Chapter 3: Argentina and its Implications, The Exceptional Access Policy, and Mechanisms to Resolve Collective Action Problems
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Ms. Julianne Ams
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Mr. Tamon Asonuma
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Mr. Wolfgang Bergthaler
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Ms. Chanda M DeLong
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Ms. Nouria El Mehdi
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Mr. Mark J Flanagan
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Mr. Sean Hagan
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Ms. Yan Liu
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Charlotte J. Lundgren
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Mr. Martin Mühleisen
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Alex Pienkowski
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Mr. Gustavo Pinto
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Mr. Eric Robert
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Abstract

1. In 2001–02, Argentina experienced one of the worst economic crises in its history. The severity of the crisis, and the economic/political complexity for debt crisis resolution made it particularly important to examine what lessons could be learned from it [40]. The circumstances of the crisis highlighted the need to establish a better framework for countries to exit in a timely fashion from unsustainable debt dynamics. In the aftermath of the crisis, the IMF focused its work particularly on two areas aiming to promote a more orderly system for the resolution of sovereign debt crises: rethinking the framework for committing exceptional levels of IMF resources, and considering methods for addressing collective action problems. On the latter, the IMF considered in parallel both statutory and contractual approaches.