Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 28 items

  • Keyword: voter x
Clear All Modify Search
On the Buyability of Voting Bodies

On the Buyability of Voting Bodies »

Source: On the Buyability of Voting Bodies

Volume/Issue: 2007/165

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Felix Vardy , and John Morgan

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 2007

ISBN: 9781451867299

Keywords: Vote buying, lobbying, elections, voters, voting, voter, election,

We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that la...

Ethnic Diversity, Democracy, and Corruption1

Ethnic Diversity, Democracy, and Corruption1 »

Source: Ethnic Diversity, Democracy, and Corruption

Volume/Issue: 2007/218

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Etienne Yehoue

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 September 2007

ISBN: 9781451867824

Keywords: Ethnic Fractionalization, Democracy, voters, ethnic group, voter, ethnic groups,

I study the link between ethnic diversity, democracy, and corruption. In a static model, I show that contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption might emerge as a negative externality of democracy. This occurs thro...

Political Budget Cycles in Papua New Guinea

Political Budget Cycles in Papua New Guinea »

Source: Political Budget Cycles in Papua New Guinea

Volume/Issue: 2007/219

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Ebrima Faal

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 September 2007

ISBN: 9781451867831

Keywords: Politics, elections, election, expenditure, voters,

This paper assesses the presence of opportunistic electoral budget cycles in Papua New Guinea. Using quarterly time series data, a clear pattern emerges of pre-election manipulations of fiscal policy by incumbent g...

Hold Your Nose and Vote

Hold Your Nose and Vote »

Source: Hold Your Nose and Vote : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption?

Volume/Issue: 2009/83

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Marco Pani

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 April 2009

ISBN: 9781451872309

Keywords: Political Equilibrium, Public Expenditure, Constitution, voter, law, law enforcement, voters, election,

This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of rep...

The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions

The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions »

Source: The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions : Theory and Empirical Evidence

Volume/Issue: 2007/171

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Xavier Debrun , and Manmohan Kumar

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 2007

ISBN: 9781451867350

Keywords: Deficit bias, credibility, accountability, voters, fiscal institutions, fiscal rule, Accountablility,

This paper discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline. A dynamic model of fiscal policy shows that optimal institutions lack credibil...

Corruption, Competition, and Contracts

Corruption, Competition, and Contracts »

Source: Corruption, Competition, and Contracts : A Model of Vote Buying

Volume/Issue: 2006/11

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Felix Vardy , and John Morgan

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 January 2006

ISBN: 9781451862713

Keywords: Vote buying, lobbying, elections, voters, voter, voting, interest groups, interest group, Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Legislatures

In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shar...

Votingon the "Optimal" Size of Government

Votingon the "Optimal" Size of Government »

Source: Votingon the "Optimal" Size of Government

Volume/Issue: 2000/174

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Jan-Peter Olters

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 October 2000

ISBN: 9781451858686

Keywords: Party programs, median delegates, elections, public goods, political parties, political party, voters, election, voting

Viewing fiscal policies as the outcome of democratically resolved conflicts of households over public goods and taxes, the “economic model of politics” proposes a public choice approach, which does no...

Institutional Inertia

Institutional Inertia »

Source: Institutional Inertia

Volume/Issue: 2009/193

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Laura Valderrama

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 September 2009

ISBN: 9781451873405

Keywords: Private Information, Property Rights, Dynamic Voting, Inertia, voting, technology choice, technologies, voter, technological change,

We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority vot...

Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries

Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries »

Source: Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries : Theory and Evidence

Volume/Issue: 2006/260

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Claudio Paiva , and Rodrigo Moita

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 November 2006

ISBN: 9781451865202

Keywords: Political cycle, regulated prices, election, voters, elections, oil prices, Regulation and Business Law: General, Economics of Regulation,

This paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfa...

Electoral System and Public Spending

Electoral System and Public Spending »

Source: Electoral System and Public Spending

Volume/Issue: 2001/22

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Roberto Perotti , Massimo Rostagno , and Gian Milesi-Ferretti

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 March 2001

ISBN: 9781451843972

Keywords: electoral rules, proportionality, public spending, transfers, electoral system, electoral systems, voter, voting, government spending, Structure

We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We present a model emphasizing the distinction between purchases of goods and s...