Chapter

APPENDICES

Author(s):
Joseph Gold
Published Date:
September 1987
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Appendix A. SDRs: Interest and Charges

RULE T-1 OF RULES AND REGULATIONS, BEFORE AMENDMENT EFFECTIVE ON AUGUST 1, 1983

T—Interest, Charges, and Assessments in Respect of Special Drawing Rights

  • T-1. (a) Interest and charges in respect of special drawing rights shall accrue daily at the rate referred to in (b) below and shall be paid promptly as of the end of each financial year of the Fund. The accounts of participants shall be credited with the excess of interest due over charges or debited with the excess of charges over the interest due. The accounts of holders that are not participants shall be credited with the interest due.

  • (b) The rate of interest on holdings of special drawing rights for each calendar quarter shall be equal to the combined market interest rate as determined in (c) below.

  • (c) The combined market interest rate shall be the sum of the average yield or rate on each of the respective instruments listed below for the fifteen business days preceding the last two business days of the last month before the calendar quarter for which interest is to be calculated, with each yield or rate multiplied by the number of units of the corresponding currency listed in Rule O-1 and the value in terms of the special drawing right of a unit of that currency as determined by the Fund under Rule O-2(a) and (b), provided that the combined market interest rate shall be rounded to the two nearest decimal places. The yields and rates for this calculation are:

    • Market yields for three-month U.S. Treasury bills

    • Three-month interbank deposits rate in Germany

    • Three-month interbank money rate against private paper in France

    • Discount rate on two-month (private) bills in Japan

    • Market yields for three-month U.K. Treasury bills

  • (d) The Fund will review the rate of interest on holdings of special drawing rights at the conclusion of each financial year.

Adopted September 18, 1969; amended June 13, 1974; June 30, 1976; April 1, 1978; June 15, 1978, effective July 1, 1978; and September 17, 1980, effective January 1, 1981; paragraph (b) amended October 25, 1978, effective January 1, 1979, and April 22, 1981, effective May 1, 1981; paragraph (c) amended April 22, 1981, effective May 1, 1981.

RULE T-1 OF RULES AND REGULATIONS, AFTER AMENDMENT EFFECTIVE ON AUGUST 1, 1983

T—Interest, Charges, and Assessments in Respect of SDRs

  • T-1. (a) Interest and charges in respect of SDRs shall accrue daily at the rate referred to in (b) below. The amount that has accrued during each quarter of the financial year of the Fund shall be paid promptly as of the beginning of the following quarter. The accounts of participants shall be credited with the excess of interest due over charges or debited with the excess of charges over the interest due. The accounts of holders that are not participants shall be credited with the interest due.

  • (b) The rate of interest on holdings of SDRs for each weekly period commencing each Monday shall be equal to the combined market interest rate as determined by the Fund at the beginning of the period in the manner described in (c) below.

  • (c) The combined market interest rate shall be the sum, rounded to the two nearest decimal places, of the products that result from multiplying each yield or rate listed below, expressed as an equivalent annual bond yield, for the preceding Friday by the value in terms of the SDR on that Friday of the amount of the corresponding currency specified in Rule O-1, as determined pursuant to Rule O-2(b). If a yield or rate is not available for a particular Friday, the calculation shall be made on the basis of the latest available yield or rate.

  • (d) The Fund will review the rate of interest on holdings of SDRs at the conclusion of each financial year.

U.S. dollarMarket yield for three-month U.S. Treasury bills
Deutsche markThree-month interbank deposit rate in Germany
French francThree-month interbank money rate against private paper in France
Japanese yenDiscount rate on two-month (private) bills in Japan
Pound sterlingMarket yield for three-month U.K. Treasury bills

Adopted September 18, 1969, amended June 13, 1974, June 30, 1976, April 1, 1978, June 15, 1978, effective July 1, 1978, September 17, 1980, effective January 1, 1981, and July 26, 1983, effective August 1, 1983; paragraph (b) amended October 25, 1978, effective January 1, 1979, and April 22, 1981, effective May 1, 1981; paragraph (c) amended April 22, 1981, effective May 1, 1981.

Appendix B. Surveillance Under Article IV, Section 3(b)

Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies [1983]

The Executive Board has reviewed the general implementation of the Fund’s surveillance over members’ exchange rate policies, as required by paragraph VI of Procedures for Surveillance attached to Decision No. 5392-(77/63), adopted April 29, 1977, including the procedures for the conduct of consultations under Article IV, which consultations shall comprehend the consultations under Article VIII and Article XIV, and approves the continuation of the procedures as described in SM/83/43, in the light of the Managing Director’s summing up, until the next annual review, which shall be conducted not later than April 1, 1984.

Decision No. 7374-(83/55) March 28, 1983

Attachment to Decision No. 7374-(83/55) Managing Director’s Summing Up

General Remarks

Directors considered that Article IV consultation reports should continue to deal with exchange rate questions in a forthright fashion while taking into account the sensitivities involved; several Directors felt that more attention should be paid to exchange rate issues outside the regular consultation process.

A number of Directors observed that Fund surveillance was not sufficiently symmetrical. They noted that precise prescriptions regarding exchange rate movements or changes are often given to small countries or countries making use of Fund resources; at the same time, quite large discrepancies between exchange rates and fundamental underlying conditions draw little attention from the Fund staff when they relate to major currencies, despite the fact that those currencies play a greater role in the working of the international monetary and financial system. In this context, several Directors stressed the importance of more frequent and more analytical Board discussions on exchange rate developments generally, and on the interrelationship and implication of policies and prospects in the major currency countries in particular. A number of Directors also called for a discussion in the Executive Board on the recent EMS realignment.

Important questions regarding the setting of financial policies and the relationship of exchange rates to underlying economic and financial conditions remain to be answered. Also to be considered is the need to develop a medium-term framework for the assessment of balance of payments developments. Directors welcomed the work in progress in the Fund in these areas, including the forthcoming paper on “Issues in the Assessment of Exchange Rates of the Industrial Countries in the Context of their Economic Policies.” Such studies are expected to provide useful background for the biennial review of the principles of surveillance, which is to take place by April 1, 1984.

Many Directors emphasized the need for the Fund clearly to address the dangers associated with the growth of protectionism, and they encouraged the staff to expand the coverage and analysis of trade policy matters in Article IV consultation reports, while avoiding overlap into the areas of responsibility of other institutions, particularly the GATT. In this regard, they said, the focus should be on the impact of trade measures on domestic adjustment and the exchange rate of the relevant country and on its trading partners.

It was noted that, during 1982, debt service difficulties had become a focal point for concern. Most Directors considered it to be extremely important for the staff to do its utmost to improve the coverage of external debt developments—particularly their short-term aspects—and policies related to external debt in Article IV consultation reports. More specific proposals on that matter would be discussed in the Board meeting on external debt issues, scheduled for April 6. Some Directors also indicated that the Fund should be in a position to provide better coverage of the “liability” side of the banking sectors in member countries and their reserve management policies.

Frequency of Article IV Consultations

Directors agreed that the consultation process is at the heart of surveillance and that, in view of the problems experienced by members in 1982 and the speed with which these problems have spread, a very determined effort needs to be made to ensure more regular scheduling of Article IV consultations. There have been cases, Directors noted, where members have run into serious external and internal imbalances during periods in which the Executive Board has not had an opportunity to analyze the issues and to offer the member the benefit of its advice. Directors indicated that such cases were unfortunate and should not be repeated in the future.

There was general agreement among Directors that some procedural changes would help to guarantee a stricter approach to the scheduling of consultations. Most agreed that the approach of establishing, at the conclusion of each consultation, a final date for the discussion of the next consultation with the member would be helpful, although specification of the cycle in this fashion should not be so rigid as to detract from management’s prerogative, in consultation with the member country and the Executive Director concerned, to change the scheduling. To the extent that stricter scheduling was desirable, however, it could be enhanced by periodic reports to the Board on the status of members with respect to the observation of the consultation schedule and with an indication of any problems that might have been encountered in adhering to it. In that regard, there was no intention to lay blame on the country concerned; the purpose of the report would be to inform the Board of the causes for the delay, such as insufficient staff, a problem in local political conditions, and so on.

The criteria for determining the countries under a strict cycle were agreed, that is, economies having a substantial impact on other countries, members with Fund-supported programs, and situations where there are substantial doubts about medium-term viability. For the large majority of members for which a stricter cycle should apply, most Directors considered that the objective should be to limit the interval between consultations to no more than 12 months, with a grace period of, say, three months beyond the specified date. For members not on a strict cycle, the permissible outer limit would be two years. Management was encouraged to experiment with six-month reviews or miniconsultations—as had been done recently in some cases—where the economic situation of the member was changing rapidly.

In considering the circumstances that might justify delays in consultations, Directors noted that military hostilities, for example, would warrant a delay; however, it was to be understood that, once the special circumstances had passed, the consultation should be held quickly. Delays for political reasons, such as elections, or delays because the member was engaged in a process of reformulating its economic policies were less clear cut. Most Directors judged that consultations should not be delayed because of the political timetable in member countries; indeed, they observed that it was precisely in such periods of uncertainty that financial problems could emerge or become more acute. Moreover, as pointed out in the staff paper, consultations would be particularly useful and timely when a member was in the process of developing new policies. Delays should, where possible, be fitted into the grace period of three months; if that meant that the policies envisaged by the authorities could not be fully specified in the staff report, however, it might be appropriate to hold follow-up discussions at an early date, when the policies had been formulated.

Directors agreed that a number of adaptations to existing procedures might be necessary to maintain the higher average frequency of consultations that was implied by adherence to strict annual consultation cycles for most members, at least in current circumstances. Given the large number of requests for use of Fund resources expected in the coming year, it was accepted that consultation missions might sometimes be combined with negotiations of the use of Fund resources. However, a number of Directors considered that, where an annual consultation was due, its discussion in the Board should precede the Board discussion of a program. Some believed that combining consultations with requests for use of Fund resources should be the exception rather than the rule, but a number of Directors considered that consultations could appropriately be combined with reviews of existing Fund programs.

Directors stressed the importance of REDs [reports on Recent Economic Developments], which they considered to be a valuable and often unique source of economic and financial information on member countries. Directors agreed that, if necessary for logistical reasons, REDs might be shortened on a selective basis and perhaps merely updated in each second year; however, they stressed that changes of substance in economic policies and institutional settings should always be incorporated in the yearly report. In practice, therefore, it was likely that most REDs would have to be prepared annually.

Methods of Surveillance over Exchange Rate Changes, and Notification Procedures

All Directors asked for an evenhanded approach to surveillance and indicated that the Fund needed to play a more active role with respect to exchange rate changes. Some stressed the importance of more detailed and forthright discussion on exchange rate issues in Article IV consultations and in discussions on the world economic outlook, particularly when a stricter consultation schedule was being observed. In those exceptional circumstances where additional discussions with members seemed warranted, the existing procedures for dealing with such questions could be invoked.

To give effect to a more active role for the Fund and to help to ensure uniformity of treatment, most Directors saw merit in the “threshold” approach described in the staff paper, and there was broad support for implementing the approach on an experimental basis. Directors made a number of interesting and penetrating observations about the approach in the course of the discussion, and some indicated that they would be providing further, more detailed observations later. On the technical issue of the size of the numerical threshold, some Directors felt that a 5 per cent threshold would result in too large a number of information notices for such notices to be meaningful. Others felt that any change as large as 5 percent in real effective terms was important and should be subject to an information notice. On balance, particularly since the approach is to be adopted on an experimental basis, I would propose that we initially use a threshold of 10 percent.

Another technical issue concerns the appropriate starting point for the measurement of cumulative changes. Most Directors, while noting that there were weaknesses in the recommended approach, indicated a willingness to experiment with a starting point that was the latest occasion on which the Board had had an opportunity to discuss the member’s exchange rate policy, which in most cases would be the most recent Article IV consultation.

On another matter, there was general agreement that, during the trial period, the staff should use its best judgment on the indicator of competitiveness to be employed and should incorporate a description of that indicator, with relevant data, in the Article IV consultation reports. The views of member countries on the measurement to be used would, of course, be taken into account.

On the content of information notices, Directors recommended a flexible approach and invited management to exercise discretion in deciding when to provide analysis and an appraisal. They agreed that the existing practice of notifying the Board of large discrete changes in nominal exchange rates should be continued, because it was important both for surveillance and for the general information of other members.

The management and staff will carefully examine and attempt to implement the proposal made by [Executive Director] for a periodic—perhaps quarterly—staff paper containing an indication of real effective exchange rates of members, flagging those cases where changes in the rate are particularly large. While it will be necessary to address a number of questions on the appropriate time perspective to be used, an effort will be made to provide a permanent flow of figures in a periodic brochure. Again, Directors indicated a willingness to rely on management’s judgment of whether or not comments on those indicators should be provided or whether particular cases should be discussed in the Board.

Surveillance over Members’ Exchange Rate Policies [1984]

(a) Review of Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies

The Executive Board has reviewed the document “Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies” as provided in paragraph 2 of Executive Board Decision No. 5392-(77/63), adopted April 29, 1977, and will review it again at an appropriate time not later than April 1, 1986.

Decision No. 7645-(84/40) March 12, 1984

(b) Review of Implementation of Procedures for Surveillance

The Executive Board has also reviewed the procedures relating to the general implementation of the Fund’s surveillance over member’s exchange rate policies, as required by paragraph VI of Procedures for Surveillance in the document “Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies” referred to in (a) above, including the procedures for the conduct of consultations under Article IV, which consultations shall comprehend the consultations under Article VIII and Article XIV, and approves the continuation of the procedures as described in SM/84/44, in the light of the Managing Director’s summing up, until the next annual review, which shall be conducted not later than April 1, 1985.

Decision No. 7646-(84/40) March 12, 1984

Attachment to Decision No. 7646-(84/40) Managing Director’s Summing Up

In our review, Directors once again indicated the great importance they attach to the Fund’s role in the field of surveillance. They also stressed that effective surveillance requires the full cooperation of members and that it must be conducted in an effective and evenhanded way.

The discussion encompassed two reviews: the biennial review of the basic document setting out the principles of surveillance and the annual review of the implementation of surveillance. I shall refer first to Directors’ remarks on the key issues encountered in the conduct of surveillance that can be related to the principles and procedures set out in the documents. Second, I shall refer to the remarks relating to the various methods through which surveillance is carried out: the multilateral aspects, Article IV consultations, and exchange rate monitoring.

Key Issues in the Conduct of Surveillance

In focusing on the substance of surveillance, a number of Directors stressed that the Fund should be more energetic in its efforts to make surveillance effective, evenhanded, and symmetrical. The following conclusions emerged from the discussions.

First, while many Directors recognized that the assessment of exchange rate policies was a very complex task, they stressed that it was incumbent on the Fund to form a view on the appropriateness of members’ exchange rate policies, irrespective of the exchange arrangements chosen by individual members and of the member’s need for Fund financial support. This principle is the core of Article IV. In practice, it is often difficult to determine with quantitative precision the magnitude of an exchange rate’s “out-of-lineness.” But if the Fund is convinced that a rate is out-of-line, it must express that view in the first instance to the authorities of the countries directly involved. A few Directors held the view that the staff sometimes seemed insufficiently flexible, and somewhat dogmatic in its views with regard to exchange rates, with a tendency to overestimate the effectiveness of exchange rate depreciation, particularly in developing countries and centrally planned economies.

Second, the staff’s determination of the adequacy of the exchange rate policy in an individual country is not merely an econometric exercise; it is something that touches on the functioning of the international monetary system. Thus it is important that when the Fund staff is convinced of a maladjustment in exchange rates, it should seek agreement of the membership on that judgment and on the necessary policy changes. It can happen that national authorities have domestic goals and constraints that may result in an inappropriate exchange rate in the judgment of the Fund. In such instances, through Article IV consultations and other reviews, the matter is brought to the attention of the Executive Board; after discussion and Board agreement with the staff position, the country is informed. Beyond that, the effectiveness of the Fund’s surveillance procedures requires that the members of this institution give active and broad support to the positions taken by the Fund.

Third, Directors supported the view that many of the international economic difficulties of recent years have been associated with the pronounced swings in exchange rates between major industrial countries, and with the repercussions of the low levels of economic activity and high interest rates prevailing in these countries on the rest of the world. Many Directors noted that to some extent these developments resulted from domestic policy stances in major industrial countries that, in their view, did not sufficiently promote the convergence of favorable economic conditions and that failed to take account of the implications for other countries and for the international monetary system as a whole. Most Directors felt that this failure to integrate international interests, rather than any deliberate attempt to manipulate exchange rates or the international monetary system, was the real problem. Therefore, the Fund had to form a view on the domestic policies needed to foster a smooth working of the system and had to attempt to persuade its members to follow such policies. On the basis of these considerations, Directors agreed that the experience in the implementation of surveillance does not call for a revision of the principles and procedures set out in the documents, but calls for more active implementation.

Methods of Surveillance

Multilateral Aspects

Directors considered that the World Economic Outlook provided a valuable framework for analyzing global surveillance issues, and indeed considered it indispensable for evaluating the global effects of the economic policies of major countries. They welcomed the increasing emphasis on a medium-term approach and in particular on the development of medium-term balance of payments scenarios. They also called for increased analysis of the interaction of individual members’ domestic policies, including the regional consequences of individual members’ policies.

Directors considered it important that the Fund continue to place public emphasis on surveillance through different channels, such as publications and statements by the Managing Director. They also considered the more active role of the Fund in looking for solutions to the problems of external debt and protectionism in multilateral contexts to be essential. With regard to trade matters in particular, a number of Directors emphasized that the Fund’s work could usefully enhance the GATT’s activities while fully respecting the responsibilities of that institution.

Article IV Consultations

In view of the Fund’s obligation to form a view on the exchange rate policies of members, Directors generally endorsed the practice in staff reports of providing clear appraisals of exchange rate policies. Several Directors felt that the Fund staff was still less explicit in its exchange rate policy pronouncements for large industrial countries than it was in the case of smaller countries. The view was also put forward that an appraisal of the exchange rate policy of a member in an Article IV consultation should be made, whenever appropriate, in a multilateral framework.

Directors welcomed the recent emphasis on medium-term scenarios in the analysis of external debt and encouraged the staff to make further progress in presentation and analysis, with possibly alternative scenarios on debt, and to make more explicit the assumptions that underlie these projections and the sensitivity of the scenarios to changes in assumptions. Directors also called for increased emphasis on the medium term when assessing underlying payments balances as part of the appraisal of members’ policies even when external debt or the financing of external imbalances was not a major concern.

The need for continued development of staff analyses in consultation reports of issues related to protectionism and export subsidies was stressed by many Directors. These analyses should cover the practice not only of individual members but also, if necessary, of groups of countries and customs unions. It was felt that to the extent possible the economic costs of protectionist measures taken by individual countries or groups of countries since the last Article IV consultation should be quantified and that the impact of protectionism on domestic adjustment should be examined in relevant cases.

In the course of the discussion, a number of suggestions were made for further improving the analytical coverage in consultation reports of structural aspects, capital flows, openness of capital markets, the size and structure of government revenue and expenditure, barriers to direct investment, the noncentral government public sector, structural adjustment problems, aid to ailing industries, and labor markets. A number of Directors also proposed that consultation reports should follow up the main points made in the summing up of the previous consultation. These reports should recall the main recommendations of the Board as contained in the summing up and indicate whether appropriate measures had been taken.

As in the recent discussion of “Coverage and Currentness of Data,” Directors emphasized the crucial role of accurate data in consultation reports.

The marked increase in consultation frequency was welcomed by all Directors, who noted particularly the improved coverage of countries with Fund-supported programs. Directors recognized the efforts made in the last 18 months to reduce the backlog of overdue consultations, and considered that at the present time the problem of overdue consultations had been largely solved. Leaving aside cases involving security problems, at present only one member country was significantly behind in the consultation cycle. Directors reiterated their view that consultations should not be delayed on account of discussions on the use of Fund resources. A number of Directors believed that the Board should consider the Article IV consultation before turning to a request for use of Fund resources in those cases where the consultation was overdue. This is a very important policy recommendation.

Directors emphasized the need to carry out consultations on a timely basis in the future. In this regard, the system of advance specification of consultation cycles provides a useful framework. To help ensure that consultations are completed on time, we shall report to the Board on problems that may arise on a semiannual basis.

Directors broadly endorsed current practices in specifying consultation cycles. The suggestion was made that the criteria for the one-year consultation cycle be expanded to include members that wish to be kept on that cycle. Directors recognized that with such a work load, special efforts would be necessary to maintain the quality of consultation work. Therefore, the staff would continue to combine requests for use of Fund resources and periodic reviews with consultation reports. Some Directors supported the practice of selectively shortening, or even omitting, the papers on recent economic developments, particularly for countries on which economic information was amply available; but a number of other Directors stressed the importance of those papers for members individually and collectively, and they were opposed to any reduction in the role or importance of these documents.

Directors encouraged the staff to bring consultations on closely related countries to the Board simultaneously, in order to avoid duplication of effort on common features and to better understand the interaction aspect.

Exchange Rate Monitoring

Directors considered that both the quarterly reports on indicators of real effective exchange rates and the notices on individual countries provided useful information, although, of course, the developments have to be carefully analyzed before reaching any policy-directed conclusions. Most Directors considered that the threshold for issuing information notices should continue to be 10 percent. Some questions were raised regarding the benchmark date.

Directors welcomed the staff’s intention to continue making improvements in the information notice system, and attached importance to making the coverage of the system as comprehensive as possible. In view of the importance of price, exchange rate, and direction of trade data for policy formulation, it is incumbent on country authorities, in consultation with the staff, to obtain the necessary data and to provide it to the Fund.

In sum, the Board felt that surveillance is an essential tool for the stability of the international monetary system. It considers that, despite the progress realized in the Fund’s work in this field, the insufficient convergence of economic conditions throughout the world requires, not necessarily changes in Fund procedures but, rather, strong political support from the membership.

There are still large differences of views on the way the exchange rate system is working and even larger differences of views on the way it should function. There are also differences of views on the way economic policies interact and, thus, affect the setting of prescriptions by the Fund. In a collective institution, these prescriptions can sometimes be difficult to express and even more difficult to implement.

We should continue to improve the quality and the persuasiveness of our analysis of policy interactions. It is only through the quality of these analyses that the Fund will enlist support for its recommendations. The Executive Directors can help the staff and management in this task by maintaining the high standards of their interventions relating to all surveillance matters.

Surveillance over Members’ Exchange Rate Policies: Review of Implementation of Procedures [1985]

The Executive Board has reviewed the general implementation of the Fund’s surveillance over members’ exchange rate policies, as required by paragraph VI of Procedures for Surveillance attached to Decision No. 5392-(77/63), adopted April 29, 1977, including the procedures for the conduct of consultations under Article IV, which consultations shall comprehend the consultations under Article VIII and Article XIV, and approves the continuation of the procedures as described in SM/85/65, in the light of the Managing Director’s summing up, until the next annual review, which shall be conducted not later than April 1, 1986.

Decision No. 7939-(85/49) March 25, 1985

Attachment to Decision No. 7939-(85/49) Managing Director’s Summing Up

Directors once again emphasized the great importance that they attach to the role of the Fund in the area of surveillance. They welcomed the emphasis of this year’s review on questions related to the effectiveness of surveillance, particularly in view of the current international economic environment. Directors stressed in particular the need for a continued evolution of surveillance procedures to enhance the ability of the Fund to carry out its responsibilities in this area in an effective and evenhanded way, and made a number of suggestions for improvements in the way surveillance is implemented.

The Effectiveness and Evenhandedness of Surveillance

The discussion of the question of the effectiveness of surveillance was wide ranging and we have heard some very thoughtful comments on this subject. The views expressed on the extent to which surveillance can be considered to be evenhanded in its implementation were particularly noteworthy, and I shall begin with an attempt to draw together the common threads of that discussion.

Directors all agreed that evenhandedness was essential to the effectiveness of surveillance. They noted the widely held view that the Fund was much stricter in its oversight of the policies of deficit developing countries than of those of other countries. Several Directors indicated their support for this view, but most agreed with the staff paper that this interpretation resulted from an insufficient distinction between the function of surveillance and other functions of the Fund, such as those involved in conditionality and jurisdiction over exchange restrictions. It was true that conditionality did involve particularly detailed attention to the policies of member countries engaged in Fund-supported adjustment programs. When countries faced financial crises, however, it was clear that policies needed to be corrected immediately, and in any case, the Fund was obliged to see that appropriate use was made of its resources. Most Directors thus agreed that surveillance, as such, had been evenhanded in its application. They stressed, however, that surveillance also needed to appear to be evenhanded, and for that to be the case it must be seen to be effective with respect to the large industrial countries. Given the effects that developments in such countries had on the rest of the world economy, moreover, it was particularly important that it be effective for those countries.

Directors considered that surveillance in fact had been much less effective than it should have been. Directors did note the important role that surveillance had played in bringing key policy issues to the attention of the authorities and keeping them under active discussion. It was also possible to cite many instances where policy decisions in member countries clearly had taken account of the views expressed by the international community through the Fund’s surveillance process.

More generally, however, it was clear that there remained substantial divergences between the policies actually pursued by some member countries and those advocated by the Fund membership collectively. A number of references were made by Directors to the fact that fiscal policy in the United States continues to diverge from what in the view of those Directors would be optimal in terms of its effects on the world economy, as well as on the U.S. economy itself. The continuing inadequacy of corrective policies in other industrial countries and in many developing countries was also stressed. Some Directors expressed the view that what was needed was more explicit guidance for members on the types of exchange rate and other policies that were consistent with the objectives of the Fund than was provided in the surveillance decision or, indeed, in the Articles themselves. Directors underlined the fact that while we must continually endeavor to sharpen our analysis and to improve our procedures, the basic issue was not procedural. Rather it was the willingness of member countries to adapt their policies in light of the views expressed by the international community.

Before turning to Directors’ views on the major ideas for enhancing the effectiveness of surveillance in this area noted in Section VI of the staff paper, I will sum up the discussion of various issues emerging from the experience in 1984 with the implementation of surveillance.

Issues Arising from the Implementation of Surveillance in 1984

(i) The Analytical Basis of Surveillance

Directors considered that the analytical framework provided by the world economic outlook exercise continued to be an extremely useful basis for evaluating the global impact of the economic policies of the major countries. They welcomed the increasing emphasis, both in the world economic outlook and in Article IV consultations, on the medium-term implications of members’ policies. Directors also noted the desirability of further development of analytical techniques in the key policy areas. In this connection, they stressed the need for more comprehensive analysis of the international implications of country policies. They also noted the need for a better understanding of the ways in which financial policies and problems of structural adjustment interacted internationally to affect exchange rates.

(ii) Article IV Consultations

Directors considered that Article IV consultations were the key element of the surveillance process. They welcomed the increased coverage in Article IV staff reports, both of important policy issues and of technical aspects, such as the quality of statistics and relations with the World Bank. They nonetheless encouraged the staff to be economical in reporting, to avoid blurring the focus of staff reports on the key issues. Many Directors felt that, given the heavy work load, the staff should be free to experiment with abbreviated reports on recent economic developments (REDs) in some cases.

Directors welcomed the improvement in consultation scheduling that has occurred since the implementation in 1983 of the system of advance specification of consultation cycles. In this connection, Directors considered it important that the Fund focus its efforts on those situations most in need of attention, and suggested that more differentiation in specification of cycles would be appropriate. In particular, all of the largest countries (several figures have been mentioned to define this group, and on that basis, I would say at least the 25 largest members) should be on the standard cycle. On the other hand, for small countries (other than countries with programs with the Fund or where there were questions about balance of payments viability), longer cycles up to two years would generally be appropriate, although where such members valued annual discussions with the Fund, they should be entitled to request the standard cycle. Some Directors suggested that informal staff visits for policy discussions midway between full consultations might be a useful way to accommodate the preferences of some members in such cases, while still keeping the work load within manageable proportions.

(iii) Monitoring of Exchange Rates

Directors considered that experience had been broadly satisfactory with the system of monitoring exchange rate developments through notifications to the Executive Board of changes in exchange arrangements and through information notices relating to large movements in real effective exchange rate indices, although some Directors cautioned against the temptation to rely too heavily on mechanical indicators of that sort. Many Directors felt that exchange rate developments in large industrial countries deserved perhaps more frequent attention, and a number of Directors supported a reduction in the threshold for information notices for such countries. But after having looked at the tally, I would conclude that the Board has not called at this point in time for a change in the information notice system.

Suggestions for Improving the Effectiveness of Surveillance

I turn now to the discussion of the major ideas described in Section VI of the staff paper. In general, Directors believe that we should explore every possible avenue for improving the effectiveness of surveillance.

First, while some Directors were quite negative with regard to the use of objective indicators, there was a broad-based interest in exploring the idea of making greater use of objective indicators as an instrument of Fund surveillance, particularly vis-à-vis major industrial countries. Most Directors stressed, however, that there would be considerable difficulty in establishing such indicators and agreeing with members on appropriate values for them. Directors therefore urged the staff to take an experimental approach in terms both of further development in the conceptual approach to be followed and of exploration of the concept with interested authorities. I conclude that, for the time being at least, the use of such indicators in particular cases where they might be appropriate and acceptable would be limited to providing a basis for reviewing, in the course of an Article IV consultation, developments against the background of the conclusion of the previous one.

Second, most Directors reacted negatively to the idea of a major move toward greater publicity in connection with Article IV consultations. They emphasized that the confidential relationship between the Fund and its members has been one of the most important elements of the consultation process, and they believed that publicity would involve a change in that practice that could have serious consequences for the candor and frankness of the policy discussions between the Fund and its members.

In the same vein, most Directors expressed reservations—although some of them were very interested in the idea—about the release of staff reports, and were concerned that such a practice could adversely affect the frankness and usefulness of these reports. For, I think, similar reasons, the reaction was negative at this point in time to the idea of the Managing Director making public statements following the conclusion of Article IV consultations. At the same time, I noted the Board’s general support for the manner in which I have been expressing my views and positions on matters of Fund concern in my public addresses. I should also note that most Directors were open to the wider release, including publication, of REDs with the approval of the member concerned.

Third, Directors believed that there was considerable scope for expanded follow-up to consultations on the side of both the Fund and country authorities. They considered that the current practice in Article IV staff reports of including reviews of developments against the background of the previous consultation should be further developed as a means of assessing the effectiveness of the consultation process, by giving indications of the weight the authorities attached to the views of the Fund. Directors strongly supported more “internal publicity” among the authorities of member countries themselves for the findings of the Fund. It was noted approvingly that in many member countries authorities at the ministerial level participate in the final policy discussions with the mission. The staff will continue the practice of listing in its reports the principal representatives of the member country taking part in the discussions.

It was also considered desirable that management communicate directly with Ministers of Finance regarding the outcome of the Fund’s review, but only in carefully selected cases where the Executive Board felt high-level consideration to be particularly important because of the urgency of the policy views expressed. In that context, it was noted that the Managing Director frequently has contacts with the highest authorities of member countries, in Washington or abroad, as well as through exchanges of communications and telephone conversations, which will of course continue.

Fourth, Directors encouraged the use of supplemental consultations with member countries in selected circumstances. A wide range of detailed views was expressed on this subject. Several Directors suggested that supplemental consultations might be appropriate for members in arrears to the Fund, members without current programs but with large financial obligations to the Fund, or members making prolonged use of Fund resources. Supplemental consultations could, in the view of several Directors, also be triggered as a result of major policy actions by members. At their discussion on March 18 on trade policies, Directors asked that the Board be notified of major new developments in that area, and such notifications, as with the current exchange rate information notices, could well lead to supplemental consultations if Directors so requested. They could also take place some time following the conclusion of an Article IV consultation that left serious doubts about the appropriateness of a member’s policies.

Finally, there was a wide-ranging discussion of various issues involved in enhanced surveillance of the policies of member countries involved in multiyear rescheduling arrangements. Directors believed that the Fund should be selective in acceding to requests for enhanced surveillance, and some Directors cautioned against the involvement of the Fund in such arrangements for too long a period of time. A number of them considered that in practice the procedure would be appropriate mainly for countries where strong adjustment policies were well under way. Otherwise, the Fund would continue to consider the endorsement of the country’s adjustment program in the context of a stand-by or an extended arrangement as the normal means of providing the necessary signal to commercial banks and other sources of finance. Most Directors considered that release of staff reports to banks in such cases would be acceptable if the country requested it and if it was necessary for the restructuring to take place. Directors emphasized that staff reports provided to commercial banks in cases of enhanced surveillance should not be, and should not be seen to be, of such a character as to provide on/ off signals from the Fund. Directors, moreover, reiterated the view expressed during the Board’s discussion on March 20 of external indebtedness that commercial banks should take full responsibility for their country-risk assessments. More generally, Directors cautioned that, under enhanced surveillance, the Fund should not be seen as either formally endorsing the member’s policies or intervening too deeply in the relations between debtor countries and commercial banks. We have taken very careful note of the many issues raised by Directors regarding the access to and procedures for enhanced surveillance. The staff will reflect on them and we will return to these matters as experience is gained on a case-by-case basis.

In the course of their discussion, Directors indicated their awareness of the difficulties of embarking on new procedures at a time when Board, management, and staff all face very heavy work loads, and urged that ways be found to mitigate the burden. Some of the ideas supported by the Board today could be implemented without too much difficulty, but others would involve some considerable effort. What I would propose is that over the next few months management and staff consider Directors’ ideas both to gain experience with how they could be implemented in practice and to explore their implications for the work load and for the budget.

The Executive Board will return to the matter of surveillance, taking stock of all the ideas that have been explored, and of suggestions put forward by Directors, including the issue of publicity.

Appendix C. Enhanced Surveillance

Extract from Managing Director’s Speech on May 10, 1985 Before the Annual Spring Membership Meeting of the Institute of International Finance, Washington, D.C.

To begin with, the Fund will continue to play an active role through its support for countries’ adjustment policies and its surveillance of their economies.

As countries progress toward renewed access to financial markets, it is likely that there will be increased emphasis on the Fund’s role as a financial catalyst and on its role in providing continuing analysis and policy advice. In this connection, certain countries have asked the Fund to conduct enhanced surveillance of their economies, to facilitate banks’ monitoring of their progress toward a viable external position in the absence of a Fund-supported program.

The procedure of enhanced surveillance is still developing, and doubtless will evolve with experience on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, some of the opportunities and challenges it presents to member countries and their creditors are already clear. The cornerstone of enhanced surveillance is the member country’s preparation of a quantitative financial program that will set out major macroeconomic targets and policy objectives over the year ahead. Needless to say, the success of such programs will depend, above all, on the commitment on the part of the authorities concerned to carry them out. The Fund will evaluate such programs, assessing the consistency of the policies adopted with the objectives and their compatibility with sustained growth and progress toward a viable external position. Half-yearly consultation reports will monitor the progress achieved in the implementation of programs, and will evaluate countries’ economic performance.

Creditors, for their part, will need to weigh these assessments, together with other available information, before arriving at their own judgments about the economic performance of a country and making their own credit decisions. Fund staff reports under enhanced surveillance cannot be relied upon to provide “on/ off indications for financing. That would be inconsistent with progress toward more market-related decision making by creditors. Enhanced surveillance can support banks’ risk assessment procedures, but cannot substitute for them. For this procedure to evolve in a manner that can best serve the interests of all parties, it will be essential that the adjustment being undertaken is supported by “spontaneous” financing on a flexible and continuing basis, as justified by the particular circumstances of the country concerned. (IMF Survey, Vol. 14 (May 27, 1985), pp. 162–65, at p. 164.)

The Chairman’s Summing Up of the Discussion of the Role of the Fund in Assisting Members with Commercial Banks and Official Creditors Executive Board Meeting 85/132 - September 4, 1985

General Remarks

The procedures relating to enhanced surveillance that have been discussed by Directors were developed in response to the need to help members make progress toward addressing their debt problems and improving their relations with their creditors in an orderly manner and in a broader framework.

It was noted by many Directors that by adapting some of its policies, the Fund had played a central role in helping to limit the disruptions associated with the debt crisis and in promoting a normalization of debtor/creditor relations. Most Directors, however, observed that the practice of enhanced surveillance that had developed involved some risks. Some Directors stressed the risk of a possible weakening of Fund conditionality. Others feared that the Fund might tend to become too deeply and too specifically involved in relations with the commercial banks, and that generalized reliance on the Fund’s judgment by the international community could affect the Fund’s credibility and interfere with the normal functioning of the markets, which should rely eventually on the banks’ own assessments. In other words, enhanced surveillance in the view of most Directors should not become a substitute for stand-by and extended arrangements and should not ‘crowd out’ or ‘dilute’ the Fund’s normal procedures and transform the institution into a kind of universal credit-rating agency. In that vein, a majority of Directors, while recognizing the usefulness of the practices that have evolved, considered that enhanced surveillance should be used on a limited basis under the guidance and control of the Executive Board, essentially to help promote MYRAs (multiyear rescheduling arrangements), although all MYRAs might not be associated with enhanced surveillance.

Criteria and Procedures

a. Criteria for the Adoption of Enhanced Surveillance

While several Directors insisted on the need for flexibility and on the importance of avoiding too rigid criteria, most Directors felt that enhanced surveillance could be undertaken when the four following conditions are met:

First, at the request of a member country, who must initiate the procedures;

Second, in cases where a good record of adjustment has been shown;

Third, in cases in which a MYRA is needed to normalize market relations and to facilitate the return to voluntary or spontaneous financing;

Fourth, in cases where the member is in a position to present an adequate quantified policy program in the framework of consultations with the Fund staff, which are part of the procedure of enhanced surveillance.

b. Length of the Fund’s Involvement

Directors thought that, on the whole, the early cases of enhanced surveillance had covered rather too long periods. They felt that in the future the Fund should try to limit the procedure to about the consolidation period of a MYRA. I would suggest that we should retain some flexibility and remain open to the possibility of extending enhanced surveillance a little beyond the consolidation period. If the Fund were to cut off enhanced surveillance at the end of the consolidation period, the communication of reports to the banks would be halted at a delicate time in the normalization of relations between the country and its creditors; i.e., at the time when the country will need more voluntary financing to meet external payments falling due. While we should try to limit enhanced surveillance as much as possible to the consolidation period, there might be occasions when an extension of enhanced surveillance into the period after consolidation may be necessary and warranted.

c. Trigger Mechanisms

A number of Directors feared that staff involvement in the design and the negotiation of trigger mechanisms between the commercial banks and the member country risked diluting the banks’ responsibility in the monitoring process under MYRAs and risked engaging the Fund in providing on/off signals to the banks. Most Directors felt that the staff should not negotiate or take responsibility for designing and assessing trigger mechanisms. But, if the member wished, the Fund staff would not refuse to give its views on the purely technical merits or drawbacks of such mechanisms. It is important to emphasize that the Fund should take no active part in the negotiation of the design of these trigger mechanisms.

d. Contents and Distribution of Staff Reports

Directors stressed the need to ensure that staff reports to be issued to creditor banks under the policy of enhanced surveillance continue to provide full and frank assessments of the policies and economic prospects of member countries. While a number of Directors were of the view that staff reports should be made available to creditor banks under the enhanced surveillance procedures only after the Executive Board had met to discuss the reports, most Directors agreed that countries would be authorized to release these staff reports to their creditor banks not earlier than two weeks after their issuance to the Executive Board. The majority of Directors were of the view that authorization to release staff reports should be provided by a general decision pertaining to all cases for which enhanced surveillance is agreed rather than by an individual decision in each case. The reports to be released to creditor banks would reflect only the staff’s views and would not contain any reference to the discussion and views of the Executive Board. No amendments to the staff report other than the deletion of references to Board discussions would be made.

e. Involvement of the Executive Board

I understand that the procedure would be as follows: First, request by a member for enhanced surveillance; second, management assesses the case in accordance with the policies agreed by the Executive Board today and determines whether to submit the request for the endorsement of the Board. In cases where the criteria raise delicate problems of interpretation, management would continue to consult informally with Executive Directors at the earliest opportunity.

.................................................................................

g. Review of the Policy on Enhanced Surveillance

A number of Directors suggested that in view of the need to assess changing circumstances and the possible effects of the procedures for enhanced surveillance on the Fund and its policies, the Board should engage in a periodic review of the policy of enhanced surveillance, with an initial review to be held in about one year.

Enhanced Surveillance – Procedures for Transmittal of Staff Reports

When the Executive Board has approved a request by a member for consultations under the Fund’s policy on enhanced surveillance, the annual and midyear consultation reports prepared by the Fund staff in accordance with that policy in respect of the member may be transmitted by the member to creditor banks and other creditor financial institutions party to the arrangements specified by the member in the request for consultations, on the understanding that the recipients of the reports have assured the member that the reports will not be used for any purpose other than those of the arrangements specified in the member’s request to the Fund and will be kept confidential; and that the reports shall not be transmitted by the member earlier than two weeks after their circulation to members of the Executive Board.

Decision No. 8222-(86/45) March 12, 1986

Appendix D. Annual Report, 1986, Pp. 34–36

Proposals to Improve Surveillance

When the decision on surveillance was adopted in April 1977 it was recognized that it would not be possible to produce a comprehensive set of guidelines applicable to all situations that might arise. Accordingly, the decision that established the principles of surveillance also specified that they should be reviewed at two-year intervals, or more frequently. A recurrent theme of each subsequent review has been the need to make surveillance effective. The most recent review, concluded on February 12, 1986, focused on several proposals made recently to improve the functioning of the international monetary system and to enhance the implementation of surveillance procedures, most prominently in the reports of the Group of Ten and the Group of Twenty-Four.

These reports agreed on a number of key points regarding the implementation of surveillance: first, the function of surveillance is central to the role of the Fund; second, surveillance should be evenhanded and symmetrical; third, the achievement of this symmetry requires particularly close scrutiny of the policies of countries that are important in the international financial system; and fourth, surveillance has so far been less effective than would be desirable in influencing national policies and in promoting economic and financial conditions conducive to exchange rate stability.

The Executive Board endorsed these broad conclusions of the two reports. It noted that the shortcomings highlighted in these reports—in particular the concerns about evenhandedness and effectiveness—had in large measure been rooted in the fundamental changes that had occurred in the international economic and financial environment since the widespread adoption of floating exchange rates. They also reflected the difficulty that individual countries had in fully appreciating the benefits to be gained from framing their domestic policies in the light of a set of consistent international objectives. The perceived asymmetry in the effectiveness of Fund influence—meaning that conditionality in the use of the Fund resources had significantly affected developing countries, while surveillance had had little practical effect on the countries with a major impact on the world economy—had increased since the adoption of floating exchange rates by several major countries. The Board felt that an essential requirement for effective surveillance was a willingness on the part of all members to implement policies in a way that took full account of both their interdependence within the international monetary system and their mutual self-interest in the improved operation of the system.

Part of the responsibility for shortcomings in the functioning of the system might, in the Executive Board’s view, also be attributed to the way in which the surveillance mechanism has operated. Particular importance was thus attached to reviewing possible means of improving the surveillance mechanism. The Executive Board considered a number of proposals, including some that focused on improvements in the procedures through which surveillance was implemented.

First, the scope of surveillance could be widened to include the broader principles of oversight by the Fund over members’ economic policies, thus recognizing explicitly that exchange rate movements that cause international concern are more often than not the unintended result of divergences and inadequacies in domestic policies rather than the deliberate consequences of policies aimed at influencing conditions in the foreign exchange market. Second, indicators—not necessarily quantified, rigid indicators, but more systematic guidelines than those specified in the existing surveillance decision—could be used to characterize a stance of policies and to help the detection of inconsistencies and deviations from appropriate policies. Third, the implementation of existing surveillance procedures could be strengthened along the lines of some of the detailed proposals in the reports of the Group of Ten and Group of Twenty-Four. These proposals, summarized in Table 13, can be grouped broadly into three categories: those aimed at improving the analytical basis of surveillance, those designed to enhance the multilateral setting of surveillance, and those intended to strengthen the influence of the consultation process.

As regards the analytical basis of surveillance, a number of proposals met with widespread support. It was agreed that there was need to broaden the coverage of policies subject to surveillance and to integrate further the assessment of exchange rates and domestic policies within a medium-term framework. Specifically, exchange rate developments should be viewed in the context of an assessment of fiscal, monetary, trade, and structural policies. Moreover, a medium-term framework was seen as essential to assess the consistency and sustainability of members’ policies. In this context, regular consultations provide a useful opportunity to assess the adequacy of available data and to stress the main areas of needed improvement. Finally, it was emphasized that staff reports for Article IV consultations should provide candid appraisals of members’ policies, making clear the analytical basis of policy judgments; when the staff disagreed with a member’s policies, precise suggestions for policy change should be made.

Considerable support was also expressed for proposals to strengthen the multilateral setting of surveillance. While the basis for an overall assessment of international economic developments and prospects is provided by the twice-yearly world economic outlook exercise, it was felt that the usefulness of this review could be enhanced by a more explicit analysis of economic interactions among major countries. The inclusion of a separate chapter in the World Economic Outlook devoted to an analysis of the international repercussions of policies and developments in the larger countries should improve the framework for reviewing policy issues in a multilateral setting.

A suggested means for strengthening the conduct of Article IV consultations was through direct contact, at the conclusion of certain Article IV consultations, between the Managing Director of the Fund and the finance minister of the country concerned. This could be helpful in those cases where high-level consideration was thought to be particularly necessary because of the importance of the issues involved or the urgency of the need for policy action. Second, the continuity of the consultation process could be strengthened through a review in subsequent reports of policy recommendations made by the Fund in the course of a consultation. Third, the coverage of information notices used to monitor key developments in the period between Article IV consultations could be broadened. At present, these notices cover only significant changes in real effective exchange rates and in trade policies. Fourth, greater use could be made of the supplemental surveillance procedure, whereby the Managing Director can initiate an informal and confidential discussion if he considers that a modification in a member’s exchange arrangements or exchange rate policies, or the behavior of the exchange rate for its currency, may be important or may have important effects for other members.

These various issues related to surveillance, together with a report by the Managing Director of their initial consideration by the Executive Board, were reviewed by the Interim Committee in April 1986. The Committee reaffirmed the key role that Fund surveillance needs to play in the functioning of the international monetary system. The need to strengthen the multilateral framework of surveillance, which had been a particular focus of the reports of the Group of Ten and the Group of Twenty-Four, was also a central element of the Committee’s review of means to improve surveillance. The Committee noted in this context that increased emphasis would be given in the world economic outlook exercise to policy interactions among industrial countries in order to strengthen the basis for assessing the international repercussions of the policies and objectives of the major industrial countries, and to help promote the further development of recent initiatives to enhance policy coordination among these countries.

The Interim Committee asked the Executive Board to consider ways in which its regular reviews of the world economic situation could be further adapted to improve the scope for discussing external imbalances, exchange rate developments, and policy interactions. The Committee suggested that an approach worth exploring was the formulation of a set of objective indicators related to policy actions and economic performance, having regard to a medium-term framework. Such indicators might help identify a need for discussion of countries’ policies.

Subsequently, at the Tokyo Economic Summit in May 1986, participants reaffirmed their undertaking made in 1982 to cooperate with the Fund in strengthening multilateral surveillance, particularly among the countries whose currencies constitute the SDR basket. They requested that, in conducting such surveillance and in conjunction with the Managing Director of the Fund, their individual economic forecasts should be reviewed, taking into account such indicators as GNP growth rates, inflation rates, interest rates, unemployment rates, fiscal deficit ratios, current account and trade balances, monetary growth rates, reserves, and exchange rates.

NOTES

References to provisions of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement are to the present Articles.

The six earlier pamphlets in this series are referred to by the number and date of the pamphlet, as follows:

  • Pamphlet No. 19 – Floating Currencies, Gold, and SDRs: Some Recent Legal Developments (1976).

  • Pamphlet No. 22 – Floating Currencies, SDRs, and Gold: Further Legal Developments (1977).

  • Pamphlet No. 26 – SDRs, Gold, and Currencies: Third Survey of New Legal Developments (1979).

  • Pamphlet No. 33 – SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Fourth Survey of New Legal Developments (1980).

  • Pamphlet No. 36 – SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Fifth Survey of New Legal Developments (1981).

  • Pamphlet No. 40 – SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Sixth Survey of New Legal Developments (1983).

Pamphlet No. 36, pp. 1–14 and 93–96.

For the full text of Decision No. 6631-(80/145)G/S, dated September 17, 1980, see Selected Decisions of the International Monetary Fund and Selected Documents, Eleventh Issue (Washington, 1985), pp. 284–85. (Hereinafter referred to as Selected Decisions); Pamphlet No. 36, p. 95.

Rules and Regulations, By-Laws. Rules and Regulations, Forty-Second Issue (Washington, 1985), pp. 55–60. (Hereinafter referred to as By-Laws, Rules and Regulations.)

International Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 85/29 (September 23, 1985).

Executive Board Decision No. 8160-(85/186)G/S, adopted December 23, 1985.

The changes that took effect on that date are discussed in Pamphlet No. 36, pp. 14–20.

Ibid., pp. 19 and 97.

Ibid., pp. 16–17.

The method of calculating the interest rate is this: the interest rate on an instrument in the interest rate basket is multiplied by the number of units in the basket of the currency in which the instrument is denominated; the product is multiplied by the value of the currency in terms of the SDR; the resulting products for the five currencies are added together.

Article XX, Section 3.

Article XX, Section 1.

Article XX, Section 2.

Under Rule J-7 of the Rules and Regulations, the Fund’s financial year begins on May 1 and ends on the next April 30. By-Laws, Rules and Regulations. p. 47.

Article XX, Section 5.

(1) Participants have various obligations to “surrender,” that is, use SDRs, in payments to the Fund; one such obligation is to pay charges on the amount by which allocations exceed holdings of SDRs. Other obligations are imposed by Article III, Section 3(a); Article V, Section 9(d); Article VII, Section 1(ii); Article XII, Section 6(e); and Article XVI, Section 2, among other provisions. (2) Cancellation of SDRs by the Fund under Article XVIII, Section 2 can be considered a form of compulsory surrender of SDRs by participants to the Fund.

A participant is compelled to accept SDRs from another participant in accordance with the designation process of Article XIX, Section 5. This obligation is one of the two fundamental obligations on which the SDR system rests. The other obligation is that of the Fund to designate a participant to accept SDRs if another participant requests the designation of a transferee.

Article XX, Section 1.

Article XX, Section 2.

Article XX, Section 5.

Article XX, Sections 2 and 5.

Agreement Establishing the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, Part II—Establishment of Bank, paragraph 3(1), p. 2.

Decision No. 7707-(84/79)S, adopted May 17, 1984.

International Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 84/1 (May 17, 1984).

See Joseph Gold, Special Drawing Rights: The Role of Language, IMF Pamphlet Series No. 15 (Washington, 1971); Joseph Gold, “Special Drawing Rights: Renaming the Infant Asset,” Staff Papers, Vol. 23 (July 1976), pp. 295–311.

By-Laws. Rules and Regulations, Rule B-6, p. 21.

Joseph Gold, “The SDR in Treaty Practice: A Checklist,” International Legal Materials (Washington), Vol. 22, No. 1 (January 1983), pp. 209–13.

International Maritime Organization, “Oil Pollution Liability Convention 1984: Text of the Convention of November 1969 as Amended by the Protocols of 1976 and 1984.” Commercial Laws of Europe (London), Vol. 8, Part 87 (June 1985), pp. 177–98.

International Maritime Organization, “Oil Pollution Fund Convention of December 1971 as Amended by the Protocol of 1984,” Commercial Laws of Europe (London), Vol. 8, Part 88 (July 1985), pp. 199–234.

See note 26, Article VII, paragraph 8.

Article V, paragraph 2.

Article 13, paragraph 5.

Article 16.

See note 27, Article 4, paragraphs 4(a)-(d).

Ibid., paragraph 4(3).

For discussion of the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels, December 18, 1971), which entered into force on October 16, 1978, see Gold, Pamphlet No, 33, pp. 33–35.

Ibid., pp. 31–32.

Pamphlet No. 36, pp. 32–33.

Proposed UPU Amendment 1007.1/Rev. 1.

Resolution 05 by the People’s Republic of China at the UPU Congress, Hamburg, 1984, adopted by the Congress, effective January 1, 1986.

Ibid.

The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency: Documents Submitted to the Board of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at its 1985 Annual Meeting, October 1985, Chapter II, Article 5, p. 20.

Ibid., Chapter II, Article 6, p. 20.

The text is based on the article by Melchiade Yadi, “La Communaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs,” Studia Diplomatica (Brussels), Vol. 34, No. 6 (1981), pp. 709–51.

Pamphlet No. 33, pp. 43–44.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Export Credit Financing Systems in OECD Member Countries (OECD, Paris, 1982), pp. 7–8. See the OECD Trade Directorate, Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits, TD Consensus No. 82/41, Section 14, p. 15.

Export-Import Bank of the United States, Report to the U.S. Congress on Export Credit Competition and the Export-Import Bank of the United States for the Period January 1, 1984 through December 31, 1984 (September 1985), p. 43.

Bonds of this length have been referred to sometimes in the field of export credits as medium-term.

Export-Import Bank of the United States, Report to the U.S. Congress on Export Credit Competition and the Export-Import Bank of the United States for the Period January 1, 1984 through December 31, 1984 (September 1985), pp. 43–45. David M. Cheney, “The OECD export credits agreement,” Finance and Development, Vol. 22, No. 3 (September 1985), pp. 35–37. Export-Import Bank of the United States, Report to the U.S. Congress on Export Credit Competition and the Export-Import Bank of the United States for the Period January 1, 1983 through December 31, 1983 (September 1984), pp. 30–32. Joseph H. Gainer, “Eximbank’s Services to the U.S. Exporting Community,” International Practitioner’s Notebook, No. 32 (October 1985), pp. 7–10, at pp. 9–10.

Decision No. 6026-(79/13), January 22, 1979, Selected Decisions, p. 14.

Ibid., p. 10 (Decision No. 5392-(77/63), April 29, 1977).

Attachment to Decision No. 7646-(84/40), March 12, 1984, Managing Director’s Summing Up (reproduced in Appendix B of this Pamphlet), pp. 112–13.

Ibid.

Decision No. 6026-(79/13), January 22, 1979, Selected Decisions, p. 13.

The Fund’s index of competitiveness can be given normative effect by a member. For example, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance on August 12, 1985 published rules regarding the international value of the Norwegian krone, pursuant to Royal Decree of August 9, 1985 by which the King had delegated certain of his powers to the Ministry in accordance with Section 4, second paragraph of the Act of May 24, 1985, relating to Norges Bank and the Monetary System. Section 1 of the Rules sets forth the composition of the exchange rate index and the weights, consisting of 14 currencies. Paragraph 2 of Section 1 provides in translation that: “The weights are to be reassessed at certain intervals and may also be reassessed in connection with changes in the competitiveness weights of the International Monetary Fund.” (Bank of Norway, Economic Bulletin, 1985/3, Vol. 56 (September 1985), pp. 230–31, at p. 231; see also pp. 206–207.)

Article XII, Section 4.

By-Laws, Rules and Regulations, Rule C-6, p. 23.

Ibid.

Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 1985 (Washington, 1985), p. 47. (Hereinafter referred to as Annual Report 1985.)

Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 1984 (Washington, 1984), pp. 55–56. (Hereinafter referred to as Annual Report 1984.)

Attachment to Decision No. 7646-(84/40), Managing Director’s Summing Up (reproduced in Appendix B of this Pamphlet), pp. 111–15.

International Monetary Fund, International Monetary Reform, Documents of the Committee of Twenty (Washington, 1974), pp. 24–28. (Hereinafter referred to as Documents of the Committee of Twenty.)

Ibid., p. 19.

Selected Decisions, pp. 360–61.

See also Annual Report 1985, p. 47; “Supplement on the Fund,” IMF Survey, Vol. 14 (September 1985), p. 11; De Nederlandsche Bank n.v. Annual Report 1984, p. 134.

See Appendix C of this Pamphlet; IMF Survey, Vol. 14 (May 27, 1985), pp. 162–65, at p. 164. For the provisions of agreements between a member and private lenders on restructuring debts, which involve monitoring procedures by the Fund, see International Legal Materials, Vol. XXV, No. 2, March 1986, pp. 477–81.

“Supplement on the Group of 10 Deputies’ Report,” IMF Survey, Vol. 14 (July 1985), pp. 1–16. The Group of Ten had its origin in the negotiation of the Fund’s General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB), which were set forth in a decision of the Fund on January 5, 1962 and which became effective on October 24, 1962. The members are Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Switzerland has met regularly with the Group as its eleventh member since December 26, 1983, when the GAB was enlarged to include Switzerland as a full participant.

Article IV, Section 2(b).

“Supplement on the Group of 10 Deputies’ Report,” IMF Survey, Vol. 14 (July 1985), p. 3, paragraph 9.

Ibid., p. 3, paragraph 12.

Ibid., pp. 3–4, paragraphs 13–22.

Ibid., pp. 4–5. paragraphs 23–31.

Ibid., p. 5, paragraphs 31—32.

Ibid., pp. 6–8, Chapter III, paragraphs 34–54.

Ibid., p. 6, paragraph 39.

Joseph Gold, Legal and Institutional Aspects of the International Monetary System: Selected Essays, Vol. I (Washington, 1979), pp. 55–70, 469–517; Vol. II (Washington, 1984), pp. 103–104, 122, 255–307, 396–403, 563, 568. (Hereinafter referred to as Gold, Selected Essays.)

“Supplement on the Group of 10 Deputies’ Report,” IMF Survey, Vol. 14 (July 1985), pp. 6–7, paragraphs 41–18.

Ibid., pp. 7–8. paragraphs 49–54.

IMF Survey, Vol. 14 (June 24, 1985), pp. 205–206.

“Supplement on the Group of 24 Deputies’ Report,” IMF Survey, Vol. 14 (August 1985), pp. 7–8, Chapter IV, paragraphs 59–71.

Ibid., pp. 8–10, Chapter V, paragraphs 72–89.

Ibid., pp. 7–8, Chapter IV, paragraph 63.

Ibid., p. 7, paragraph 66.

Ibid., pp. 7–8, paragraph 68.

Ibid., pp. 8–9, Chapter V, paragraph 78.

See Documents of the Committee of Twenty, pp. 8–13.

“Communiqué of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on the International Monetary System, October 7, 1985,” IMF Survey, Vol. 14 (October 28, 1985), p. 309, paragraph 10.

Selected Decisions, pp. 11–12.

Ibid., p. 11.

Paragraph 23 of the Report of the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention (called the Jurgensen report after its Chairman) of March 1983 describes “disorderly conditions” as follows:

While it has never been possible to devise a common, comprehensive operational definition of “disorderly markets,” authorities in each country have intervened at times when they perceived unusual and undesirable patterns of behaviour in exchange markets. Such patterns of behaviour have included a substantial widening of bid-asked spreads, large intra-day exchange rate movements, perceptions that trading has become “thin” or highly uncertain, and, at times, judgements that market psychology was beginning to generate self-sustaining exchange rate movements. All countries have intervened occasionally in order to offset the immediate destabilising impact of sudden events of an essentially non-economic nature, (pp. 8–10)

Table 1 of the report (p. 9) lists 14 objectives of intervention pursued at various times by Summit countries during the period subsequent to the par value system. Three subheadings are listed under “Countering disorder,” and two subheadings appear under “Resisting rate movements (‘which bear no relation to the fundamentals’)”. Paragraph 22 (p. 8) states: “All seven countries have had one objective in common: that of countering disorderly exchange market conditions as part of their commitment to promoting a stable system of exchange rates, in accordance with their obligations under Article IV of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund as amended in 1978. But there is no unique definition of what conditions in the market are indicative of disorder.”

Selected Decisions, p. 12.

Joint Statement on International Monetary Undertakings, issued at the conclusion of the Versailles Summit, January 6, 1982. See IMF Survey, Vol. 11 (June 21, 1982), p. 189.

Statement on Exchange Market Intervention, issued April 29, 1983. See IMF Survey, Vol. 12 (May 9, 1983), p. 138.

The Joint Statement issued January 17, 1985 at the conclusion of the meeting of the Group of Five in Washington appears in the IMF Survey, Vol. 14 (January 21, 1985), pp. 1 and 25.

The Williamsburg Declaration on Economic Recovery, issued at the conclusion of the Williamsburg Summit, May 30, 1983 (see IMF Survey, Vol. 12 (June 13, 1983), pp. 171—72), contains the following paragraph:

2. The consultation process initiated at Versailles will be enhanced to promote convergence of economic performance in our economies and greater stability of exchange rates, on the lines indicated in an annex to this Declaration. We agree to pursue closer consultations on policies affecting exchange markets and on market conditions. While retaining our freedom to operate independently, we are willing to undertake coordinated intervention in exchange markets in instances where it is agreed that such intervention would be helpful.

The Annex, entitled “Strengthening Economic Cooperation for Growth and Stability,” contains this statement:

3. Exchange Rate Policy. We will improve consultations, policy convergence and international cooperation to help stabilize exchange markets, bearing in mind our conclusions on the Exchange Market Intervention Study.

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System of the United States has published a number of Staff Studies on intervention. For example, No. 126: Donald B. Adams and Dale W. Henderson, Definition and Measurement of Exchange Market Intervention (September 1983); No. 127: Margaret L. Greene, U.S. Experience with Exchange Market Intervention: January—March 1975 (August 1984); No. 128: Margaret L. Greene, U.S. Experience with Exchange Market Intervention: September 1977-December 1979 (October 1984); No. 129: Margaret L. Greene, U.S. Experience with Exchange Market Intervention: October 1980-September 1981 (August 1984); No. 132: Kenneth Rogoff, Time-Series Studies of the Relationship between Exchange Rates and Intervention: A Review of the Techniques and Literature (September 1983); No. 133: Bonnie E. Loopesko, Relationships Among Exchange Rates, Intervention and Interest Rates: An Empirical Investigation (November 1983).

Communiqué of the Ministers and Governors of the Group of Ten, issued June 21, 1985 at the conclusion of the meeting in Tokyo. See IMF Survey, Vol. 14 (June 24, 1985), p. 205.

Communiqué of the Group of Five, issued September 22, 1985 at the conclusion of the meeting in New York. See IMF Survey, Vol. 14 (October 7, 1985), pp. 289 and 295.

David C. Mulford, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, October 23, 1985, in “The Group of Five Meeting and Announcement: Context and Perspective,” Treasury News (Washington), B-326, p. 8. See also the following statement by Karl Otto Pohl, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, in Frankfurt am Main on November 4, 1985:

There was agreement in New York on 22/9—as is stated in the communiqué—that an appreciation of the currencies of Europe and in particular an appreciation of the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar was desirable. In this context, interventions by central banks on the foreign exchange markets were considered to be appropriate and useful under certain circumstances also by the United States, on whose initiative, incidentally, the New York meeting was arranged. This constitutes a remarkable change in the attitude of the United States and we welcome it. But it would be wrong to draw the conclusion from this that some kind of ‘target zones’ or fixed levels for the exchange rate of the US dollar had been laid down in New York. I believe that it was clear to all those involved that any such attempt would be doomed to fail from the start owing to the sheer size of the international financial markets. Apart from this, probably no country would be prepared to accept the consequences of defending specific exchange rates for its monetary and fiscal policies. But I nevertheless consider it to be a step forward that the United States now attaches greater importance to the exchange rate of its currency and is willing to engage in closer co-operation on the foreign exchange markets, as we have advocated for a long time.

Since the meeting in New York interventions have been carried out on the foreign exchange markets on a considerable scale, albeit not primarily by the Bundesbank but by the United States and Japan, in contrast to September 1984 and late February 1985. To my mind, this is appropriate considering that the foreign trade imbalances that are intended to be influenced by corresponding changes in exchange rates are first and foremost a problem between the United States and Japan. In the first nine months of 1985 alone the surplus on Japan’s bilateral balance of trade with the United States totalled some $27 billion.

Gold, Selected Essays, Vol. II, Chapter 7, pp. 515–79.

G. J. H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law (Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1983), pp. 187–88 (footnotes omitted).

Article IV, Section 2; Article IV, Section 4; Article VIII, Section 7; Article XXII; Schedule D, paragraph 2(a).

Gold, Selected Essays, Vol. II, Chapter 1, pp. 17–254.

Ibid., p. 238.

Pamphlet No. 40, p. 33.

J. Keith Horsefield, The International Monetary Fund. 1945–1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, Volume I: Chronicle, pp. 403–404, 482; and Volume II: Analysis, ed. by J. Keith Horsefield, pp. 548–49 (Washington, 1969).

Decision No. 6790-(81/43), March 20, 1981, Selected Decisions, pp. 273–75.

Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 1985 (Washington, 1985), p. 37.

Ibid.

[1976] A. C. 443.

Law Commission, Private International Law: Foreign Money Liabilities, Law Commission No. 124 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, Cmnd 9064, October 1983). Cmnd 9064 was presented to Parliament in October 1983. References to paragraphs of the report to which the conclusions and recommendations relate have been deleted.

Ibid., pp. 80–82, paragraphs 3.8–3.62.

Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on Foreign Money Liabilities (Vancouver: Ministry of Attorney General, Law Reform Commission No. 65, 1983), p. 60.

For a detailed critique of the three sections in the Tentative Final Draft and in its two immediate predecessors, Tentative Drafts 5 and 6, see Joseph Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts, Vol. III, Chapter 22 (Washington, 1986), pp. 673–743.

American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), Vol. 1, Parts 1, 2, 3 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: The Institute, July 15, 1985), p. 1249.

Ibid., p. 1271.

Law Commission, Private International Law: Foreign Money Liabilities (see note 108), p. 83, paragraph 5.17.

Ibid., pp. 54–55, paragraphs 5.14–5.17.

J. Michael Robinson, “Canada Adopts a Currency Conversion Code,” International Financial Law Review (London), Vol. 3 (November 1984), pp. 27–28.

Ibid., p. 28.

Joined Cases 64 and 113/76, 167 and 239/78, 27, 28, and 45/79 [1982] ECR, p. 1733.

[1979] ECR, p. 3091.

The Council’s calculation resulted in FF 5.633 per unit of account for the period August 1, 1975 to July 31, 1977 and FF 5.7806 per unit for the period August 1, 1977 to October 18, 1977. The applicants claimed FF 6.73056 per ECU.

[1978] 3 W.L.R. 804. See Gold, Pamphlet No. 33, pp. 77–79. In citing the two cases, the Advocate General was making the point that the rate of exchange at the date of payment applied to both contractual and noncontractual claims.

The same principle seems to apply under the law of Spain. See Elicia Rivas Manga, “Enforcing foreign currency loans in Spain,” International Financial Law Review (London), Vol. 4 (January 1985), pp. 33–35.

See note 118. [1982] ECR, pp. 1758–59.

Société Française Bunge SA v. Belcan NV (The Federal Huron). [1985] 3 All E.R. 378, [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 189.

Federal Register (Washington), Vol. 47, No. 234 (December 6, 1982), pp. 54766–54768.

15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.

See, for example, Roy L. Brooks, “Currency Translations in the Registration Statements of Foreign Issuers,” The Business Lawyer (Chicago), Vol. 35 (January 1980), pp. 435–54.

Federal Register (Washington), Vol. 46, No. 231 (December 2, 1981), pp. 58507–11.

In Les Rapides Savoyards S.à.r.l. and Others v. Directeur Général des Douanes et Droits Indirects (Case 218/84), [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 116, the issue was the customs duty that France could impose on an importation of goods from Switzerland under Protocol 3 of the European Economic Community (EEC)-Switzerland Free Trade Agreement, and this issue raised the question of the date as of which to apply exchange rates. Some American components in the manufacture of the goods in Switzerland had been imported into that country from France and some directly from the United States. To enjoy the preferential tariff under the Agreement, the Swiss customs authorities had to certify that the value of non-European components was below 5 percent of the finished product. The Swiss did make this certification, basing it on the exchange rates at the date of importation of the American components into Switzerland. The French customs authorities denied the preferential tariff on the ground that the value was more than 5 percent on the basis of exchange rates at the date of importation into France. The U.S. dollar had appreciated in the meantime. The Advocate General, the Italian Government, and the Commission argued that the Swiss valuation was conclusive, because, if it were not, fluctuating exchange rates would make it impossible for an exporter to know, before the date of exportation, what the rate of duty was going to be, and it would be difficult for the exporter to quote firm prices. Furthermore, the applicable rate of duty could vary among Member States of the Community in relation to Switzerland because of the development of exchange rates. The European Court held the Swiss certification of value to be conclusive for the French customs authorities but on the basis of the literal interpretation of the Agreement and not because of the fluctuation of exchange rates. The French authorities were entitled to apply the exchange rate between the French franc and the Swiss franc at the date of importation into France to determine the value of the imported goods but not the rate of duty payable when the rate depends on the Swiss certification of the value of non-Swiss components. (See “Preferential Duty Treatment Under the EEC-Switzerland Agreement,” European Law Review (London), Vol. 10 (February 1985), pp. 43–46.)

Glafke Shipping Co. AS v. Pinios Shipping Co. No. 1 (The Maria) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 300.

646 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1981).

Laura Stevenson Conrad, “Bernina Distributors, Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Machine Co.: New Grounds for Commercial Impracticability Based on Currency Exchange Rates Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2–615,” North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation. Vol. 8 (Winter 1982), pp. 117–29, at pp. 117–18.

The contention was that the court could make this determination under Utah’s enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), Utah Code Ann. §70A–2–305(1) (1980).

Utah Code Ann. §70A–2–615 (1980): Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions.

U.C.C. §2–615 (1978), Official Comment 8.

Gulf Oil Corp. v. F.P.C., 563 F. 2d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 1977).

Utah Code Ann. §70A–2–302 (1980).

U.C.C. §2–302, Unconscionable Contract or Clause, Comment 1.

Ibid.

646 F.2d at 440.

Pamphlet No. 22, pp. 7–14.

Pamphlet No. 33, pp. 64–67.

Pamphlet No. 40, pp. 71–74.

Ibid., p. 94.

See p. 128 of the article by Laura Stevenson Conrad cited in note 132.

Trustees of the British Museum v. Attorney General [1984] 1 All E.R. 337.

Ibid., p. 339. (The reference is to Law Reform Committee, The Powers and Duties of Trustees, published in Cmnd 8733, October 1982.)

Ibid., p. 339.

[1984] 1 All E.R., pp. 340–41.

John Chown, “A ‘Free Lunch’ in the Currency Risk Market?” The Treasurer (London), May 1981, pp. 9–12, at p. 9.

R. K. Ashton, “Foreign Exchange Gains/Losses Reconsidered,” Business Law Review (London), Vol. 3 (July 1982), pp. 218–20, at p. 219. Note also John Chown, “The Tax Treatment of Foreign Exchange Fluctuations in the United States and the United Kingdom,” George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, Vol. 16 (No. 2, 1982), pp. 201–37: “The relevant law in both countries is both complex and unsatisfactory. It typically is based on statutes and cases that were enacted and decided when currency fluctuations were not major problems. The American literature, in particular, has tended to assume that other currencies, and not the dollar, fluctuate.” (p. 235)

[1984] 1 A.C. 362. See Edward Troup, “Taxation of foreign exchange gains,” International Financial Law Review (Chicago), Vol. 3 (April 1984), pp. 26–27; Jill Pagan, “Marine Midland—The Tip of the Iceberg for Trades in a Foreign Currency,” British Tax Review (London), 1984, No. 3, pp. 161–70; “Exchange Rate Fluctuations: SP 3/85,” Business Law Review (London), Vol. 6 (March 1985), Infobank, pp. 89–92. Developments have occurred in accounting for the effects of changes in foreign exchange rates. Established methods of accounting have an influence on various branches of law, including the law of taxation. See Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No. 20 (SSAP 20), Foreign Currency Translation, April 1983, of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, and the comment on it by Peter A. Bird, “Foreign Currency Translation,” Journal of Business Law (London), July 1983, pp. 320–21; International Accounting Standards Committee, International Accounting Standard No. 21, Accounting for the Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates, July 1983. (The function of the Committee is to attempt the international harmonization of accounting standards; the business of the Committee is conducted by a Board consisting in March 1983 of representatives of accounting bodies in 12 countries, including the countries of the Group of Five); Financial Accounting Standards Board of the Financial Accounting Foundation (United States), Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation (Stamford, Connecticut), December 1981.

Pattison v. Marine Midland Ltd. [1984] 1 A.C., p. 372; also [1984] 2 W.L.R., p. 14.

In the accounts of each year the monetary assets and liabilities denominated in a foreign currency were valued in sterling at the exchange rate at the balance sheet date, but as the result of matching, no profit or loss was shown.

[1983] 2 W.L.R., p. 819.

[1983] 2 W.L.R., p. 827.

National Standard Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 80 T.C. 551 (1983). See Eileen M. Dranginis, “Tax Planning: Taxation of Foreign Currency Transactions,” Corporation Law Review (Boston, Massachusetts), Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring 1983), pp. 156–61, at p. 156:

Transactions involving foreign currency can have surprising and seemingly illogical ramifications for federal income tax purposes. Furthermore, because the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have considered a limited number of foreign currency transactions, many issues cannot be resolved with any certainty at all.

The trouble with foreign currency is that economically it is a medium of exchange but for tax purposes, in a system where everything must be measured by reference to the value of the U.S. dollar, foreign currency must be treated as property. Yet, the “property” treatment cannot be a perfect fit and the tension between the economic characteristics of foreign currency and the attempt to treat it as property for tax purposes produce rules which are not easy to explain. (Footnote omitted.)

Ibid., p. 556.

Avco Financial Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation (Cth), Australian Law Journal Reports (Sydney), Vol. 56 (July 1982), pp. 668–78.

Ibid., p. 672. According to three members of the court:

In the argument emphasis was given to the notion that the money stock of a finance company is similar to the trading stock of a trading company. There are some obvious similarities. However, there are some differences. Money is not dealt with in specie as a commodity and money is not included in the definition of “trading stock” for the purposes of the Act—see s.6. Despite these differences, what is of immediate importance is the strong similarity between the getting in and the turning over of trading stock by a trading company and the borrowing and onlending of money by a finance company. This similarity is so strong as to suggest that just as exchange gains and losses on the acquisition of trading stock are to be included in the assessable income of a trading company, like gains and losses in connexion with the borrowing and repayment of loans by a finance company, are also to be included in assessable income (p. 677).

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Hunter Douglas Limited [1983] 14 A.T.R. 639; [1983] A.T.C. 4562, Australian Law Journal (Sydney), Vol. 58 (June 1984), pp. 350–51; John F. Chown, “Foreign Exchange Gains and Losses: Are Australians Facing an Old Tax Trap?” Australian Tax Review (Sydney), December 1985, pp. 234–42; David Flint, Foreign Investment Law in Australia (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1985), pp. 365–76.

(1984) 466 U.S. 243; 80 L Ed 2d 273, 104 S. Ct. 1776.

Pamphlet No. 40, p. 77.

Report to the Congress of the Commission on the Role of Gold in the Domestic and International Monetary Systems (March 1982), 2 vols., Vol. 1, p. 14.

Bank for International Settlements, Press Review (Basle), No. 49, March 10, 1983, p. 4.

Jan Amesz and Others v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] E.C.R. 4465, at 4467.

Ibid.

See, for example, Anton Birke v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] E.C.R. 4425; Günter Bruckner v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] E.C.R. 4525.

(1984) 466 U.S. 243; 80 L Ed 2d 273, 104 S. Ct. 1776.

A higher limit applied if the consignor of cargo declared a higher value for it when the cargo was handed to the carrier and paid the surcharge that was exigible.

49 U.S.C. §1301 et seq.

Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention), October 12, 1929, reprinted at 49 U.S.C. §1502.

80 L Ed 2d, p. 278.

0.888 671 gram of fine gold (Article XXI, Section 2 before Second Amendment).

80 L Ed 2d, p. 280.

Public Law No. 92–268, §2, 86 Stat. 116 (1972); Public Law No. 93–110, §1, 87 Stat. 352 (1973).

Public Law No. 94–564, §6, 90 Stat. 2660 (1976).

80 L Ed 2d, p. 282.

Ibid., p. 283.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 284.

Ibid. (footnotes omitted).

Ibid.

Ibid. The computation for converting Poincare francs into U.S. dollars would be as follows on the basis of the value of the SDR on March 23, 1979, the date the cargo was delivered to TWA: 1 Poincare franc (90 percent fine gold) = 0.0655 gram of fine gold; 1 Poincare franc (100 percent fine gold) = 0.05895 gram of fine gold; 1 SDR (gold value on March 31, 1978) = 0.888671 gram of fine gold; the number of francs in 1 SDR = 0.888671/0.05895 = 15.075, rounded to 15. The Warsaw Convention limit of 250 francs per kilogram converted to SDRs = 250/15 = 16.67 SDRs per kilogram, rounded to 17 SDRs. The dollar value of 1 SDR on March 23, 1979 = 1.28626; 17 SDRs per kilogram times 1.28626 = $21.87 per kilogram. (SDR 17 per kilogram was equal to approximately $17.99 on April 17, 1984.) Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, by Trans World Airlines, Inc., Petitioner, January 15, 1983, p. 20, n. 34, in Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corporation et al.

80 L Ed 2d, p. 285.

Ibid., p. 284.

Ibid., p. 285, n. 31.

Ibid., p. 285.

Ibid., pp. 287–301.

Ibid., p. 285.

Ibid., p. 286.

Ibid., p. 285, n. 31. In the United Kingdom, rates for translating the unit of account into sterling are made from time to time by the Secretary of State under Carriage by Air (Sterling Equivalents) Orders. The following comment has been made on this practice:

The exercise of the Secretary of State’s discretion in the making of these orders has never yet been challenged, but it is not impossible that such a challenge might succeed, in accordance with the principles of administrative law. Certainly, the further the levels of limited liability become removed from the levels of compensation which would be available to a plaintiff under unlimited principles, the greater the incentive for such a challenge. (Peter Martin and John Balfour, “Carriage by Air—Limited or Unlimited Liability,” Business Law Review (London), Vol. 4 (July 1983), pp. 169–71, at p. 170).

See Arnold Kean, ed., “Sterling Equivalents (Air),” Journal of Business Law (London), July 1985, pp. 336–38.

Pamphlet No. 40, p. 88.

Droit maritime français (Paris), Vol. 32 (1980), pp. 285–94.

Ibid., pp. 275 et seq. The cases are discussed in Joseph Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts, Vol. II (Washington, 1982), pp. 446–51.

Marthe Simon-Depitre, “Société Egyptair v. Chamie,” Revue critique de droit international privé (Paris), Vol. 73 (1984), pp. 310–15.

Ibid., p. 311 (translation).

Foro Italiano (Bologna), Part I–134 (1982), pp. 2074–78.

Konrad Zweigert and J. Kropholler, eds., Sources of International Uniform Law, Vol. 2: Transport Law (Leiden, the Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff, 1972), pp. 23–28. The Brussels Convention will be replaced by the Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978 (“the Hamburg Rules”), adopted on May 31, 1978, when it becomes effective; Pamphlet No. 36, pp. 33–34.

Ibid., p. 25.

Ibid., p. 27.

“Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading” (1968). Register of Texts of Conventions and Other Instruments Concerning International Trade Law, Vol. 2, Chapter 2 (UN Document No. E. 73 V.3, A/CN.9/76/Add. 1).

Foro Italiano (see note 198), p. 2076 (Translation).

Gold, Selected Essays, Vol. II, pp. 332, 733, 742, and 744.

On the valuation of gold in official reserves, see Pamphlet No. 26, p. 86, n. 98; Pamphlet No. 33, p. 89; Pamphlet No. 40, p. 77.

Foro Italiano (see note 198), p. 2077 (Translation).

See note 199, pp. 23 and 25.

The indices as published by the Instituto Centrale di Statistica (ISTAT) (Central Institute of Statistics), Rome.

“Monnaie—Tribunal de Milan,” Journal du droit international, 110th year. No. 1 (January-February-March 1983), pp. 194–95.

Ibid., p. 195.

See Pamphlet No. 26, pp. 24–26; Pamphlet No. 33, pp. 32–33.

Schip en Schade (Zwolle, the Netherlands), No. 30 (1983), pp. 78–80.

See note 199, p. 259.

See note 212, p. 78 (Translation).

See note 199, pp. 253–54.

United Kingdom, Statutory Instruments, 1980, Part 3, Section 3, 1st September to 30th 1980, No. 1966 (C. 84): “Road Traffic: The Carriage by Air and Road Act, 1979” (Commencement No. 1), Order 1980, p. 7048.

United Kingdom, The Public General Acts, 1979, Part 2, Chapter 28: “The Carriage by Air and Road Act, 1979” (London: Council of Law Reporting, 1980), pp. 673–93.

Ibid., Section 4(1), p. 676.

Under Section 5 of the statute that was brought into force by the Order cited in note 216, the value of an SDR on a particular day shall be treated as equal to such sum in sterling as the Fund has found for that day, or, if no sum has been found for that day, for the last day before that day for which the Fund has found a sum. A certificate by or on behalf of the U.K. Treasury stating the sum in sterling in accordance with the foregoing rule shall be conclusive evidence in any proceedings.

The report does not clarify why the proceedings were brought in the Netherlands, but it may be that the defendant was a resident of that country. Article 31(1) of the CMR (see note 199, pp. 524–35, at p. 532) provides that:

  • In legal proceedings arising out of carriage under this Convention, the plaintiff may bring an action in any court or tribunal of a contracting country designated by agreement between the parties and, in addition, in the courts or tribunals of a country within whose territory:

  • (a) the defendant is ordinarily resident, or has his principal place of business, or the branch or agency through which the contract of carriage was made, or

  • (b) the place where the goods were taken over by the carrier or the place designated for delivery is situated,

  • and in no other courts or tribunals. (Translation)

Possibly, subparagraph (a) applied because the carrier received the goods in Marseilles for delivery in England.

No. 1 R 145/83, translated and reproduced in Brief of Trans World Airlines, Inc., August 29, 1983, at BA12–21, in Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corporation et al.

European Transport Law (Antwerp), Vol. 9 (1974), pp. 701–10.

Pamphlet No. 19, pp. 17–33. See also Joseph Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts, Vol. II, pp. 228, 242, and 442.

Gold, Selected Essays, Vol. I, pp. 558–66.

The relevant Articles of the General Civil Code of Austria are as follows;

  • Article 6. No other interpretation shall be attributed to a particular provision of the law than that which is apparent from the plain meaning or the language employed and from the clear intention of the legislator.

  • Article 7. If a case can be decided neither from the language nor from the natural sense of a law, similar situations which are determined by reference to the laws and the purpose of related provisions must be taken into consideration. Should the case still remain doubtful, then it must be decided upon the carefully collected and well-considered circumstances in accordance with the natural principles of justice.1

Footnote 1 attached to Article 7 is as follows:

These two articles (6 and 7) are rules of interpretation which are binding upon the court. Article 6 demands principally a semantic interpretation, taking into account the intent of the legislator. Such intent is found in the deliberations of the experts who drafted the law, and, in later laws in the published reports of the “motives”, the reasons for drafting the laws. The first part of Article 7 refers to the use of analogy, and the second sentence refers to the principles of “natural law” which were in vogue at the time (1811). This rule was later discarded, and the meaning is now: The judge shall decide according to such rules as he would enact if he were the legislator at the time of drafting of the Code (see Commentary by Prof. Klang). (Paul L. Baeck, ed., The General Civil Code of Austria, annotated and rev. ed. (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, for the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University, 1972), p. 4).

See brief referred to in note 221 above, at BA19.

Ibid.

Pamphlet No. 40, pp. 87–89.

For further support, the court cited Article 1: Definitions of International Air Transport Association, Passenger Services Conference Resolutions Manual, 3d ed. (Montreal, effective January 1, 1983).

See brief referred to in note 221 above, at BA23–35.

Article IV, Section 2(b); Schedule C, paragraph 1.

Article V (not IV as stated by the court), Section 12(e); Schedule B, paragraphs 3 and 7; Schedule K, paragraph 2.

U.S. Congress, Senate (98th Congress, 1st Session), “Montreal Aviation Protocols 3 and 4,” Executive Report No. 98–1, pp. 1–49; reproduced in International Legal Materials (Washington), Vol. 22, No. 1 (January 1983), pp. 13–36.

Ibid., p. 13 (Executive Report); p. 19 (International Legal Materials).

“Lawyers Clash on Limiting Liability in Air Crash Treaty,” Congressional Quarterly (Washington), October 30, 1982, pp. 2770–71; Editorial: “A Question of Liability,” Journal of Commerce (London), April 19, 1984, p. 4A.

David Shribman, “Air Liability Treaty Rejected by Senate,” New York Times, March 9, 1983, p. D6.

Public Law 96–389, 94 Stat. 1551, at 1555.

See Pamphlet No. 36, p. 79.

Pamphlet No. 40, pp. 75–83, at p. 75.

Public Law 98–181, 97 Stat. 1276, Section 813, sec. 50.

Ibid., pp. 1276–77.

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to the Congress on the Functioning of the International Monetary and Financial System and the Role and Operation of the International Monetary Fund (Washington, March 15, 1985), p. iii.

Ibid., p. 45.

Ibid., p. 48.

Ibid., p. 49.

This statement is a broad and not completely correct paraphrase of the treatment of gold in a liquidation of the Fund. Under Schedule K, which deals with the administration of liquidation, claims on the Fund have priority in the distribution of the Fund’s assets. These claims include the rights of creditors of the Fund under its borrowing agreements but not the claims of members to the repayment of any part of their subscriptions, even that part that is equivalent to the use of the subscriptions by the Fund. In the discharge of claims, the Fund uses the currency in which the claim is payable, and, if insufficient, only then gold; and finally, if these assets are inadequate, all other currencies in proportion, so far as practicable, to the quotas of members.

Even in the distribution of the rest of the Fund’s assets, “creditor” members (that is, the members whose subscriptions have been used to such extent that the Fund holds their currencies in amounts less than their quotas) do not have a prior right to the Fund’s gold that it held on August 31, 1975 and continued to hold on the date of the decision to liquidate. To the extent of the excess of the market value of this gold over the former official price, gold is distributed to those members that were members on August 31,1975 in proportion to their quotas on that date. Only at the next step do creditor members (in the sense of the definition in parentheses above) have a prior right to gold. The Fund distributes its remaining holdings of gold among the members whose currencies are held by the Fund in amounts less than their quotas in the proportions of, but not in excess of, the amounts by which their quotas exceed the Fund’s holdings of their currencies.

See note 242, p. 50.

See Pamphlet No. 26, pp. 46–51.

Public Law 93–110, 87 Stat. 352.

Public Law 93–373, 88 Stat. 445.

Public Law 93–110, Section 3(b).

Public Law 93–373, Section 2(b).

For the text of the Gold Clause Joint Resolution, see Pamphlet No. 22, pp. 82–83.

Public Law 95–147, 91 Stat. 1227, Section 4(c).

676 F.2d 643 (1982).

294 U.S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 432, 79 L Ed 912 (1935).

31 U.S.C. §5518.

See, for example, Pamphlet No. 26, pp. 49–50, and 93, nn. 169, 170.

Public Law 73–87, 48 Stat. 337.

Public Law 94–564, 90 Stat. 2660.

Public Law 97–258 (1982); 31 U.S.C. 449.

Public Law 94–564, sec. 9.

Ibid., sec. 8. See Pamphlet No. 26, pp. 40–41.

646 F.2d 1185 (1981).

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF CASES CITED AND CONSOLIDATED INDEX OF TOPICS

The following references to the seven pamphlets surveying legal developments involving SDRs, currencies, and gold are made in the Consolidated List of Cases Cited and the Consolidated Index of Topics.

SurveyPamphlet No. (and Year)Reference
SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Seventh Survey of New Legal Developments44(1986)VII
SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Sixth Survey of New Legal Developments40(1983)VI
SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Fifth Survey of New Legal Developments36(1981)V
SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Fourth Survey of New Legal Developments33(1980)IV
SDRs, Gold, and Currencies: Third Survey of New Legal Developments26(1979)III
Floating Currencies, SDRs, and Gold: Further Legal Developments22(1977)II
Floating Currencies, Gold, and SDRs: Some Recent Legal Developments19(1976)I

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF CASES CITED (Surveys I-VII)

Australia
Avco Financial Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation (Cth), Australian Law Journal (Sydney), Vol. 56 (July 1982), pp. 668–78VII:65 (n.159); 66 (n. 160)
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Hunter Douglas Ltd. (1983) 14 A.T.R. 639; [1983] A.T.C. 4562VII:66 (n. 161)
Austria
Kislinger v. Austrian Airtransport No. 1 R 145/83, translated and reproduced in Brief of Trans World Airlines, Inc., August 29, 1983, at BA 12–21, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corporation et al.VII:87 (n. 221)
Rendezvous-Boutique-Parfumerie Friedrich und Albine Breitinger Gesellschaft mbH v. Austrian Airlines, see Brief referred to above, at BA 23–35VII:90 (n. 230)
Canada
Am-Pac Forest Products Inc. v. Phoenix Doors Ltd. et al. [1979] B.C.L.R. 63VI:49
Batavia Times Publishing Co. v. Davis [1978] 88 D.L.R. (3d) 144 Re Canadian Vinyl Industries Inc.; Textilwerke Gerbrüder Hoon v. Corber [1978] 29 C.B.R. 12VI:51, 61
Kraft v. Otto [1978] C.S. 752VI:125 (n. 176)
Williams & Glyn’s Bank Ltd. v. Belkin Packaging Ltd. [1979] 108 D.L.R. (3d) 585VI:126 (n. 194)
Cyprus
Lamaignère v Selene Shipping Agencies Ltd. [1982] I, CLR 227VI:124 (n. 166)
England
Allgemeine Gold-und-Silberscheideanstalt v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, The Times (London), December 11, 1979, p. 15IV:87 (n. 239)
Barclays Bank International Ltd. v. Levin Brothers (Bradford) Ltd. [1976] 3 All E.R. 900; [1976] 3 W.L.R. 852; [1977] Q.B. 270IV:81 (n. 214)

II:15 (n. 48), 16 (n. 53)
B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt (No. 2) [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783V:62 (n. 176), 63 (n. 181)
British and French Trust Corp. v. New Brunswick Ry. [1937] 4 All E.R. 516 (C.A.)III:51 (n. 175)
Choice Investments Ltd. v. Jeromnimon (Midland Bank Ltd. garnishee) [1981] 1 All E.R. 225VI:44
The Despina R. [1977] 3 W.L.R. 597; [1977] 3 All E.R. 874; The Times (London), February 2, 1977, p. 9; [1978] 3 W.L.R. 804; [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1VII:49 (n. 121)

VI: 123 (n. 154)

IV:77 (nn. 197, 198)

III:64 (n. 211), 65 (nn. 212, 213), 66 (n. 214), 67 (n. 215)

II:18 (n. 63)
Dodd Properties (Kent) Ltd. and Another v. Canterbury City Council and Others [1979] 2 All E.R. 118; [1980] 1 All E.R. 928V:61 (n. 173)
Re Dynamics Corporation of America and Another [1972] 3 All E.R. 1046; [1976] 2 All E.R. 669VI:52 II:88 (n. 49)

II:89 (n. 54)
Federal Commerce and Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Tradex Export SA [1977] 2 All E.R. 41
George Veflings Rederi A/S v. President of India and other appeals. The Bellami, The Pearl Merchant, The Doric Chariot [1978] 1 W.L.R. 982; [1979] 1 All E.R. 380VI: 122 (n. 145)

IV:79 (n. 201)
Glafke Shipping Co. AS v. Pinios Shipping Co. No. 1 (The Maria) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 300VII:55 (n. 130)
The Halcyon the Great [1975] 1 All E.R. 882I:36 (n. 70)
Helmsing Schiffahrts G.m.b.H. & Co. K.G. v. Malta Drydocks Corporation and Others [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 444V:63 (n. 182). 64 (nn. 183–85), 65 (n. 189)
Hoffman v. Sofaer [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1350VI:123 (n. 155)
Jean Kraut A.G. v. Albany Fabrics Ltd. [1977] 2 All E.R. 116II:16 (n. 55)
Jugoslavenska Oceanska Plovidba v. Castle Investment Co. Inc. [1973] 3 All E.R. 498I:33
Re Lines Bros. Ltd. [1982] 2 All E.R. 183VI:53
Lively Ltd. and Another v. City of Munich [1976] 3 All E.R. 851VI:59

III:57 (nn. 196, 197)

II:6 (n. 24), 7
Malhotra v. Choudhury [1979] 1 All E.R. 186V:65 (n. 188)
Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. [1975] Q.B. 487; [1975] 1 All E.R. 1076; [1975] 3 All E.R. 801; [1976] A.C. 443VII:40 (n. 107), 49, 55, 76

VI:44, 46, 48, 54, 56, 60, 61

V:61 (nn. 171, 173, 174), 62 (n. 177), 63 (n. 178), 64, 65

IV:77 (n. 195), 78, 79, 80, 81

III:59 (nn. 200–202), 63 (n. 209), 66, 67, 69

II:15 (nn. 47, 51), 16 (nn. 52, 54), 18, 23, 62, 88 (n. 49), 89 (nn. 53, 54)

I:35–38
Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. (No. 2) [1976] 3 W.L.R. 477; [1976] 3 All E.R. 599; [1977] Q.B. 489VI:57 V:63 (nn. 179–80), 65 (n. 189)
Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd. and Others v. Marden, The Times (London), May 12, 1977, p. 10II:62 (n. 209)
New Brunswick Ry. v. British and French Trust Corp. [1939] A.C. 1III:51 (n. 175)
Ozalid Group (Export) Ltd. v. African Continental Bank Ltd. [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 231VI:45, 57
Pattison v. Marine Midland Ltd. [1984] 1 A.C. 362; [1984] 2 W.L.R. 14; [1983] 2 W.L.R. 819VII:62 (n. 152), 63 (n. 155, 156)
Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin [1975] 1 All E.R. 152I:33–35, 36, 37
Services Europe Atlantique Sud (SEAS) of Paris v. Stockholms Rederiaktiebolag SVEA of Stockholm (The Folias) [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1; [1978] 3 W.L.R. 804; [1978] 2 All E.R. 764 (C.A.); The Times (London), February 23, 1978, p. 11VI: 123 (n. 154)

V:65 (n. 188)

IV:78 (nn. 199, 200)

III:67 (n. 217)

II:90 (n. 55), 91 (n. 63)

I:35–38
Sharif v. Azad [1967] 1 Q.B. 605; [1966] 3 W.L.R. 1285; [1966] 3 All E.R. 785 (C.A.)VI:127 (n. 210)
Sing Batra v. Ebrahim, The Times (London), May 3, 1977, p. 11; Halsbury’s Laws of England: Annual Abridgment, 1977 (London, 1978), 453, paragraph 1906VI: 127 (n. 210)
Société Français Bunge SA v. Belcan NV (The Federal Huron) [1985] 3 All E.R. 378; [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 189VII:50 (n. 124)
Techno-Impex v. Gebr. Van Weelde Scheepvaartkantoor B.V. [1981] 1 Q.B. 648VI: 123 (n. 162)
The Teh Hu [1969] 3 All E.R. 1200VI: 123 (n. 162)
Treseder-Griffin and Another v. Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. [1956] 2 Q.B. 127II:61–62 (nn. 206–208)
Trustees of the British Museum v. Attorney General [1984] 1 All E.R. 337VII:60 (n. 146–49)
In re United Railways of the Havana and Regla Warehouses, Ltd. [1960] 2 All E.R. 332; [1961] A.C. 1007VI: 125 (n. 183)

I:36 (n. 72)
Wadsworth v. Lydall [1981] 1 W.L.R. 599VI: 123 (n. 157)
W. Bruns & Company of Hamburg v. Standard Fruit and Steamship Company of New Orleans (“The Brunsrode”) [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 74; [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 501IV:65 (nn. 168–170)
France
Compagnie des Assurances Maritimes, Aériennes et Terrestres (C.A.M.A.T.) v. Garcia et Soc. Dabi, Revue critique de droit international privé, Vol. 65 (1976), pp. 73–79II:24 (n. 63)
Le Havre, Judgment of Commercial Court, August 24, 1978, Droit maritime français (Paris), Vol. 32 (1980), p. 579VI: 114 (n. 44)
Pakistan International Airlines v. Compagnie Air Inter A.S. et al., Droit maritime français (Paris), Vol. 32 (1980), pp. 285–94VII:80 (n. 195)
Saint Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. S.E.A., Journal du droit international, 110th year, No. 1 (January-February-March 1983), pp. 194–95VII:84 (n. 209)
Société Egyptair v. Chamie, Droit maritime français (Paris), Vol. 32 (1980), pp. 285–94VII:80 (n. 194)
Germany, Federal Republic of
Matter of the Khendrik Kuivas, Hamburg District Court, No. Div. 64, Ref. No. 64 SRV 6/76V:66 (n. 192)

III:15, 30, 36

II:56 (n. 192)
Transarctic Shipping Corporation, Inc. Monrovia, Liberia v. Krögerwerft (Kröger Shipyard) Company, European Transport Law (1974), Vol. 9, pp. 701–10VII:80 (n. 222)

II:33 (n. 114), 56 (n. 191), 57

I:17–21, 22, 24–25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 39
United States of America v. Indus G.m.b.H. Court of Appeals, Karlsruhe, 10 U 94/75, February 13, 1976III:62 (n. 208)
Greece
Zakoupolos v. Olympic Airways Corp., Judgment No. 256/1974, Court of Appeals, Athens, January 10, 1974II:55 (n. 189)

I:30–31 (n. 55)
Italy
Balkan Bulgarian Airlines v. Tammaro, Judgment of October 25, 1976, Milan, Il Diritto Marittimo (1978), p. 83IV:90–91
Borletti Brothers Inc. v. Dolphin Shipping Agency, Foro Italiano (Bologna), Part I–134 (1982), pp. 2074–78VII:69, 80 (n. 198)
Japan
Bank of Okinawa v. Tokai Electric Construction K.K. Hanrei Jiho (No. 782), 19 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., July 15, 1975), Law in Japan: An Annual, Vol. 9 (1976), pp. 158–59II:19 (n. 67)
Madagascar
“Air Madagascar,” the Malagasy National Air Transport Company and United Experts, Inc. (S.A. des Experts Réunis) v. Musset, Revue de Droit Uniforme, I (1976), pp. 236–39II:93 (n. 86)
Netherlands
Avandero N.V. v. Westeuropese Transportmaat schappij Wetram N.V., Judgment of May 12, 1978, Schip en Schade, Vol. 23, No. 5 (May 1979), p. 162V:81 (n. 232)
Frigoscandia Transport B.V. v. Sea Products International, Schip en Schade, No. 30 (1983), pp. 78–80VII:85 (n. 212)
Giants Shipping Corporation v. State of the Netherlands (The Blue Hawk), Rechtspraak van de Week, May 30, 1981, pp. 321–30VI:84
Hornlinie v. Société Nationale des Petroles d’ Aquitaine (“The Hornland”), Nederlandse Jurisprudence (1972), No. 269, pp. 728–38II:33 (n. 113), 56 (n. 190)

I:22, 30, 31
New Zealand
Isaac Naylor & Sons Ltd. v. New Zealand Co-operative Wool Marketing Association Ltd. [1981] 1 NZLR 361VI:55, 67
Scotland
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft v. Large, Scots Law Times (Reports), [1977], p. 219IV:80 (n. 208)
Sweden
Re Motor Ship “Saga,” Judgment of the General Average Assessor, Gotenborg, October 2, 1973II:55 (n. 188), 56

I:31 (n. 56)
United States
In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, Causey et al. v. Pan American Airways, Inc. et al., 684 F.2d. 1301VI:133 (n. 285)
Re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833 (1982)VI:87, 133 (n. 277)
Australia/U.S. Atlantic & Gulf Conference, Proposed Imposition of Currency Adjustment Surcharge, Federal Maritime Commission, Docket No. 72–5, January 28, 1972VI:129 (n. 241)
Aztec Properties, Inc. v. Union Planters National Bank of Memphis (Tenn. Sup. Ct.), 530 S.W. 2d 756 (1975); 44 L.W. 2209 (November 11, 1975)I:71 (n. 159)
Bernina Distributors, Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Machine Co., 646 F.2d. 434 (10th Cir. 1981)VII:57 (n. 131); 59 (n. 140)
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. Ltd., 307 U.S. 265 (1939)I:68–69
Birkenstock v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 646 F.2d. 1185 (1981)VII:99 (n. 264)
Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. a/k/a Hycel v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 344 (1981)VI:133 (n. 277)
Bradford v. Plains Cotton Cooperative Association, 539 F.2d. 1249 (10th Cir. 1976)VII:59
Deere & Company v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, N.D. III., Index No. 81 C 4726 (December 30, 1982)VI: 87
Energetic Worsted Corporation v. The United States, Customs Appeal No. 5160 (April 7, 1966)VI: 120 (n. 115)
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Grosvenor, 426 F. Supp. 67 (U.S. Dist. Ct. W.D. Tenn., 1976)III:49 (n. 169)

II:59 (n. 200)
Federal Maritime Commission v. Australia/U.S. Atlantic & Gulf Conference et al., 337 F. Supp. 1032 (1972)VI:129 (n. 241)
Feldman v. Great Northern Railway Company, 428 F. Supp. 979 (U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D.N.Y., 1977)III:49 (n. 169)
Franklin Mint Corporation et al. v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1288, Docket No. 82–7012VI:85, 113 (n. 37)
Gold Bondholders Protective Council Inc. v. United States, 676 F.2d. 643 (1982)VII:97 (n. 255)
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939)I:68–69
Gulf Oil Corp. v. F.P.C., 563 F.2d. 588 (3d Cir. 1977)VII:59 (n. 136)
Henderson et al. v. Mann Theatres Corporation of California, 65 Cal. App. 3d 397; 135 Cal. Reptr. 266 (Calif. Ct. App., 2d App. Dist., Div. 1, 1976); cert. den. 434 U.S. 825III:49 (n. 169)
Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324 (1937)III:50 (n. 170)
In the Matter of Arbitration of Disputes Relating to the Charters of M.S. John Wilson and M.S. Chilean Nitrate, both dated June 12, 1968, between Ocean Transport Line, Inc., as Owner, and Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation, as Charterer, 1973 A.M.C. 1489III:62 (n. 208)

II:10 (n. 35)
N.V. Motorscheepv. Maats. Josephine and Dammers & Van Der Heide’s Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd. v. Azta Shipping Company and 2,350 Bags of Costa Rican Coffee, 1975 A.M.C. 1339 (U.S. Dist. Ct., Eastern District of La., May 22, 1975)I:71 (n. 159)
National Standard Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 80 T.C. 551 (1983)VII:64 (n. 157)
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 432, 79 L Ed 912 (1935)VII:97 (n. 256)
Todok v. Union Bank of Harvard, 281 U.S. 449, 50 S. Ct. 363 (1930)V:83 (n. 245)
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corporation et al., 466 U.S. 243; 80 L Ed 2d 273; 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984)VII:68 (n. 162), 71 (n. 169), 79, 86, 89, 91
Court of Justice of European Communities
Anton Birke v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 543/79 [1982] E.C.R. 4425VII:70 (n. 168)
Boussac Saint-Frères SA v. Brigitte Gerstenmeier, Case 22/80 [1982] 33 C.M.L.R.202VI:38
British Beef Company Ltd. v. The International Board for Agricultural Produce, Case 146/77 (1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 47IV:71 (n.183)
British Beef Company Ltd. v. The International Board for Agricultural Produce. The Times (London), June 20, 1978, p. 7; [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 83III:61 (n.205)
Butter-und Eier-Zentrale Nordtmark eG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, Case 38/79 [1982]2 C.M.L.R. 753VI:69
Compagnie Cargill v. Office National Inter- professional des Céréales (ONIC), Case 27/77 [1977] E.C.R. 1535III:61 (n.203)
Comptoir National Technique Agricole (CNTA) S.A. v. E.C. Commission, Case 74/74 [1977]1 C.M.L.R. 171II:86 (n.28.)
Fabrizio Gillet v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 28/74 [1975] E.C.R. 463II:71 (nn.25–28)
Firma Gebrüder Dietz v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 126/76 [1977] E.C.R. 2431IV:71 (n.182)
Firma Johann Lührs v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, Case 78/77 [1978] E.C.R. 169IV:17 (n. 43)
Fratelli Zerbone S.N.C. v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Case 94/77 [1978] E.C.R. 99, 113IV:70 (n. 180), 71, 84 (nn. 225, 228)
Günter Bruckner v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 799/79 [1982] E.C.R. 4525VII:70 (n. 168)
Hans-Markus Slötting v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (preliminary ruling requested by the Finanzgericht Hamburg), Case 138/78 [1979] E.C.R. 713V:70 (n. 199), 71
IRCA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Case 7/76 [1976] E.C.R. 1213II:87 (n. 28)
Jan Amesz and Others v. Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases 532, 534, 567, 600, 618 and 660/79 [1982] E.C.R. 4465VII:70 (n. 166, 167)
Les Rapides Savoyards S.à.r.l. and Others v. Directeur Général des Douanes et Droit Indirects, Case 218/84 (1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 116VII:55 (n. 129)
Merkur-Aussenhandels-GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 43/72 [1973] E.C.R. 1055I:2 (n. 4)
Re Monetary Compensatory Amounts for Durum Wheat: Italy v. E.C. Commission, Case 12/78; Tomadini SNC v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (Unione Industriale Pastai Italiani intervening), Case 84/78 [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 573V:68 (n. 197), 73 (n. 198)
N.G.J. Schouten B.V. v. Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten, Case 35/78 [1978] E.C.R. 2543IV:72 (n. 185), 73 (n. 186)
P. Dumortier Fréres SA and Others v. Council of the European Communities, Joined Cases 64 and 113/76, 167 and 239/78, 27, 28 and 45/79 [1982] E.C.R. 1733; [1979] E.C.R. 3091VII:47 (n.118)
Regina v. Brian Albert Johnson and Others [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 226III:47 (n. 163)
Regina v. Ernest George Thompson, Case 7/78 [1978] E.C.R. 2247IV:86 (n. 238)
S.A, Roquette Frères v. French State-Administration des Douanes, Case 29/77 [1977] E.C.R. 1835III:61 (nn. 204, 205)
Société anonyme génèrate Sucriére v. Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases 41, 43, and 44/73 [1977] E.C.R. 445III:57 (n. 198)
Société pour I’ Exportation des Sucres SA v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 132/77 [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 309IV:74 (n. 187)

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF TOPICS

SDRs
AllocationIV: 1–5, 103–104
Application of gold units of account: SDR solutionVII:72, 74–76, 78–79, 80, 83, 86;
VI:83–89;
V:81–83:
IV:91–92; III:35–40;
II:55–58; I:17–22,
30–33
Borrowing by FundVI:5–6; V:103 (n. 3);
IV:15–16; III:7–10;
I:54–57
ClassificationV: 34–37
Constant purchasing powerVI: 10–11, 97–99;
V:37–40; IV:18–20
Gold units of account in combination withVI:4, 6, 97–99;
SDRV:42–43
IndexationVI:10–11, 97–99
InterestVII:5–8, 105–106;
V: 14–20, 96–97;
IV:14–15
Payment ofVII:5–8
Unification of basketsVII:4; V:14–16
Weighting of basketVII:4; V: 18–20
InvestmentVI:6
New UsesIV:5–12, 105, 112
DonationsIV:12, 111–12
Forward operationsIV: II, III
LoansIV:7, 105–107
PledgesIV:7–9, 107–108
Settlement of financial obligationsIV:5–7, 105
SwapsIV: 10–11, 109–110
Transfers as securityIV:9–10, 108–109
Nonmembers of FundVI:4, 6, 8–10, 43;
V:41–42; IV:30, 35–36;
III:22–25; II:30–32;
I:47–48
Obligations of third partiesIV:12–13, 116 (n. 29)
Prescribed holdersVII:9–10; VI: 1–2;
V:21–26
ListVII:10; VI: 1–2; V:25
Second AmendmentV: 22–23
Terms and conditionsV:23–25, 98–99
ReconstitutionV:20–21; IV:13–14
RésuméVII:99–101; VI:89;
V:85–88; IV:95–97;
III:69–71; II:64–69
Succession to holderVII:9–10
Treaties: general aspectsV:40–43; II:24–29
Units of accountVII: 1–4, 11–19, 47–50;
VI:1, 2–8, 42, 66,
73–74, 83–89, 97–99;
V:26–34; IV: 20–44,
112–14; I:43, 45–66
Commercial transactionsVI: 7–8; III:30
Fixed and flexibleVII:17–18; IV:34;
II:46–48, 66–67
Maintenance of valueVI:2–3; III:15–19,
77–78
ObjectivesV:37–40; III:11–15
Private useIV:39–43; III:28–30;
I:49–51, 58–64
Regional organizationsVII:18; IV: 22–23, 27–29,
37; III:27–28; II:39–40,
43–14, 46–49; I:57–58
Treaties and organizationsVII:11–19; VI:3–7:
V:26–34;
IV:21–39; III:19–27;
II:24–49
Use of acronymVII:10–11
ValuationVII:1–5; V:1–14, 104–105
(n. 15);
III:1–15; I:9–15
Analogous basketsVII:19–21; IV:43–44
AveragingIII: 30–32
Concurrent methodsV:28–29; IV:15–17;
III:7–8; I:56–57
Consequences of changeIII:7–11
Exchange rates for calculating valueV: 12–14
First basketII:71–72; I:9–15, 84–87
First revised basketV:2; III:2–7, 75–77
Future revisionsV:8–12
Majorities for decisionsV: 10–12; III:9–10;
I:53–55
Second revised basketV:1–8, 93–96, 98
Third revised basketVII:2–5
Currencies
AccountingVI:63–64; V:41–42
Adaptation of monetary clauses
(see Amendment of monetary provisions)
Amendment of monetary provisionsVI: 71–74; V:48–52;
IV:81–85;
III:55–57; II:3–5
Allocation of exchange risksVI: 64–67
Anti-dumpingVI:34–35, 41
Averaging exchange ratesV:66–67
Choice of exchange ratesVI:43, 45–46, 48, 49–57,
58–60, 65, 67–71;
V:47–48
CommuniquésVII:27–30
ConsultationVI: 13, 14, 16, 17, 115
(n. 58); 116 (n. 165), 117
(n. 71)
Continuing effects of par valuesIV:84–85
Currency adjustment factorsVI:71–74
Currencies of paymentV:52–57
Discriminatory currency arrangementsVI:12, 26, 28, 35–36;
IV:68–69
Treaty of RomeVI:38–40
Enhanced surveillanceVII:26–27, 121–24
Equal valueVI:66, 128 (n. 226)
European Monetary SystemVI:12, 41, 47–48;
IV:46–64
ECUVI:60–62, 69; IV:48–50,
55–63
Exchange arrangements and interventionIV:50–55, 127 (n. 140)
External relationsIV:62–63
FinancingIV:55–61
“Snake”IV:63–64
TextsIV:124–25 (n. 129)
Exchange arrangementsI:4–8
Financial Accounting Standards Board StatementsVI:62–63; V:60–61
Forward contractsVI:24–25, 67–71
“Freely usable” currenciesVI:66; V:52–57
Frustration of contractIII:61–63; II:10–11
GATTVI:23, 43–44, 50–51;
V:71–77, 100–101
Hardship and other protective clausesVII:57–60; IV:64–67;
II:7–14
InformationVI:15–16
International reportsVII:27–30
InterventionVII:30–35
Judgments in foreign currenciesVII:39–51; VI:43–62, 65;
(Miliangos doctrine)V:61–65; IV:76–81, 132
(n. 206); III:63–69;
II:15–19; I:33–38
American Law Institute’s RestatementVII:43–46
Bankruptcy and liquidationVI:51–54, 65, 67
Choice of currencyVII:50–52
Enforcement of foreign judgmentVI:49–50
European Community practiceVII:49
Foreseeability of fluctuationVII:57; VI:46, 47–48,
56–57
Garnishment of debtsVI:45
InterestVI:57–58; V:61–65, 114
(n. 181), 115–16 (n. 190)
Judgments and Articles: exchange ratesVII:43–44; VI:58–60
Judgments and Articles: restrictionsVI:60–62
Law Commission, EnglishVII:41–43; VI;48, 109
Law Reform Commission, British ColumbiaVII:46; VI:55
NominalismVI:55–56
Ontario lawVII:46–47
OptionVI:45–48
Other jurisdictionsVI:49–57; IV:80–81
RestitutionV:62
Securities and Exchange Commission practiceVII:52–55
TortIV:76–79
Legal consequences of fluctuationVII:39–70
Contract lawVII:55
Tax lawVII:62–68
Trust lawVII:60–62
Maintenance of valueV:57–59; III:77–78; II:73
Measurement of changes in exchange ratesV:71–77. 100–101
Mitigation of damagesVI:67–71
Monetary compensatory amountsVI:69–70; V:67–71;
IV:69–74;
III:60–61
Multiple currency practicesVII:37–39; VI:12, 17–35, 36–37, 58, 107–108;
IV:68–69
AdaptationVI:19
Capital transactionsVII:37–39
Consequences of unapproved practicesVI:30–35
DefinitionVI:22–27
Jurisdictional issuesVI:17–20
PolicyVI:28–30
Relevance of provisions other than Article VIIIVI:27
Responsibility of membersVI:20–22
Notices of real effective exchange rate changesVII:23–24
Objective indicatorsVII:25–26
Obligations of membersVII:30–39
Par values and central ratesVII:69–70, 88; VI:22–23, 36;
III:53–60; II:5–7; I:25–27, 77–83
Principles for guidanceVII:30–35
Protection against exchange risks:
By operation of lawIV:67–74
By partiesVI:67–71
RésuméVII:101–103; VI:90–94;
V:88–91; IV:97–100; III:73
RestrictionsVI:18–19, 36–37, 60–61, 117–18 (n. 81)
Restrictions on receipt of currencyVI:61–62
Second AmendmentVI:17–22; III:51–52; II:19–24, 74–78
Sharing exchange risksIV:74–76
“Soft” lawVII:35–37
Sources of international lawVII:36–37
Surveillance over exchange rate policiesVII:21–30; VI:11–17, 139–46; V:43–15; IV:45–46; III:51–52; II:78–81
Role of Executive DirectorVI:14–15
Role of Managing DirectorVI:13–14
TaxationVII:62–68; VI:40; V:59–60
Unenforceability under Article VIII, Section 2(b)VI:32–34, 60–62
Uniformity and symmetryVI:115 (n. 53)
Units of account (other than SDR)VI:41–43, 52, 65–67; V:45–47; I:40–45
Use of Fund’s resourcesVI:30–32
Validity of exchange ratesVI:34, 58–60
Versailles communiquéVI:16–17, 106–107
Variability of exchange rates, effects ofVI:40–75
World Bank Currency Pooling SystemVI:65–66; IV:74–76
Gold
Application of gold units of accountVII:70–90; VI:83–89; III:38–39
Avoidance of exchange for SDRsV:79–81
Certificates as assets of Federal Reserve SystemVI:76, 130–31 (n. 251)
Domestic official priceVII:71–79, 94; VI:78; III:40–41, 88–89 (n. 136)
European Monetary SystemIV:88, 94
Fund’s transactionsVI:79–80; II:50–51
Gold certificatesVII:98–99
Gold coverVI:79; IV:83
Gold units of account
(see Judicial application, Legislative application)
Group of Ten agreementIII:41–46
Joint Resolutions (U.S.)VII:96–98; III:46–51; II:82–83; I:66–71
Judicial application of gold units of accountVII:70–90; VI:83–87;
V:81–83; IV:90–92; II:55–58; I:17–33
Legislative application of gold units of accountVII:91–92; VI:87–89; III:38—40
ObligationsIV:85–87
Official transactionsIII:41–46
Official translation of gold units of accountVII:79; IV:92–93; III:35–40; 88 (n. 128)
Private ownershipII:58–61
RestitutionVI:79, 80–81; II:50–51
RésuméVII:103–104; VI:94–95; V:91–92; IV:100–102; III:71–73; I:63–69
Revaluation profitsVI:77; V:84–85
Revived roleVI:75–83; V:78–79, 117–118 (nn. 210–212)
Subsidies to producersIV:89–90
TaxationVII:98–99; VI:130–31
(n. 251)
U.S. Gold CommissionVI:75–83
U.S. Treasury report, 1985VII:92–96
Validity of gold unit of accountII:61–63
ValuationIV:87–89; II:49–55
FundIV:87; II:49–52
International organizationsIV:88
National practicesVI:77, 79, 84; IV:89; III:32–34, 86 (n. 98); II:52–55

IMF PAMPHLET SERIES

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND PAMPHLET SERIES

(All pamphlets have been published in English, French, and Spanish, unless otherwise stated)

*1. Introduction to the Fund, by J. Keith Horsefield. First edition, 1964. Second edition, 1965. Second edition also in German.

*2. The International Monetary Fund: Its Form and Functions, by J. Marcus Fleming. 1964. In English only.

3. The International Monetary Fund and Private Business Transactions: Some Legal Effects of the Articles of Agreement, by Joseph Gold. 1965.

4. The International Monetary Fund and International Law: An Introduction, by Joseph Gold. 1965.

*5. The Financial Structure of the Fund, by Rudolf Kroc. First edition, 1965. Second edition, 1967.

6. Maintenance of the Gold Value of the Fund’s Assets, by Joseph Gold. First edition, 1965. Second edition, 1971.

7. The Fund and Non-Member States: Some Legal Effects, by Joseph Gold. 1966.

8. The Cuban Insurance Cases and the Articles of the Fund, by Joseph Gold. 1966.

9. Balance of Payments: Its Meaning and Uses, by Poul Høst-Madsen. 1967.

*10. Balance of Payments Concepts and Definitions. First edition, 1968. Second edition, 1969.

11. Interpretation by the Fund, by Joseph Gold. 1968.

12. The Reform of the Fund, by Joseph Gold. 1969.

13. Special Drawing Rights, by Joseph Gold. First edition, 1969. Second edition, with subtitle Character and Use, 1970.

14. The Fund’s Concepts of Convertibility, by Joseph Gold. 1971.

15. Special Drawing Rights: The Role of Language, by Joseph Gold. 1971.

16. Some Reflections on the Nature of Special Drawing Rights, by J.J. Polak. 1971.

17. Operations and Transactions in SDRs: The First Basic Period, by Walter Habermeier. 1973.

18. Valuation and Rate of Interest of the SDR, by J.J. Polak. 1974.

19. Floating Currencies, Gold, and SDRs: Some Recent Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1976. Also in German.

20. Voting Majorities in the Fund: Effects of Second Amendment of the Articles, by Joseph Gold. 1977.

21. International Capital Movements Under the Law of the International Monetary Fund, by Joseph Gold. 1977.

22. Floating Currencies, SDRs, and Gold: Further Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1977. Concluding section also in German.

23. Use, Conversion, and Exchange of Currency Under the Second Amendment of the Fund’s Articles, by Joseph Gold. 1978.

24. The Rise in Protectionism, by Trade and Payments Division. 1978.

25. The Second Amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, by Joseph Gold. 1978.

26. SDRs, Gold, and Currencies: Third Survey of New Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1979. Concluding section also in German.

27. Financial Assistance by the International Monetary Fund: Law and Practice, by Joseph Gold. First edition, 1979. In English only. Second edition, 1980.

28. Thoughts on an International Monetary Fund Based Fully on the SDR, by J.J. Polak. 1979.

29. Macroeconomic Accounts: An Overview, by Poul Høst-Madsen. 1979.

30. Technical Assistance Services of the International Monetary Fund. 1979.

31. Conditionally, by Joseph Gold. 1979.

32. The Rule of Law in the International Monetary Fund, by Joseph Gold. 1980.

33. SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Fourth Survey of New Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1980.

34. Compensatory Financing Facility, by Louis M. Goreux. 1980.

35. The Legal Character of the Fund’s Stand-By Arrangements and Why It Matters, by Joseph Gold. 1980.

36. SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Fifth Survey of New Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1981.

37. The International Monetary Fund: Its Evolution. Organization, and Activities. First edition, 1981. Fourth edition, 1984.

38. Fund Conditionality: Evolution of Principles and Practices, by Manuel Guitián. 1981.

39. Order in International Finance, the Promotion of IMF -Stand-By Arrangements, and the Drafting of Private Loan Agreements, by Joseph Gold. 1982.

40. SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Sixth Survey of New Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1983. In English. French and Spanish in preparation.

41. The General Arrangements to Borrow, by Michael Ainley. 1984 In English. French and Spanish in preparation.

42. The International Monetary Fund: Its Financial Organization and Activities, by Anand G. Chandavarkar. 1984. In English. French and Spanish in preparation.

43. The Technical Assistance and Training Services of the International Monetary Fund In English. French and Spanish in preparation.

44. SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Seventh Survey of New Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1987.

* Out of print. Photographic or microfilm copies of all English editions, including numbers that are out of print, may be purchased direct from University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106, U.S.A., or, for those living outside the Western Hemisphere, from University Microfilms Limited, 30/32 Mortimer St., London, WIN 7RA, England.

Copies (unless out of print) may be requested from:

External Relations Department, Attention: Publications

International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 20431, U.S.A.

Telephone number: 202 623-7430 Cable address: Interfund

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