Chapter

Appendix II. Financial Operations and Transactions

Author(s):
International Monetary Fund
Published Date:
October 2003
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The tables in this appendix supplement the information given in Chapter 8 on the IMF’s financial operations and policies. Components may not sum to total because of rounding.

Tabelle II.1Arrangements Approved During Years Ended April 30, 1953–2003
Financial YearNumber of ArrangementsAmounts Committed Under Arrangements1

(In millions of SDRs)
Stand-ByEFFSAFPRGFTotalStand-ByEFFSAFPRGFTotal
1953225555
1954226363
1955224040
1956224848
1957991,1621,162
195811111,0441,044
195915151,0571,057
19601414364364
19611515460460
196224241,6331,633
196319191,5311,531
196419192,1602,160
196524242,1592,159
19662424575575
19672525591591
196832322,3522,352
19692626541541
197023232,3812,381
19711818502502
19721313314314
19731313322322
197415151,3941,394
19751414390390
1976182201,1882841,472
1977191204,6805185,198
197818181,2851,285
1979144185081,0931,600
1980244282,4797973,277
19812111325,1985,22110,419
1982195243,1067,90811,014
1983274315,4508,67114,121
1984252274,287954,382
198524243,2183,218
1986181192,1238252,948
19872210324,1183584,476
198814115301,7022456702,617
198912147242,9562074279554,545
199016334263,2497,6273741511,328
199113223202,7862,338154545,593
199221215295,5872,49327438,826
199311318231,9711,242495273,789
199418217281,381779271,1703,357
1995173113113,0552,3351,19716,587
199619418329,6458,3811821,47619,684
199711512283,1831,1939115,287
19989482127,3363,0781,73832,152
19994101914,32514,09099829,413
200011102515,7066,58264122,929
2001111142613,093–91,24914,333
2002991839,4391,84841,287
2003102102228,5977941,18030,571

Includes augmentations less approved reductions of committed amounts.

Includes augmentations less approved reductions of committed amounts.

Table II. 2Arrangements Approved During Financial Years Ended April 30, 1953–20031
Financial

Year
Number of ArrangementsAmounts Committed Under Arrangements

as of April 30

(In millions of SDRs)
Stand-ByEFFSAFPRGFTotalStand-ByEFFSAFPRGFTotal
19911451214452,7039,5975391,81314,652
1992227816534,83312,1591012,11119,203
1993156420454,4908,569832,13715,279
1994166322471,1314,504802,7138,428
19951991275613,1906,840493,30623,385
19962171285714,9639,3901823,38327,918
1997141135603,76410,1844,04817,996
19981413336028,32312,3364,41045,069
1999912355632,74711,4014,18648,334
20001611315845,6069,7983,51658,920
2001178376234,9068,6973,29846,901
200213355244,0957,6434,20155,939
2003153365442,8074,4324,45051,689

Certain figures have been restated to exclude expired arrangements.

Certain figures have been restated to exclude expired arrangements.

Tabelle II.3Stand-By and Extended Arrangements in Effect During Financial Year Ended April 30, 2003(In millions of SDRs)
Arrangement DatesAmounts ApprovedUndrawn Balance
MemberEffective

date
Expiration

date
Prior to

FY2003
In

FY2003
At date of

termination
As of

April 30, 2003
Argentina3/10/20001/24/200316,9377,180
Argentina1/24/20038/31/20032,1751,201
Bolivia4/2/20034/1/20048643
Bosnia and Herzegovina8/2/200211/1/20036836
Brazil9/14/20019/6/200212,144759
Brazil9/6/200212/31/200322,82115,215
Bulgaria2/27/20022/26/2004240104
Colombia1/15/20031/14/20051,5481,548
Croatia3/19/20015/18/2002200200
Croatia2/3/20034/2/2004106106
Dominica8/28/20028/27/200331
Ecuador3/21/20034/20/2004151121
Guatemala4/1/20023/31/20038484
Jordan7/3/20027/2/20048575
Latvia4/20/200112/19/20023333
Lithuania8/30/20013/29/20038787
Macedonia, FYR4/30/20036/15/20042020
Peru2/1/20022/29/2004255255
Romania10/31/200110/15/2003300110
Serbia and Montenegro16/11/20015/13/2002200
Sri Lanka4/20/20019/19/2002200
Turkey2/4/200212/31/200412,8212,381
Uruguay4/1/20023/31/20055941,534798
Total for Stand-By Arrangements44,09528,5978,34322,014
Colombia12/20/199912/19/20021,9571,957
Indonesia2/4/200012/31/20033,6381,032
Jordan4/15/19995/31/2002128
Serbia and Montenegro15/14/20025/13/2005650450
Sri Lanka4/18/20034/17/2006144124
Ukraine9/4/19989/3/20021,920727
Total for Extended Arrangements7,6437942,6841,606
Total51,73829,39111,02723,620

Effective February 4, 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro.

Effective February 4, 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro.

Tabelle II.4Arrangements Under the Poverty Redaction and Growth Facility in Effect During Financial Year Ended April 30, 2003(In millions of SDRs)
MemberArrangement DatesAmounts ApprovedUndrawn Balance
Effective dateExpiration datePrior to FY2003In FY2003At date of terminationAs of April 30, 2003
Albania6/21/20026/20/20052820
Armenia5/23/20015/22/20046929
Azerbaijan7/6/20017/5/20048064
Benin17/17/20003/31/2004274
Bolivia29/18/19986/7/200210137
Burkina Faso39/10/199912/9/200239
Cambodia410/22/19992/28/200359
Cameroon12/21/200012/20/200311148
Cape Verde4/10/20024/9/200596
Chad51/7/200012/6/20034810
Congo, Dem. Rep. of6/12/20026/11/2005580133
Cöte d’Ivoire3/29/20023/28/2005293234
Djibouti610/18/19991/17/2003195
Ethiopia3/22/20013/21/200410031
Gambia, The7/18/20027/17/20052017
Georgia1/12/20011/11/200410859
Ghana75/3/199911/30/200222953
Guinea5/2/20015/1/20046439
Guinea-Bissau12/15/200012/14/2003149
Guyana9/20/20029/19/20055549
Honduras83/26/199912/31/200215748
Kenya98/4/20008/3/2003190156
Kyrgyz Republic12/6/200112/5/20047338
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.4/25/20014/24/20043218
Lesotho3/9/20013/8/20042511
Madagascar103/1/200111/30/20047945
Malawi12/21/200012/20/20034539
Mali118/6/19998/5/2003516
Mauritania127/21/199912/20/200242
Moldova12/21/200012/20/200311183
Mongolia9/28/20019/27/20042824
Mozambique136/28/19996/27/20038717
Nicaragua12/13/200212/12/20059891
Niger12/22/200012/21/20035925
Pakistan12/6/200112/5/20041,034603
Rwanda8/12/20028/11/200543
São Tome and Principe4/28/20004/27/200375
Senegal4/28/20034/27/20062424
Sierra Leone9/26/20019/25/200413156
Sri Lanka4/18/20034/17/2006269231
Tajikistan12/11/200212/10/20056557
Tanzania144/4/20006/30/200313515
Uganda9/13/20029/12/20051412
Vietnam4/13/20014/12/2004290166
Zambia153/25/19993/28/20032542441
Total4,2011,1801892,474

Extended from 7/16/03.

Extcnded from 9/17/01.

Extended from 9/9/02.

Extended from 10/21/02.

Extended from 1/6/03.

Extended from 10/17/02.

Extended from 5/2/02.

Extended from 3/25/02.

Bccame inoperative on 1/13/03.

Extcndcd from 2/29/04.

Extended from 8/05/02.

Extended from 7/20/02.

Extended from 6/27/02.

Extended from 4/3/03.

Augmented by SDR 24.45 million on 5/29/02. Extended from 3/24/02.

Extended from 7/16/03.

Extcnded from 9/17/01.

Extended from 9/9/02.

Extended from 10/21/02.

Extended from 1/6/03.

Extended from 10/17/02.

Extended from 5/2/02.

Extended from 3/25/02.

Bccame inoperative on 1/13/03.

Extcndcd from 2/29/04.

Extended from 8/05/02.

Extended from 7/20/02.

Extended from 6/27/02.

Extended from 4/3/03.

Augmented by SDR 24.45 million on 5/29/02. Extended from 3/24/02.

Table II. 5Summary of Disbursement, Repurchases, and Repayments, Financial Years Ended April 30, 1948–2003(In millions of SDRs)
DisbursementsRepurchases and RepaymentsTotal Fund

Credit Outstanding2
Financial YearPurchases1Trust Fund

loans
SAF

loans
PRGF

loans
TotalRepurchasesTrust Fund

repayments
SAF/PRGF

repayments
Total
1948606606133
1949119119193
195052522424204
195128281919176
195246463737214
19536666185185178
1954231231145145132
1955494927627655
1956393927227672
19571,1141,1147575611
195866666687871,027
1959264264537537898
1960166166522522330
1961577577659659552
19622,2432,2431,2601,2601,023
19635805808078071,059
1964626626380380952
19651,8971,8975175171,480
19662,8172,8174064063,039
19671,0611,0613403402,945
19681,3481,3481,1161,1162,463
19692,8392,8391,5421,5423,299
19702,9962,9961,6711,6714,020
19711,1671,1671,6571,6572,556
19722,0282,0283,1223,122840
19731,1751,175540540998
19741,0581,0586726721,085
19755,1025,1025185184,869
19766,5916,5919609609,760
19774,910324,94286886813,687
19782,5032682,7714,4854,48512,366
19793,7206704,3904,8594,8599,843
19802,4339623,3953,7763,7769,967
19814,8601,0605,9202,8532,85312,536
19828,0418,0412,0102,01017,793
198311,39211,3921,555181,57426,563
198411,51811,5182,0181112,12934,603
19856,2896,2892,7302122,94337,622
19864,1014,1014,2894134,70236,877
19873,6851393,8246,1695796,74933,443
19884,1534454,5977,9355288,46329,543
19892,5412902643,0956,2584476,70525,520
19904,5034194085,3296,0423566,39824,388
19916,955844917,5305,4401685,60825,603
19925,3081254835,9164,76814,77026,736
19938,465205739,0584,083364,11928,496
19945,325506125,9874,348521124,51329,889
199510,6151457311,1753,98442444,23136,837
199610,8701821,29512,3476,69873957,10042,040
19974,9397055,6446,66855247,19640,488
199820,00097320,9733,78915954,38556,026
199924,07182624,89710,46562711,09267,175
20006,3775136,89022,99363423,62750,370
20019,59963010,22911,24358811,83148,691
200229,19495230,14619,20776919,97658,699
200321,7841,21823,0027,7849288,71272,879

Includes reserve tranche purchases.

Excludes reserve tranche purchases; includes outstanding associated loans from the Saudi Fund for Development.

Includes reserve tranche purchases.

Excludes reserve tranche purchases; includes outstanding associated loans from the Saudi Fund for Development.

Tabelle II.6Purchases and. Loans from the IMF Financial Year Ended. April 30, 2003(In millions of SDRs)
MemberReserve

Tranche
Stand-By/

Credit Tranche
Extended

Fund Facility
SRFTotal

Purchases
PRGF

Loans
Total Purchases

and Loans1
Afghanistan444
Albania88
Argentina973973973
Armenia3030
Benin88
Bolivia434343
Bosnia and Herzegovina323232
Brazil4,87910,43715,31615,316
Bulgaria104104104
Burkina Faso66
Burundi101010
Cambodia1717
Cameroon1616
Cape Verde11
Chad55
Congo, Dem. Rep. of6161447507
Djibouti55
Dominica222
Ecuador303030
Ethiopia1010
Gambia, The33
Georgia2323
Grenada333
Guinea1313
Guyana66
Indonesia1,1701,1701,170
Jordan11617272
Kyrgyz Republic2323
Lao, PDR55
Lesotho44
Madagascar1111
Malawi171717
Mali1414
Mauritania1212
Moldova99
Mozambique88
Nicaragua77
Niger88
Pakistan258258
Romania138138138
Rwanda11
Serbia and Montenegro150200250250
Sierra Leone1919
Sri Lanka48216938107
Tajikistan88
Tanzania2020
Timor-Leste222
Turkey2,2462,2462,246
Uganda22
Uruguay361,0791291,2431,243
Vietnam4141
Zambia133133
Total1029,6641,45110,56621,7841,21823,002

Effective February 4, 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro.

Effective February 4, 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro.

Tabelle II.7Repurchases and Repayments to the IMF, Financial Year Ended April 30, 2003(In millions of SDRs)
MemberStand-By/

Credit Tranche
Extended

Fund Facility
Others1Total

Repurchases
SAF/PRGF and

Trust Fund

Repayments
Total

Repurchases

and Repayments
Albania33610
Algeria18884272272
Argentina7814341,2151,215
Armenia66814
Azerbaijan63844650
Bangladesh61611476
Belarus232323
Benin1212
Bolivia2121
Bosnia and Herzegovina252525
Brazil373373373
Bulgaria114419137137
Burkina Faso1212
Burundi22
Cambodia1189
Cameroon33
Chad55
Congo, Dem. Rep. of127823157143300
Congo, Republic of4436
Cöte d’Ivoire6767
Croatia24608484
Djibouti222
Dominican Republic202020
Equatorial Guinea11
Estonia999
Ethiopia1212
Gabon101010
Georgia991929
Ghana1111
Guinea1111
Guinea-Bissau1112
Guyana1313
Haiti88311
Honduras2424630
Indonesia1,5591181,6781,678
Jamaica141414
Jordan54177171
Kenya1414
Kyrgyz Republic881422
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.88
Latvia888
Lesotho22
Lithuania5896666
Macedonia, FYR8829
Madagascar44
Malawi66
Mali2020
Mauritania1313
Moldova681414
Mongolia66
Mozambique1818
Nepal33
Nicaragua44
Niger55
Pakistan193017622540266
Panama444
Peru134134134
Philippines253132385385
Romania28316060
Russian Federation1777453591,2811,281
Rwanda222
Senegal2424
Sierra Leone2424
Sri Lanka3434
St. Kitts and Nevis111
Sudan71512222
Tajikistan772532
Tanzania1717
Thailand913913913
Togo88
Turkey174174174
Uganda3232
Ukraine362083140140
Uruguay575757
Uzbekistan171717
Vietnam444852
Yemen, Republic of2244
Zambia169169
Zimbabwe1112
Total4,7762,0081,0007,7849288,712

Includes Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility and Systemic Transformation Facility.

Includes Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility and Systemic Transformation Facility.

Tabelle II.8Outstanding IMF Credit by Facility and Policy, Financial Years Ended April 30, 1995–2003(In millions of SDRs and percent of total)
199519961997199819992000200120022003
Millions of SDRs
Stand-By Arrangements115,11720,70018,06425,52625,21321,41017,10128,61234,241
Extended Arrangements10,1559,98211,15512,52116,57416,80816,10815,53814,981
Supplemental Reserve Facility7,10012,6554,0855,87515,700
Compensatory and Contingency
Financing Facility3,0211,6021,3366852,8453,0322,992745413
Systemic Transformation Facility3,8483,9843,9843,8693,3642,7181,9331,311644
Subtotal (GRA)32,14036,26834,53949,70160,65143,96842,21952,08165,978
SAF Arrangements1,2771,208954730565456432341137
PRGF Arrangements23,3184,4694,9045,5055,8705,8575,9516,1886,676
Trust Fund1029590908989898989
Total36,83742,04040,48856,02667,17550,37048,69158,69972,879
Percent of total
Stand-By Arrangements1414945463843354947
Extended Arrangements282428222533332621
Supplemental Reserve Facility131991022
Compensatory and Contingency
Financing Facility843146611
Systemic Transformation Facility10910755421
Subtotal (GRA)878685899087878891
SAF Arrangements332111113
PRGF Arrangements2911121091212119
Trust Fund333333333
Total100100100100100100100100100

Includes outstanding credit tranche and emergency purchases.

Includes outstanding associated loans from the Saudi Fund for Development.

Less than ½ of 1 percent of total.

Includes outstanding credit tranche and emergency purchases.

Includes outstanding associated loans from the Saudi Fund for Development.

Less than ½ of 1 percent of total.

Tabelle II.9Summary of Bilateral Contributions to the PRGF and PRGF-HIPC Trusts(In millions of SDRs; as of April 30, 2003)
PRGF TrustPRGF-HIPC Trust
Subsidy contributions

“as needed”1
Loan commitments2Subsidies and HIPC grant

contributions “as needed”3
Total3,490.215,722.71,561.6
Major industrial countries2,294.012,864.8880.5
Canada204.3700.048.8
France474.42,900.082.2
Germany197.72,750.0127.2
Italy157.81,380.063.6
Japan723.15,134.8144.0
United Kingdom358.982.2
United States177.7332.6
Other advanced countries980.82,452.8299.7
Australia14.824.8
Austria62.814.3
Belgium120.8350.035.3
Denmark66.9100.018.5
Finland42.18.0
Greece39.66.3
Iceland4.60.9
Ireland8.15.9
Israel1.8
Korea60.092.715.9
Luxembourg14.10.7
Netherlands141.6450.045.4
New Zealand1.7
Norway45.5150.018.5
Portugal5.36.6
San Marino0.05
Singapore32.716.5
Spain26.2708.423.3
Sweden186.318.3
Switzerland109.5601.737.0
Fuel-exporting countries17.249.593.1
Algeria5.5
Brunei Darussalam0.1
Gabon42.5
Iran, Islamic Republic of2.02.2
Kuwait3.1
Libya7.3
Nigeria13.9
Oman0.8
Qatar0.5
Saudi Arabia15.149.553.5
United Arab Emirates3.8
Other developing countries184.9355.6221.1
Argentina535.116.2
Bangladesh0.91.7
Barbados0.4
Belize0.3
Botswana2.35.7
Brazil15.0
Cambodia0.04
Chile4.04.4
China14.9200.019.7
Colombia0.9
Cyprus0.8
Egypt13.3155.61.3
Ghana0.5
India13.222.9
Indonesia6.18.2
Jamaica2.7
Malaysia46.012.7
Malta2.11.1
Mauritius0.1
Mexico54.5
Micronesia, F. S.0.006
Morocco9.71.6
Pakistan4.03.4
Paraguay0.1
Peru2.5
Philippines6.7
Samoa0.006
South Africa28.6
Sri Lanka0.6
St. Lucia0.1
St. Vincent and the Grenadines0.1
Swaziland0.01
Thailand17.24.5
Tunisia1.81.5
Turkey11.6
Uruguay2.62.2
Vietnam0.4
Countries in transition13.442.9
Croatia0.4
Czech Republic13.44.1
Estonia0.5
Hungary6.0
Latvia1.0
Poland12.0
Russian Federation14.6
Slovak Republic4.0
Slovenia0.4
Pending contributions to the PRGF-HIPC Trust (“as needed”)324.1
Bahrain0.9
Dominican Republic0.5
Fiji0.1
Grenada0.1
Lebanon0.4
Maldives0.01
Venezuela20.4
Tonga0.02
Trinidad and Tobago1.6
Vanuatu0.1

The calculations are based on actual interest rates through end-June 2002 and an assumed SDR interest rate of 5 percent per annum thereafter.

Excludes a loan commitment from the OPEC Fund for International Development of US$50 million (equivalent to SDR 37 million).

The term “as needed” refers to the nominal undiscounted sum of the projected delivery of HIPC assistance plus the profile of projected subsidy needs associated with PRGF lending during 2002–05.

Contribution to the PRGF-HIPC Trust includes a pending balance of SDR 1.9 million “as needed.”

Contribution to the PRGF-HIPC Trust includes a pending balance of SDR 6.4 million “as needed.” “

Less than SDR 5,000.

The calculations are based on actual interest rates through end-June 2002 and an assumed SDR interest rate of 5 percent per annum thereafter.

Excludes a loan commitment from the OPEC Fund for International Development of US$50 million (equivalent to SDR 37 million).

The term “as needed” refers to the nominal undiscounted sum of the projected delivery of HIPC assistance plus the profile of projected subsidy needs associated with PRGF lending during 2002–05.

Contribution to the PRGF-HIPC Trust includes a pending balance of SDR 1.9 million “as needed.”

Contribution to the PRGF-HIPC Trust includes a pending balance of SDR 6.4 million “as needed.” “

Less than SDR 5,000.

Tabelle II.10Holdingsof SDRs by All Participants and Groups of Countries as Percentage o f Their Cumulative Allocations of SDRs, at End of Financial Years Ended April 30, 1994–2003
Nonindustrial Countries2
Net debtor countries
All

Participants1
Industrial

Countries2
All nonindustrial

countries
Net creditor

countries
All net debtor

countries
Heavily indebted

poor countries
199471.077.956.3222.547.712.5
199590.9105.160.4263.949.814.1
199691.4102.467.9285.556.617.4
199787.299.860.5303.647.817.3
199895.0107.069.4323.756.124.1
199981.194.652.5170.746.326.3
200084.695.062.5174.156.620.6
200186.6101.654.6204.246.512.4
200291.5107.756.9227.944.714.6
200393.0102.472.0173.757.717.1

Consists of member countries that are participants in the SDR Department. At the end of FY2003, of the total SDRs allocated to participants in the SDR Department (SDR 21.4 billion), SDR 1.5 billion was not held by participants, but instead by the IMF and prescribed holders.

Bascd onIFS classification (International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various years).

Consists of member countries that are participants in the SDR Department. At the end of FY2003, of the total SDRs allocated to participants in the SDR Department (SDR 21.4 billion), SDR 1.5 billion was not held by participants, but instead by the IMF and prescribed holders.

Bascd onIFS classification (International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various years).

Table II. 11Key IMF Rates, Financial Year Ended April 30, 2003(In percent)
Period

Beginning
SDR Interest Rate

and Unadjusted Rate

of Remuneration1
Basic Rate

of Charge1
Period

Beginning
SDR Interest Rate

and Unadjusted Rate

of Remuneration1
Basic Rate

of Charge1
2002
May 12.282.82November 42.102.59
May 62.302.84November 111.982.45
May 132.302.84November 181.992.46
May 202.332.88November 251.972.43
May 272.312.85
December 21.962.42
June 32.322.87December 91.922.37
June 102.322.87December 161.922.37
June 172.312.85December 231.942.40
June 242.322.87December 301.912.36
July 12.302.842003
July 82.332.88January 61.912.36
July 152.282.82January 131.902.35
July 222.292.83January 201.892.33
July 292.252.78January 271.882.32
August 52.222.74February 31.862.30
August 122.212.73February 101.842.27
August 192.212.73February 171.822.25
August 262.232.75February 241.812.24
September 22.252.78March 31.762.17
September 92.222.74March 101.732.14
September 162.242.77March 171.762.17
September 232.222.74March 241.752.16
September 302.192.70March 311.742.15
October 72.192.70April 71.722.12
October 142.182.69April 141.742.15
October 212.232.75April 211.772.19
October 282.202.72April 281.752.16

Under the FY2003 decision on burden sharing, the rate of remuneration was adjusted downward and the rate of charge was adjusted upward to share the burden of protecting the IMF’s income from overdue charges and of contributing to the IMF’s precautionary balances. The amounts generated from burden sharing in FY2003 are refundable when overdue charges arc paid and when overdue obligations cease to be a problem. The basic rate of charge presented is the effective rate following the retroactive reduction that was implemented after the end of the financial year. The basic rate of charge, which was set at 128.0 percent of the SDR interest rate, was reduced to 123.5 percent of the SDR interest rate as a result of the retroactive reduction.

Under the FY2003 decision on burden sharing, the rate of remuneration was adjusted downward and the rate of charge was adjusted upward to share the burden of protecting the IMF’s income from overdue charges and of contributing to the IMF’s precautionary balances. The amounts generated from burden sharing in FY2003 are refundable when overdue charges arc paid and when overdue obligations cease to be a problem. The basic rate of charge presented is the effective rate following the retroactive reduction that was implemented after the end of the financial year. The basic rate of charge, which was set at 128.0 percent of the SDR interest rate, was reduced to 123.5 percent of the SDR interest rate as a result of the retroactive reduction.

Tabelle II.12Members That Hast: Accepted ihz Obligations of Article Mils Sections 2, 3, arid 4, of the Articles of Agreement
MemberEffective

Date of Acceptance
AlgeriaSeptember 15, 1997
Antigua and BarbudaNovember 22, 1983
ArgentinaMay 14,1968
ArmeniaMay 29, 1997
AustraliaJuly 1, 1965
AustriaAugust 1,1962
Bahamas, TheDecember 5,1973
BahrainMarch 20, 1973
BangladeshApril 11, 1994
BarbadosNovember 3, 1993
BelarusNovember 5, 2001
BelgiumFebruary 15, 1961
BelizeJune 14, 1983
BeninJune 1, 1996
BoliviaJune 5, 1967
BotswanaNovember 17, 1995
BrazilNovember 30, 1999
Brunei DarussalamOctober 10, 1995
BulgariaSeptember 24, 1998
Burkina FasoJune 1, 1996
CambodiaJanuary 1, 2002
CameroonJune 1, 1996
CanadaMarch 25, 1952
Centra] African RepublicJune 1, 1996
ChadJune 1, 1996
ChileJuly 27, 1977
ChinaDecember 1, 1996
ComorosJune 1, 1996
Congo, Democratic Republic ofFebruary 10, 2003
Congo, Republic ofJune 1, 1996
Costa RicaFebruary1, 1965
Cöte d’IvoireJune 1, 1996
CroatiaMay 29, 1995
CyprusJanuary 9, 1991
Czech RepublicOctober 1, 1995
DenmarkMay 1, 1967
DjiboutiSeptember 19, 1980
DominicaDecember 13, 1979
Dominican RepublicAugust 1,1953
EcuadorAugust 31, 1970
El SalvadorNovember 6, 1946
Equatorial GuineaJune 1, 1996
EstoniaAugust 15, 1994
FijiAugust 4, 1972
FinlandSeptember 25, 1979
FranceFebruary 15, 1961
GabonJune 1, 1996
Gambia, TheJanuary 21, 1993
GeorgiaDecember 20, 1996
GermanyFebruary15, 1961
GhanaFebruary 21, 1994
GreeceJuly 7,1992
GrenadaJanuary24, 1994
GuatemalaJanuary 27, 1947
GuineaNovember 17, 1995
Guinea-BissauJanuary 1, 1997
GuyanaDecember 27,1966
HaitiDecember 22, 1953
HondurasJuly 1, 1950
HungaryJanuary 1, 1996
IcelandSeptember 19, 1983
IndiaAugust 20, 1994
IndonesiaMay 7,1988
IrelandFebruary 15, 1961
IsraelSeptember 21, 1993
ItalyFebruary 15, 1961
JamaicaFebruary 22, 1963
JapanApril 1, 1964
JordanFebruary 20, 1995
KazakhstanJuly 16, 1996
KenyaJune 30, 1994
KiribatiAugust 22,1986
KoreaNovember 1, 1988
KuwaitApril 5, 1963
Kyrgyz RepublicMarch 29, 1995
LatviaJune 10, 1994
LebanonJuly 1, 1993
LesothoMarch 5, 1997
LithuaniaMay 3, 1994
LuxembourgFebruary 15, 1961
Macedonia, FYRJune 19, 1998
MadagascarSeptember 18, 1996
MalawiDecember 7,1995
MalaysiaNovember 11, 1968
MaliJune 1, 1996
MaltaNovember 30, 1994
Marshall IslandsMay 21, 1992
MauritaniaJuly 19, 1999
MauritiusSeptember 29, 1993
MexicoNovember 12, 1946
Micronesia, Federated States ofJune 24, 1993
MoldovaJune 30, 1995
MongoliaFebruary 1, 1996
MoroccoJanuary 21, 1993
NamibiaSeptember 20, 1996
NepalMay 30,1994
NetherlandsFebruary 15, 1961
New ZealandAugust 5,1982
NicaraguaJuly 20, 1964
NigerJune 1, 1996
NorwayMay 11, 1967
OmanJune 19,1974
PakistanJuly 1, 1994
PalauDecember 16, 1997
PanamaNovember 26,1946
Papua New GuineaDecember 4, 1975
ParaguayAugust 22, 1994
PeruFebruary15, 1961
PhilippinesSeptember 8, 1995
PolandJune 1, 1995
PortugalSeptember 12, 1988
QatarJune 4, 1973
RomaniaMarch 25, 1998
Russian FederationJune 1, 1996
RwandaDecember 10, 1998
St. Kitts and NevisDecember 3, 1984
St. LuciaMay 30, 1980
St. Vincent and the GrenadinesAugust 24, 1981
SamoaOctober 6, 1994
San MarinoSeptember 23, 1992
Saudi ArabiaMarch 22, 1961
SenegalJune 1, 1996
Serbia and Montenegro1May 15,2002
SeychellesJanuary 3, 1978
Sierra LeoneDecember 14,1995
SingaporeNovember 9, 1968
Slovak RepublicOctober 1,1995
SloveniaSeptember 1, 1995
Solomon IslandsJuly 24, 1979
South AfricaSeptember 15, 1973
SpainJuly 15, 1986
Sri LankaMarch 15,1994
SurinameJune 29, 1978
SwazilandDecember 11, 1989
SwedenFebruary 15, 1961
SwitzerlandMay 29, 1992
TanzaniaJuly 15, 1996
ThailandMay 4, 1990
Timor-LesteJuly 23, 2002
TogoJune 1, 1996
TongaMarch 22, 1991
Trinidad and TobagoDecember 13, 1993
TunisiaJanuary 6, 1993
TurkeyMarch 22, 1990
UgandaApril 5, 1994
UkraineSeptember 24, 1996
United Arab EmiratesFebruary 13,1974
United KingdomFebruary 15, 1961
United StatesDecember 10,1946
UruguayMay 2, 1980
VanuatuDecember 1,1982
VenezuelaJuly 1, 1976
Yemen, Republic ofDecember 10, 1996
ZambiaApril 19, 2002
ZimbabweFebruary 3, 1995

Effective February 4, 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro.

Effective February 4, 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro.

Tabelle II.13De Facto Exchange Rate Arrangements and Anchors of Monetary Policy as of April 30, 2003
Classification of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy Frameworks
This classitication system is based on members’ actual, de facto regimes, which may differ from their officially announced arrangements. The scheme ranks exchange rate regimes on the basis of the degree of flexibility of the arrangement or a formal or informal commitment to a given exchange rate path. It distinguishes between the more rigid forms of pegged regimes, such as currency board arrangements; other conventional fixed-peg regimes against a single currency or a basket of currencies; exchange rate bands around a fixed peg; crawling-peg arrangements; and exchange rate bands around crawling pegs, in order to help assess the implications of the choice of exchange rate regime for the degree of independence of monetary policy. This includes a category to distinguish the exchange arrangements of those countries that have no separate legal tender. The system presents members’ exchange rate regimes against alternative monetary policy frameworks with the intention of using both criteria as a way of providing greater transparency in the classification scheme and to illustrate that different forms of exchange rate regimes could be consistent with similar monetary frameworks. The following explains the categories.
Exchange Rate Regimes
Exchange Arrangements with No Separate Legal Tender
The currency of another country circulates as the sole legal tender (formal dollarization), or the member belongs to a monetary or currency union in which the same legal tender is shared by the members of the union. Adopting such regimes is a form of surrendering the monetary authorities’ independent control over domestic monetary policy.
Currency Board Arrangements
A monetary regime based on an explicit legislative commitment to exchange domestic currency for a specified foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate, combined with restrictions on the issuing authority to ensure the fulfillment of its legal obligation. This implies that domestic currency be issued only against foreign exchange and that it remain fully backed by foreign assets, eliminating traditional central bank functions, such as monetary control and lender of last resort, and leaving little scope for discretionary monetary policy; some flexibility may still be afforded, depending on how strict the rules of the boards are.
Other Conventional Fixed Peg Arrangements
The country (formally or de facto) pegs its currency at a fixed rate to another currency or a basket of currencies, where the basket is formed from the currencies of major trading or financial partners and weights reflect the geographical distribution of trade, service’s, or capital flows. The currency composites can also be standardized, such as those of the SDR. There is no commitment to keep the parity irrevocably. The exchange rate may fluctuate within a narrow margin of less than ±1 percent around a central rate or the maximum and minimum value of the exchange rate may remain within a narrow margin of 2 percent for at least three months. The monetary authority stands ready to keep the fixed parity through direct intervention (i.e., via sale/purchase of foreign exchange in the market) or indirect intervention (e.g., via aggressive use of interest rate policy, imposition of foreign exchange regulations or exercise of moral suasion that constrains foreign exchange activity, or through interv ention by other public institutions). Flexibility of monetary policy, though limited, is greater than in hard pegs, because traditional central banking functions are still possible, and the monetary authority can adjust the level of the exchange rate, although relatively infrequently.
Pegged Exchange Rates within Horizontal Bands
The value of the currency is maintained within certain margins of fluctuation of at least ± 1 percent around a formal or a de facto fixed central rate. It also includes the arrangements of the countries in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS), which was replaced with the ERM II on January 1, 1999. There is a limited degree of monetary policy discretion, with the degree of discretion depending on the band width.
Crawling Pegs
The currency is adjusted periodically in small amounts at a fixed rate or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators, such as past inflation differentials vis-à-vis major trading partners, differentials between the target inflation and expected inflation in major trading partners, and so forth. The rate of crawl can be set to generate inflation-adjusted changes in the currency (backward looking), or set at a preannounced fixed rate and/or below the projected inflation differentials (forward looking). Maintaining a credible crawling peg imposes constraints on monetary policy in a similar manner as a tixed- peg system.
Exchange Rates within Crawling Bands
The currency is maintained within certain fluctuation margins of at least ±1 percent around a central rate, which is adjusted periodically at a fixed rate or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators. The degree of flexibility of the exchange rate is a function of the width of the band, with bands chosen to be either symmetric around a crawling central parity or to widen gradually with an asymmetric choice of the crawl of upper and lower bands (in the latter case, there may not be a preannounced central rate). The commitment to maintain the exchange rate within the band continues to impose constraints on monetary policy, with the degree of policy independence being a function of the band width.
Managed Floating with No Predetermined Path for the Exchange Rate
The monetary authority influences exchange rate movements through active intervention to counter the long-term trend of the exchange rate without specifying a predetermined exchange rate path or without having a specific exchange rate target. Indicators for managing the rate are broadly judgmental—e.g., balance of payments position, international reserves, parallel market developments—and adjustments may not be automatic. Intervention may be direct or indirect. A distinction is made between “tightly managed floating"— where intervention takes the form of very tight monitoring that generally results in a stable exchange rate without having a clear exchange rate path, with the aim of permitting authorities an extra degree of flexibility in deciding the tactics to achieve a desired path— and “other managed floating,” where the exchange rate is influenced in a more ad hoc fashion.
Independently Floating
The exchange rate is market determined, with any foreign exchange intervention aimed at moderating the rate of change and preventing undue fluctuations in the exchange rate, rather than at establishing a level for it. In these regimes, monetary policy is, in principle, independent of exchange rate policy.
Monetary Policy Frameworks
The exchange rate regime is presented against alternative monetary policy frameworks in order to present the role of the exchange rate in broad economic policy and help identify potential sources of inconsistency in the monetary-exchange rate policy mix.
Exchange Rate Anchor
The monetary authority stands ready to buy/sell foreign exchange at given quoted rates to maintain the exchange rate at its preannounced level or range; the exchange rate serves as the nominal anchor or intermediate target of monetary policy. This type of regime covers exchange rate regimes with no separate legal tender; CBAs; fixed pegs with and without bands; and crawling pegs with and without bands, where the rate of crawl is set in a forward-looking manner.
Monetary Aggregate Anchor
The monetary authority uses its instruments to achieve a target growth rate for a monetary aggregate, such as reserve money, Ml, and M2, and the targeted aggregate becomes the nominal anchor or intermediate target of monetary policy.
Inflation-Targeting Framework
This involves the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation with an institutional commitment by the monetary authority to achieve these targets. Additional key features include increased communication with the public and the markets about the plans and objectives of monetary policymakers and increased accountability of the central bank for obtaining its inflation objectives. Monetary policy decisions are guided by the deviation of forecasts of future inflation from the announced inflation target, with the inflation forecast acting (implicitly or explicitly) as the intermediate target of monetary policy.
Fund-Supported or Other Monetary Program
This involves implementation of monetary and exchange rate policies within the confines of a framework that establishes floors for international reserves and ceilings for net domestic assets of the central bank. Because the ceiling on net domestic assets limits increases in reserve money through central bank operations, indicative targets tor reserve money may be appended to this system.
Other
The country has no explicitly stated nominal anchor but rather monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy, or there is no relevant information available for the country.
Sources: IMF Country Reports; and International Financial’Statistics.

An asterisk (*) indicates that the country has an IMF-supported or other monetary program. A dagger (“f”) indicates that the country adopts more than one nominal anchor in conducting-monetary policy (it should be noted, however, that it would not be possible, for practical reasons, to infer from this table which nominal anchor plays the principal röle in conducting monetary policy).

These countries have a currency board arrangement.

The country has no explicitly stated nominal anchor, but rather monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy.

For Ei Salvador, the printing of new eolones, the domestic currency, is prohibited, but die existing stock of eolones will continue to circulate, along with the U.S. dollar as legal tender until all colon notes wear out physically.

The member maintains an exchange arrangement involving more than one market. The arrangement shown is that maintained in the major market.

The regime operating de facto in the country is different from its de jure regime.

Comoros has the same arrangement with the French Treasury as the CFA franc zone countries do.

The band widths for diese countries are Cyprus (±15%), Denmark (±2.25%), Hungary (±15%), Sudan (±2%), and Tonga (±5%).

The band widths for these countries are Belarus (±5%), Honduras (±7%), Israel (±22%), and Romania and Slovenia (unannounced).

Insufficient information on the country is available for classification.

Effective February 4, 2003, the F’ederal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro.

Monetary Policy Framework1
Exchange

Rate Regime (number of countries)
Exchange rate anchorMonetary

aggregate

arget
Inflation

targeting

framework
IMF

supported

or other

monetary program
Other
Exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender (41)Another currency as legal tenderECCU2CFA franc zoneEuro area3
legal tender

Ecuador

El Salvador4

Kiribati

Marshall Islands

Micronesia

Palau

Panama

San Marino

Timor-Leste
Antigua and Barbuda

Dominica*

Grenada

St. Kitts and Nevis

St. Lucia

St. Vincent and the Grenadines
WAEMU

Benin*

Burkina Faso

Cote d’lvoire*

Guinea-Bissau*

Mali*

Niger*

Senegal

Togo
CAEMC

Cameroon*

Central African

Rep.

Chad*

Congo, Rep. of

Equatorial

Guinea

Gabon
Austria

Belgium

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Portugal

Spain
Currency board arrangements (7)Bosnia and Herzegovina*

Brunei Darussaiam

Bulgaria*

China–Hong Kong, SAR

Djibouti

Estonia

Lithuania
Other conventional fixed peg arrangements (42)Against a single currency (33)

Aruba

Bahamas, The5

Bahrain

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belize

Bhutan

Cape Verde*

Chinat6

Comoros7

Eritea

Guinea*6

Jordan*6

Kuwait6

Lebanon6

Lesotho*

Macedonia, FYR6

Malaysia

Maldives6

Namibia

Nepal

Netherlands Antilles

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Suriname5,6

Swaziland

Syrian Arab Republic6

Turkmenistan6

Ukraine6

United Arab Emirates

Venezuela

Zimbabwe6
Against a composite (9)

Botswana5

Fiji

Latvia

Libya

Malta

Morocco

Samoa

Seychelles

Vanuatu
China6
Pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands (5)8Within a cooperative arrangement ERMII(1)

Denmark
Other band arrangements (4)

Cyprus

Hungary*

Sudan6

Tonga
Sudan6Hungary1
Crawling pegs (5)Bolivia

Costa Rica6

Nicaragua*

Solomon Islands6

Tunisia
Tunisia
Exchange rates within crawling bands (5)9Belarus

Honduras

Israel

Romania6

Sloveniat6
Sloveniat6Israel
Managed floating with n o preannounced path for the exchange rate (46)Cambodia5

Egypt5

Gambia, The*

Ghana

Guyana*

Indonesia*

Iran, I.R. of

Jamaica6

Mauritius

Sao Tome and

Principe

Zambia
Czech Rep. ThailandArgentina

Azerbaijan

Croatia

Ethiopia

Kenya

Kyrgyz

Republic

Lao PDR5

Moldova6

Mongolia

Pakistan

Rwanda

Serbia and Montenegro11

Tajikistan

Vietnam
Afghanistan

Algeria3

Angola3

Burundi3

Dominican Rep.3,5

Guatemala3

Haiti36

India3

Iraq10

Kazakhstan3

Mauritania

Myanmar3,5,6

Nigeria

Paraguay3

Russian Federation

Singapore3

Slovak Rep.3

Trinidad and

Tobago

Uzbekistan3,5
Independently floating (36)Malawi*

Sierra Leone*

Sri Lanka

Uruguay

Yemen, Rep. of
Australia

Brazil*

Canada

Chile5

Colombia

Iceland

Korea

Mexico

New Zealand

Norway

Peru*†

Philippines

Poland

South Africa

Sweden

Turkey*

United Kingdom
Albania

Armenia

Congo, Dem. Rep. of

Georgia

Madagascar

Mozambique

Tanzania

Uganda
Japan3

Liberia3

Papua New Guinea3

Somalia5,10

Switzerland3

United States3
Sources: IMF Country Reports; and International Financial’Statistics.

An asterisk (*) indicates that the country has an IMF-supported or other monetary program. A dagger (“f”) indicates that the country adopts more than one nominal anchor in conducting-monetary policy (it should be noted, however, that it would not be possible, for practical reasons, to infer from this table which nominal anchor plays the principal röle in conducting monetary policy).

These countries have a currency board arrangement.

The country has no explicitly stated nominal anchor, but rather monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy.

For Ei Salvador, the printing of new eolones, the domestic currency, is prohibited, but die existing stock of eolones will continue to circulate, along with the U.S. dollar as legal tender until all colon notes wear out physically.

The member maintains an exchange arrangement involving more than one market. The arrangement shown is that maintained in the major market.

The regime operating de facto in the country is different from its de jure regime.

Comoros has the same arrangement with the French Treasury as the CFA franc zone countries do.

The band widths for diese countries are Cyprus (±15%), Denmark (±2.25%), Hungary (±15%), Sudan (±2%), and Tonga (±5%).

The band widths for these countries are Belarus (±5%), Honduras (±7%), Israel (±22%), and Romania and Slovenia (unannounced).

Insufficient information on the country is available for classification.

Effective February 4, 2003, the F’ederal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro.

Sources: IMF Country Reports; and International Financial’Statistics.

An asterisk (*) indicates that the country has an IMF-supported or other monetary program. A dagger (“f”) indicates that the country adopts more than one nominal anchor in conducting-monetary policy (it should be noted, however, that it would not be possible, for practical reasons, to infer from this table which nominal anchor plays the principal röle in conducting monetary policy).

These countries have a currency board arrangement.

The country has no explicitly stated nominal anchor, but rather monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy.

For Ei Salvador, the printing of new eolones, the domestic currency, is prohibited, but die existing stock of eolones will continue to circulate, along with the U.S. dollar as legal tender until all colon notes wear out physically.

The member maintains an exchange arrangement involving more than one market. The arrangement shown is that maintained in the major market.

The regime operating de facto in the country is different from its de jure regime.

Comoros has the same arrangement with the French Treasury as the CFA franc zone countries do.

The band widths for diese countries are Cyprus (±15%), Denmark (±2.25%), Hungary (±15%), Sudan (±2%), and Tonga (±5%).

The band widths for these countries are Belarus (±5%), Honduras (±7%), Israel (±22%), and Romania and Slovenia (unannounced).

Insufficient information on the country is available for classification.

Effective February 4, 2003, the F’ederal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro.

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