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Market Frictions, Interbank Linkages and Excessive Interconnections

Market Frictions, Interbank Linkages and Excessive Interconnections »

Source: Market Frictions, Interbank Linkages and Excessive Interconnections

Volume/Issue: 2016/180

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Pragyan Deb

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 26 August 2016

ISBN: 9781475530292

Keywords: Contagion, network formation, financial crises, deposit insurance, too-big-to-fail.

This paper studies banks' decision to form financial interconnections using a model of financial contagion that explicitly takes into account the crisis state of the world. This allows us to model the network forma...

The Too-Important-to-Fail Conundrum

The Too-Important-to-Fail Conundrum »

Source: The Too-Important-to-Fail Conundrum : Impossible to Ignore and Difficult to Resolve

Volume/Issue: 2011/12

Series: Staff Discussion Notes

Author(s): Inci Ötker , Aditya Narain , Anna Ilyina , and Jay Surti

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 27 May 2011

ISBN: 9781463926588

Keywords: Bank capital, Financial stability, Moral hazard, Financial crises, too big to fail, too important to fail, resolution, financial regulation, contingent capital, bail-in

DISCLAIMER: This Staff Discussion Note represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent IMF views or IMF policy. The views expressed herein should be attributed to the authors and not to the I...

From Bail-out to Bail-in

From Bail-out to Bail-in »

Source: From Bail-out to Bail-in : Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions

Volume/Issue: 2012/3

Series: Staff Discussion Notes

Author(s): Virginia Rutledge , Michael Moore , Marc Dobler , Wouter Bossu , Nadège Jassaud , and Jianping Zhou

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 24 April 2012

ISBN: 9781475503906

Keywords: Financial institutions, Financial risk, Financial stability, Debt restructuring, Bank capitalization, Banks, Banking crisis, Intervention, Financial regulatory reforms, bailout

Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief an...

Contingent Capital

Contingent Capital »

Source: Contingent Capital : Economic Rationale and Design Features

Volume/Issue: 2011/1

Series: Staff Discussion Notes

Author(s): Ceyla Pazarbasioglu , Jianping Zhou , Vanessa Le Leslé , and Michael Moore

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 25 January 2011

ISBN: 9781462304141

Keywords: Contingent capital, Bonds, Banks, Financial institutions, Financial instruments, Financial reform, Moral hazard, Risk management, Financial regulation, Too Big to Fail

The causes of the global financial crisis were multi-faceted but revealed still unresolved weaknesses in national and international financial oversight and resolution frameworks. In particular, many governments in...

Crisis Management and Resolution

Crisis Management and Resolution »

Source: Crisis Management and Resolution : Early Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Volume/Issue: 2011/5

Series: Staff Discussion Notes

Author(s): Ceyla Pazarbasioglu , Luc Laeven , Oana Nedelescu , Stijn Claessens , Fabian Valencia , Marc Dobler , and Katharine Seal

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 09 March 2011

ISBN: 9781455286546

Keywords: Financial crises, Financial stability, Crisis management, Asset restructuring, Burden sharing, Moral hazard, Stress tests, resolution, too big to fail, financial institutions

Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief an...

Market Frictions, Interbank Linkages and Excessive Interconnections

Market Frictions, Interbank Linkages and Excessive Interconnections »

Volume/Issue: 2016/180

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Pragyan Deb

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 26 August 2016

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781475530292.001

ISBN: 9781475530292

Keywords: Contagion, network formation, financial crises, deposit insurance, too-big-to-fail.

This paper studies banks' decision to form financial interconnections using a model of financial contagion that explicitly takes into account the crisis state of the world. This allows us to model the network forma...

Subsidiaries or Branches

Subsidiaries or Branches »

Source: Subsidiaries or Branches : Does One Size Fit All?

Volume/Issue: 2011/4

Series: Staff Discussion Notes

Author(s): Jonathan Fiechter , Inci Ötker , Anna Ilyina , Michael Hsu , Andre Santos , and Jay Surti

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 03 March 2011

ISBN: 9781455288564

Keywords: Cross-border banking, Bank regulations, Banks, Financial stability, Financial regulation, Stand-alone subsidiarization, Ringfencing, Subsidiary model, Branch model, Resolution

Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief an...

The Too-Important-to-Fail Conundrum
			: Impossible to Ignore and Difficult to Resolve

The Too-Important-to-Fail Conundrum : Impossible to Ignore and Difficult to Resolve »

Volume/Issue: 2011/12

Series: Staff Discussion Notes

Author(s): Inci Ötker , Aditya Narain , Anna Ilyina , and Jay Surti

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 27 May 2011

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781463926588.006

ISBN: 9781463926588

Keywords: Bank capital, Financial stability, Moral hazard, Financial crises, too big to fail, too important to fail, resolution, financial regulation, contingent capital, bail-in

DISCLAIMER: This Staff Discussion Note represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent IMF views or IMF policy. The views expressed herein should be attributed to the authors and not to the I...

From Bail-out to Bail-in
			: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions

From Bail-out to Bail-in : Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions »

Volume/Issue: 2012/3

Series: Staff Discussion Notes

Author(s): Virginia Rutledge , Michael Moore , Marc Dobler , Wouter Bossu , Nadège Jassaud , and Jianping Zhou

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 24 April 2012

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781475503906.006

ISBN: 9781475503906

Keywords: Financial institutions, Financial risk, Financial stability, Debt restructuring, Bank capitalization, Banks, Banking crisis, Intervention, Financial regulatory reforms, bailout

Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief an...

Contingent Capital
			: Economic Rationale and Design Features

Contingent Capital : Economic Rationale and Design Features »

Volume/Issue: 2011/1

Series: Staff Discussion Notes

Author(s): Ceyla Pazarbasioglu , Jianping Zhou , Vanessa Le Leslé , and Michael Moore

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 25 January 2011

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781462304141.006

ISBN: 9781462304141

Keywords: Contingent capital, Bonds, Banks, Financial institutions, Financial instruments, Financial reform, Moral hazard, Risk management, Financial regulation, Too Big to Fail

The causes of the global financial crisis were multi-faceted but revealed still unresolved weaknesses in national and international financial oversight and resolution frameworks. In particular, many governments in...