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Innovation in Banking and Excessive Loan Growth

Innovation in Banking and Excessive Loan Growth »

Source: Innovation in Banking and Excessive Loan Growth

Volume/Issue: 2008/188

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): International Monetary Fund

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 2008

ISBN: 9781451870466

Keywords: credit screening, loan quality, signaling games, incentive compatibility, probability, banking, equation, banking system, banks ? loan,

The volume of credit extended by a bank can be an informative signal of its abilities in loan selection and management. It is shown that, under asymmetric information, banks may therefore rationally lend more than...

Bank Capitalization As a Signal

Bank Capitalization As a Signal »

Source: Bank Capitalization As a Signal

Volume/Issue: 2012/114

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Daniel Hardy

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 May 2012

ISBN: 9781475503357

Keywords: pro-cyclicality, signaling games, probability, equation, probability of default, present value,

The level of a bank‘s capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: ban...

Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle

Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle »

Source: Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle

Volume/Issue: 2002/48

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Eric Le Borgne , and Ben Lockwood

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 March 2002

ISBN: 9781451972658

Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Citizen-Candidate, Representative Democracy, Signaling Games, and Political Budget Cycles, voters, probability, election, voting, elections

We investigate whether private information about citizens' competence in political office can be revealed by their entry and campaign expenditure decisions. We find that this depends on whether voters and candidate...

Innovation in Banking and Excessive Loan Growth

Innovation in Banking and Excessive Loan Growth »

Volume/Issue: 2008/188

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): International Monetary Fund

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 2008

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451870466.001

ISBN: 9781451870466

Keywords: credit screening, loan quality, signaling games, incentive compatibility, probability, banking, equation, banking system, banks ? loan,

The volume of credit extended by a bank can be an informative signal of its abilities in loan selection and management. It is shown that, under asymmetric information, banks may therefore rationally lend more than...

Bank Capitalization As a Signal

Bank Capitalization As a Signal »

Volume/Issue: 2012/114

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Daniel Hardy

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 May 2012

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781475503357.001

ISBN: 9781475503357

Keywords: pro-cyclicality, signaling games, probability, equation, probability of default, present value,

The level of a bank‘s capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: ban...

Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle

Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle »

Volume/Issue: 2002/48

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Eric Le Borgne , and Ben Lockwood

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 March 2002

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451972658.001

ISBN: 9781451972658

Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Citizen-Candidate, Representative Democracy, Signaling Games, and Political Budget Cycles, voters, probability, election, voting, elections

We investigate whether private information about citizens' competence in political office can be revealed by their entry and campaign expenditure decisions. We find that this depends on whether voters and candidate...