabilization powers, in Key Attributes for Effective Resolution, 87–88

  • Stare decisis, 196

    • the State in corporate debt restructuring, 132–33

    • as creditor, 133

    • as debtor, 133

    • as entrepreneur, 133

    • in out-of-court procedures, 255

    • public officials and, 133

    • as regulator, 132–33

    • as supervisor, 132–33

  • Statutory bail-in, 115

  • Statutory cross-border recognition, 96–97

  • Steering Committee, 154

  • Strategic Performance Plan, IFSB, 203–5

  • Sub-Saharan Africa, 262

  • Subsidiaries, 80 TLAC Standard on, 92

  • Substituting repos, 169

  • Sudan, 198

  • Sukûk, 194, 209, 212, 219

  • Surplus TLAC, 93

  • SWIFT. See Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications

  • Switzerland, 89

  • Systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), 27

    • bail-ins and, 38–48

    • corporate reorganizations of, 49

    • Federal Reserve and, 47

    • in financial crisis of 2008, 28

    • FSB on, 39–40

    • global, 43

    • insolvency of, 29

    • liquid assets of, 48

    • long-term debt of, 38–39

    • MPOE approach, 34

    • powers of, 31–32

    • recovery plans, 48–49

    • total loss absorbing capacity and, 38–48

    • See also Global systemically important banks

  • Systemic crisis, corporate debt restructuring and, 127–28

  • Systemic risk assessment of, 187

    • central banks and, 166

    • macroprudential supervision and, 187

    • monetary policy and, 187

    • regulatory reform and, 6

  • T2S, 146

    • Takāful, 196, 198, 204, 209, 220

  • Take-up rate, 202

  • TARGET2, 146

  • Tawarruq, 219n93

  • Tea Party movement, 28

  • Tear-up, 110

  • Territorial approach, to cross-border resolution, 73

  • Terrorism, 227

    • See also Antimoney laundering and combating the financing of terrorism requirements

  • TFEU. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

  • TLAC. See Total loss absorbing capacity

  • TLAC Standard, 41

    • FSB on, 56, 88n15

    • on subsidiaries, 92

  • Too-big-to-fail syndrome, 27, 128

    • addressing, 30

    • cross-border resolution and, 55–56

    • elimination of, 50

    • further implementation steps for addressing, 48–50

    • regulatory reform and, 6–7

  • Total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC), 7, 64, 80

    • accumulation of, 100

    • bail-in strategy and, 38–48

    • BRRD and, 46

    • clean holding company requirements of, 40

    • in cross-border resolution, 87–95

    • disclosure of, 93–94

    • external, 40, 91

    • Federal Reserve Board on, 40

    • FSB on, 39–40

    • G-SIBs and, 88n14

    • internal, 40, 43, 91–92

    • location of, 90–91

    • MREL and, 46

    • operational liabilities and, 88–89

    • requirements for, 87–88

    • resolution entities and, 90–91

    • resolution groups and, 90–91

    • restrictions on, 93

    • SIFIs and, 38–48

    • standards, 42

    • surplus, 93

    • term sheets, 92n27

  • Toxic assets, Sharī’ah test and, 195

  • Transactional traffic banks, 271

  • Transparency CCPs and, 114–15

    • in Islamic finance, 196–97

    • Key Attributes for Effective Resolution on, 119n36

  • Treaty of Maastricht, 144

  • Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)

    • Article 3, 144

    • Article 123, 162n13

    • Article 127(1), 144

    • Article 127(4), 145

    • Article 127(5), 144

    • Article 127(6), 150

    • on ESCB, 144–45

  • Twin peaks approach, 245–46, 246n29

  • UK. See United Kingdom

  • UNCITRAL. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

  • Union of Arab Banks, 263–64, 277

  • United Banking Corporation, 178

  • United Kingdom (UK) bank supervisor liability, 179

    • financial crisis of 2008

    • response of, 32–33

    • resolution strategies in, 33

    • SPOE and, 36–38

  • United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 96

    • Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 134

    • Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 134

    • Working Group V, 135

  • United States financial crisis of 2008 response of, 30–32

    • secular jurisdiction in, 197

  • Universal approach, to cross-border resolution, 73

  • Uruguay, 161

  • Valuations, BoE on, 38

  • Value-at-risk models, 237

  • Variation margin gains haircutting, 110

  • Veto, power of, 184

  • Vitro case, 135

  • Volcker Rule, 42

  • Waterfall CCP, 109–11

    • defining, 108

    • loss allocation tools, 110

  • Wind-down powers, in Key Attributes for Effective Resolution, 88

  • Working Group on Deposit Insurance, 241

  • World Bank, 277

    • on corporate debt restructuring, 129

    • IFSB and, 247

    • on Islamic finance, 205

    • monitoring conducted by, 244–45

    • Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, 134

  • Zakat, 234