Notes
Introduction: The Needle (and the Damage Done)
A central argument of this book is that the 2008–09 US financial crisis and the 2008–12 Euro area crisis were joined at the hip, hence the descriptor the North Atlantic crisis.
“National reputation hangs on IKB rescue”, Financial Times, August 2, 2007.
Measured using the FTSEurofirst 300 index.
The exceptions are Greece and Ireland, where the IMF estimates provide implausibly small losses in output. For Greece, I simply assume the cost of the crisis was 30 percent of output, slightly larger than the equivalent figure for Portugal, and in Ireland I assume 5 percent of GDP rather than the positive number implied by IMF estimates.
For a discussion of the spillovers from the United States see IMF (2011).
For example, they are close to the “low” scenario reported in Cline (2017), Chapter 2.
For a useful discussion and comparison see Cline (2017), Chapter 2.
It has often ben remarked that no major bankers were prosecuted after the crisis, but just as striking is that no financial experts lost their jobs. One possible exception is Shelia Blair of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, who resigned at the end of her term in 2011. She, of course, was a fierce critic of Wall Street and a woman to boot.
In the United Kingdom, two major banks (Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds) had to be rescued and Barclays came under major stress; in Switzerland, the largest bank, UBS, also required government support. Both countries have interesting, if somewhat different, stories. The problems of UBS came from their major presence in the US markets, and hence is a case of US financial spillovers onto an otherwise sound banking system. The UK case is in many ways the opposite, a homegrown crisis with only limited dalliance in US markets except for Barclays bank.
Examples for the US include Wessel (2010), Paulson (2013), Geithner (2014), and Bernanke (2015), and for the Euro area crisis Pisani-Ferry (2014), Sandbu (2015), Brunnermeier, James, and Landau (2016), and Stiglitz (2016).
For example, Wolf (2014) and King (2016)
A similar view on the United Kingdom is provided by Haldane (2009).
1 European Banks Unfettered
Laeven and Valencia (2012), Table 1. The crises were assessed as systemic, except in the cases of France, Italy, and Portugal.
Price Waterhouse (1988), Murphy (1999), and Dermine (2002).
Merler and Véron (2015) report that banking made up 88 percent of financing in Europe, versus 30 percent in the United States.
The nationalizations were partially reversed by the incoming right-wing government of Jacques Chirac, although the banking system was not fully privatized until 2002 (Plessis, 2003).
Holton (1986); see also Sachs and Wyplosz (1986).
Price Waterhouse (1988), p. 8.
European Council Directive 88/361/EEC. Ireland, Portugal and Spain were allowed to maintain temporary restrictions, mainly on short-term movements, until 31 December 1992, and for Greece the deadline was 30 June 1994. As a safeguard, the directive included a clause enabling member states to take protective measures if short-term capital movements of exceptional size seriously disrupted the conduct of monetary policy, but the transition went smoothly and no country used the option. As a result, capital controls and the associated barriers to European-wide banking became a thing of the past in the European Union by the early 1990s.
European Central Bank (2000) has a detailed discussion.
While there was a modest increase in the fiscal responsibilities of the European Union, fiscal policy remained overwhelmingly at the national level.
James (2012), pp. 313–17.
It presumably also reflected lobbying by the national regulators who, like most institutions and people, preferred to retain their jobs.
In the final text, Article 105.5 of the Treaty stated that “The ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system” (emphasis added).
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2007). See also Goodhart (2011) who provides a detailed history of the Committee’s actions from 1974 to 1997.
Ibid., p. 45.
Goodhart (2011), Chapter 6, provides a detailed discussion of this process.
Ibid., paragraph 3.
Off-balance-sheet items were first given a “conversion factor” which translated then into the equivalent on-balance-sheet risk and then were assigned to the on-balance-sheet risk buckets.
Goodhart (2011), pp. 247–9.
This issue was further confounded by the inability to reach agreement on uniform capital rules for market risk with the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which covered the US investment banking houses. The European universal banks were thus under a different regime for safety and soundness than the US investment banks, providing ample opportunities for requests to lower standards so as to provide a more level playing field.
Goodhart (2011), Chapter 7, Appendix J. The exact quote is that “roughly 7 to 10 of 15 banks produced estimates of risk within a range of plus or minus 25 percent of the median estimate”.
Greenspan (2008), pp. 372–3.
Dermine (2002), Table 13.
Branches were a more popular method of entry in the southern countries than in the northern core.
An additional underlying factor was the information technology revolution, which tended to favor large banks with widespread operations over small banks with local knowledge.
The vertical axis shows the ratio of the book value of equity to total assets, the horizontal axis the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets.
2 US Shadow Banks Unleashed
For example Johnson and Kwak (2011). My analysis is based on longer historical over-views of US financial deregulation, such as Kroszner and Strahan (2014) and (for a more jaundiced view) Sherman (2009).
The Emergency Home Finance Act allowed Freddie and Fannie to buy and sell mortgages not insured or guaranteed by the federal government.
Over time, the caps on lending rates were gradually eliminated by a combination of favorable legal decisions, regulatory competition across states, and lower inflation. The major legal step was the 1978 Supreme Court ruling that the National Banking Act allowed a bank to charge up to the maximum rate allowed by its home state regardless of the location of the borrower. This created incentives for states to raise or eliminate the caps on interest rates so as to make their banks more competitive, particularly in the much less geographically constrained credit card business. Delaware and South Dakota were the first to eliminate their usury laws altogether, leading to a rapid expansion in their banks’ credit card business. By 1988 a further 18 states had removed all restrictions. Elsewhere, the reduction in inflation in the 1990s made usury laws much less important except as regards extremely high-risk loans. By this time, however, the transfer of loans to the shadow banking system as a result of the simple leverage ratio was well underway.
Haltom (2013) provides more detail.
Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation (1997a) contains for a detailed description.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1998) contains for more detail.
In addition, the act reduced the incentives for insured banks to take risks by introducing risk-based deposit insurance charges and the incentives to widen bailout to include non-insured creditors by directing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to resolve a bank in the least costly way to the insurance fund.
In an important legal ruling, automatic teller machines were ruled to not constitute bank branches, allowing them to be set up without regard to rules on the location of bank offices.
For example, Johnson and Kwak (2011).
There are also separate regulators for credit unions and, before 2010, thrifts.
Moseby (2016).
Their origins lay in financing physical trade. Merchants would accept money from investors in return for providing a portion of the profits from the voyage assuming the ship and its cargo arrived safely. Investment banks would accept such paper at a discount that reflected the uncertainties involved in the voyage. From the start, they were heavily involved in making markets work.
For discussions and definitions of the shadow banking system see Pozsar and others (2013), Adrian and Shin (2009), and Adrian and Ashcraft (2012).
A famous early exposition is Lewis (1989).
See Edwards (1999) for more on hedge funds.
Ibid.
Of the three main rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch), one looked only at the likelihood of default and not at the amount of money that could be recovered should the security default, another took both default and losses into consideration, while the last focused on loss given default. These methodologies are easily available on their web sites.
The repo data include federal funds transactions, but since these were lent at a penalty rate it can be assumed the vast majority of the funds are private repos.
3 Boom and Bust
In addition, the core northern European banks expanded into other regions and businesses, such as Eastern Europe and trade credit. This development helped spread the impact of the subsequent North Atlantic financial bust to the rest of the world.
Securities and Exchange Commission (2003b). As preparation for this in March 2003 the SEC had issued a Final Rule that delegated the authority to “expand the categories of permissible collateral” for such repos to the Director of the Division of Market Regulation (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003a, Section IIIA).
It also extended safe haven status to other collateralized loans such as swaps, in which banks “swapped” interest payments on loans linked to interest rates of different maturities (e.g., 3-month and 1-year rates) or in different currencies.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005a and 2005b). Regulations on covered bonds were also modernized. Covered bonds, mainly used by European banks, were bonds that were backed by specific loans on a bank’s balance sheet, which meant that they would pay out even if the bank went bankrupt as long as the borrowers of the loans continued to pay.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005a), paragraph 3.
Kiff and Mills (2007) discuss mortgage originations and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2016) discuss the dynamics of mortgage-backed asset spread.
Mayer, Pence and Sherlund (2009) and Amromin and Paulson (2010) discuss the deterioration in subprime loans over time.
Tarullo (2008), p. 89.
Mortgage loans attracted a risk weight of 50 percent while mortgage-backed securities had a weight of only 20 percent.
McDonough laid out three rationales for such a review. In the face of more intense competition, arbitrage strategies were undermining the value of Basel 1; that capital adequacy rules should be supplemented by supervision and market discipline; and the need to attend to operational risk from unlikely but major shocks. Tarullo (2008), pp. 91–2.
While the preamble to the proposal advocated a three-pillar approach, comprising capital rules, supervision, and market discipline, the Committee’s work was and would continue to be focused on capital rules.
The biggest rise in capital occurred when using the foundation internal risk-based model, implying little or no incentive for banks using the standard approach to adopt this model. On the other hand, the advanced approach produced the smallest increase in overall capital charges, with a fall in capital for credit risk more than offsetting additional charges for operational risk.
Tarullo (2008), p. 113.
In addition, the Committee started coming under pressure from politicians, including, for example, German concerns over the risk weights for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
Tarullo (2008), p. 114.
On the way to the final rule a third consultative paper was released but it did not contain any fundamental changes in course.
Tarullo (2008), p. 160.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision (2006).
The 15 percent figure involved weighting banks by their capital, which put more weight on banks with large capital buffers.
Summary section of the report.
The Basel study aggregated results for QIS-4 and QIS-5, and adjusted the results for QIS-4 by the new 1.06 scaling factor for internal-ratings-based capital requirements (this scaling factor was not included in the US agencies’ report).
Financial Services Agency (2005).
Quoted in Alford (2010).
In the words of Alan Greenspan, testifying to the US Congress in October 2008: “I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations specifically banks and others were such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders.”
Tarullo (2008) and Herring (2007) contains trenchant contemporary assessments of the US process, and Getter (2014) for a more recent discussion.
All Euro area banking systems increased their assets by 40 to 150 percent of output between 2002 and 2009 except Ireland (where it rose by an astonishing 660 percent). Luxemburg is excluded as it is essentially an off-shore center.
While equivalent data are not available, it seems likely that the UK banks also expanded into investment banking. This was certainly true of the Irish banks—which were also under “light-touch” regulation—whose ratio of commercial loans to assets had sunk to one quarter by 2008, the lowest in the Euro area.
The inclusion of Austria and Finland in the periphery group is for convenience and makes little difference to the calculations as their economies are small.
Pagano and others (2014) discuss this trend in more detail.
The assets reported for the investment banking groups are considerably larger than the assets of the broker-dealer sector reported earlier, underlining that broker-dealers only represented the core institutions within these wider investment banking groups.
Lane (2013) contains an analysis.
Bernanke (2008).
The impact of private sector safe assets on interest rates and the macroeconomy are discussed in Gorton and Ordoñez (2013) and Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2016).
This is calculated by summing data on holdings of US debt by foreign official institutions and holdings of GSE securities by the five most important emerging markets. The latter adjustment reflects the use of GSE bonds as reserves by some countries, most notably China.
This calculation assumes that all of the asset purchases went into US securities, which seems reasonably given the rapid reduction in such assets after the crisis.
4 A Flawed Monetary Union
Marsh (2011), pp. 45–6.
Brunnermeier, James, and Landau (2016) contains a much more detailed treatment.
Eichengreen (2008), pp. 15–16.
James (2012), pp. 74–85.
Quoted in Marsh (2011), p. 62.
Ibid., p. 63.
Enormous amounts of energy were extended on the details of this proposal, essentially deciding whether to reduce the stringency of monetary constrains by widening the bands around the dollar while leaving European bands unchanged or to tighten monetary cooperation by leaving dollar bands unchanged and tightening European ones. In the end they chose the latter, with US exchange-rate bands left unchanged at 0.75 percent and European bands narrowed from 1.5 percent to 1.2 percent.
James (2012), p. 107.
Ibid., p. 152.
Ibid., p. 154.
Samuel Brittan of the Financial Times, quoted ibid., p. 181.
Short (2014) provides an entertaining biography of Mitterrand.
Moravcsik (1991), p. 30.
Marsh (2011), pp. 66–8.
Ibid., p. 122.
Ibid., p. 124.
The deliberations were taped, so we have a good record of what was said, as discussed in James (2012).
Ibid., p. 238.
Ibid., p. 237.
Marsh (2011), p. 129.
James (2012), p. 247.
Ibid., p. 249.
Ibid., p. 251.
Ironically, it was governor de Larosière who supported an effective supervisory mechanism in Stage 2 and beyond.
James (2012), p. 253.
Marsh (2011), p. 129.
James (2012), p. 211.
Marsh (2011), p. 143.
Ibid., p. 144.
Ibid., p. 153.
Ibid., p. 202.
Ibid., p. 110.
5 Intellectual Blinkers and Unexpected Spillovers
Honorable exceptions include Bill White at the Bank of International Settlements and the academics Nouriel Roubini and Robert Shiller.
Greenspan (2008), p. 489.
Bank of England website.
The weight on high volatility sectors, such as durable goods and construction, that contributed disproportionately to the volatility of output remained largely unchanged over time. Similarly, while greater access to loans would smooth consumption of goods that provided immediate satisfaction (such as meals) this would not necessarily occur for goods that provided their services gradually over time, such as cars. Ye t volatility had also fallen in the latter sectors.
Ibid.
Bergsten and Green (2016) contains an extensive discussion of the Plaza Agreement.
The University of Toronto has an excellent website with all of the main G7 documents, including the communiqués.
For more detailed critiques of DSGE models see Romer (2016) and Bayoumi (2016b).
Romer (2016) observes that in the models built by academics, monetary policy often had implausibly limited effects, while Bayoumi (2016b) argues the monetary effects are too large in models built by policymakers.
See, for example, Benes and Green (2016).
Greene (2004) provides an excellent intuitive explanation of the problems involved.
6 A History of the International Monetary System in Five Crises
On the benefits of international trade see International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization (2017) and Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz (2015).
International Monetary Fund (2012b), p. 13, paragraph 16. The references contained in the original have been taken out for the sake of readability. See also the main paper, IMF (2012a).
The US crisis had some elements of a domestic sudden stop as some of the speculative money was transferred to treasuries, which may explain the lower costs to the United States (although all crises had significant involvement of domestic speculators). The Euro area crisis did not have this characteristic as there were few centralized funds to support crisis countries.
Recent changes to balance of payments statistics allow a finer breakdown between debt and equity purchases than the one used here, in particular as regards foreign direct investment. The overall result, however, is similar and since the data does not go back reliably over time I use the simpler definition of debt and equity flows.
There is a similar, if less direct, increase in risk for investors who lend in dollars, as a depreciation in the value of the pound increases the cost of dollar repayments for all foreign investors, thereby making all of the loans riskier.
Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2005) provide a survey. See Krugman (1992) on the first generation models and Obstfeld (1996) on the second generation.
This is closely related to earlier models of bank runs, in which a run is always a risk unless government insurance gives depositors the assurance that their money is safe. Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
IMF (2012b) paragraph 18 and references therein.
Garber (1993) contains a more detailed description of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.
Eichengreen (2008) contains a description of the evolution of capital market regulation over time.
The Bretton Woods system came to maturity in 1960 after the termination of the European Payments Union (EPU), an arrangement that curtailed even current account transactions because of the severe shortages of dollars after the war.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997b), Cline (1984 and 1995), Cohen (1992) and Dooley (1994) contain descriptions.
Quoted in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997b), pp. 197–8.
Ibid., p. 204.
Seidman (2000), pp. 127–8.
L. William Seidman, quoted in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997b), p. 207.
James (2012), Chapter 4, provides a blow-by-blow account of the snake.
Marsh (2011) contains a lively description.
James (2012), pp. 174–7.
For descriptions see Corsetti and others (1998) and Goldstein (1998).
Goldstein (1998), p. 13.
Dooley (1994) is the only description of the crisis that argues that banks lent on the expectations of a bail-out.
A partial exception may be the break-up of Bretton Woods, since its likely demise was in the words of one commentator “one of the most accurately and generally predicted of major economic events”, Garber (1993). However, fuzzy acceptance of the limitations of the system did not prevent participants from trying to shore it up, suggesting that there was less uniformity on its terminal state that this quote suggests.
There are many approximations in these calculations. For example, growth is measured in real terms while the trade balance in nominal terms. However, the misery index still provides an intuitive measure of the size of a crisis.
The United States for the break-up of Bretton Woods, Mexico and Brazil for the Latin American crisis, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France for the ERM, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea in the Asian crisis, and the United States, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece for the North Atlantic experience.
Washington Leaders’ Summit Communiqué, from the University of Toronto “G20 Information Center” website.
An alternative is to have permanent capital controls, but this runs the risk of reducing the benefits from access to international debt markets in normal times.
7 Will Revamped Financial Regulations Work?
Getter (2014) describes the US approach.
Davis Polk (2014) provides details.
Schoenmaker and Véron (2016) contains a fuller description.
For a useful summary of Dodd–Frank see Morrison and Foerster (2010).
On holdings of government debt see Véron (2016). Within these broad aggregates there are interesting country variations. In the periphery, assets as a ratio to output shrank most in crisis countries with easily identified bubbles and/or financial programs. Within the core countries, the adjustments have been larger in Germany and Belgium than in France and the Netherlands.
the IMF’s April 2017 Global Financial Stability Report.
8 Making Macroeconomics More Relevant
Quoted from the communiqué, available on the University of Toronto website on the G20.
Faruqee and Srinivasan (2012) discuss the Mutual Assessment Process in detail.
A series of gold discoveries in the late nineteenth century, most notably in Australia, ended the Long Depression.
For a survey see Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009).
9 Whither EMU?
Ibid.
This ignores the zero lower bound, which has created problems for the monetary response to the region-wide shock caused by the North American crisis.
A formal model is contained in Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004).
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium/Luxembourg, Greece, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, and Finland.
Finally, trade with the rest of the world seems to be less stable, reflecting the inclusion of a lot of major commodity exporters whose trade is affected by commodity prices.
Glick and Rose (2016) provide a succinct review of the literature.
Many thanks to Professor Andrew Rose of Berkeley for running these custom regressions for me.
For example, Gagnon (2012) and Campos and Macchiarelli (2016).
In the case of the bankruptcy of Continental Illinois Bank in 1982, the FDIC used its powers to guarantee other creditors and noninsured depositors so as to avoid further financial spillovers.
There was also a more localized fall in house prices in Michigan over 1979–84.
Bayoumi and Masson (1998) contains a discussion and estimation of the differences in automatic stabilizers. Röhn (2010) contains more recent evidence on the Ricardian offset.
European Commission (1989).
For example, Beyer and Smets (2015) find that “the greater homogeneity of the US economy is reflected in the fact that the US factors plays a more important role in accounting for both employment growth and employment rate [i.e. unemployment] fluctuations”.
Final Thoughts
The exception was Ireland, where the lending boom and subsequent crisis was driven much more by banking competition than by a sudden reduction in borrowing costs.
The literature on whether these charges are still too low is summarized in Cline (2017).
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