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The Euro Area Crisis

The Euro Area Crisis »

Source: The Euro Area Crisis : Need for a Supranational Fiscal Risk Sharing Mechanism?

Volume/Issue: 2013/198

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Davide Furceri , and Aleksandra Zdzienicka

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 25 September 2013

ISBN: 9781484334201

Keywords: risk sharing, consumption smoothing, fiscal union, moral hazard, banking crises, moral hazard problems, private consumption, Financial Aspects of Economic Integration, Open Economy Macroeconomics,

The aim of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of risk sharing mechanisms in the euro area and whether a supranational fiscal risk sharing mechanism could insure countries against very severe downturns. Using...

What is Different About Family Businesses?

What is Different About Family Businesses? »

Source: What is Different About Family Businesses?

Volume/Issue: 2001/70

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Ralph Chami

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 May 2001

ISBN: 9781451849158

Keywords: altruism, asymmetric information, family business, trust, nonmarket transactions, moral hazard, corporate governance, family businesses, moral hazard problem, business school

Family businesses make up forty percent of the Fortune 500 companies in the US, generate about two-thirds of the German GDP, employ about one-half of the labor force in Britain, and account for the majority of the...

IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs

IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs »

Source: IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs

Volume/Issue: 2001/142

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Mohsin Khan , and Sunil Sharma

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 September 2001

ISBN: 9781451856255

Keywords: IMF-supported programs, ownership, principal-agent, moral-hazard, structural conditionality, moral hazard, capital markets, international capital markets, Asymmetric and Private Information, International Lending and Debt Problems

The paper uses finance and agency theory to establish two main propositions: First, that the conditionality attached to adjustment programs supported by the IMF is justified. Second, that ownership of programs by t...

Conditional Lending Under Altruism

Conditional Lending Under Altruism »

Source: Conditional Lending Under Altruism

Volume/Issue: 2004/100

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Alex Mourmouras , and Peter Rangazas

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 June 2004

ISBN: 9781451852431

Keywords: altruism, time consistency, Samaritan&;amp;#x2019;s dilemma, poor country, poor countries, moral hazard, International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, International Lending and Debt Problems,

We analyze how the altruism of an international financial institution (IFI) towards its lowincome member countries (LICs) alters the effectiveness of its loans. We study IFI loans to a credit-constrained LIC. The I...

IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention

IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention »

Source: IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention : An Analytical Framework

Volume/Issue: 2006/156

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Jun Kim

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 June 2006

ISBN: 9781451864168

Keywords: program design, debtor moral hazard, global game, member country, current account balance, short-term debt, Noncooperative Games, Asymmetric and Private Information, International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, International Lending and Debt Problems,

This paper presents an analytical framework for considering the role of IMF-supported programs in preventing crises, particularly capital account crises. The model builds upon the global games framework to establis...

The Euro Area Crisis
			: Need for a Supranational Fiscal Risk Sharing Mechanism?

The Euro Area Crisis : Need for a Supranational Fiscal Risk Sharing Mechanism? »

Volume/Issue: 2013/198

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Davide Furceri , and Aleksandra Zdzienicka

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 25 September 2013

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781484334201.001

ISBN: 9781484334201

Keywords: risk sharing, consumption smoothing, fiscal union, moral hazard, banking crises, moral hazard problems, private consumption, Financial Aspects of Economic Integration, Open Economy Macroeconomics,

The aim of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of risk sharing mechanisms in the euro area and whether a supranational fiscal risk sharing mechanism could insure countries against very severe downturns. Using...

What is Different About Family Businesses?

What is Different About Family Businesses? »

Volume/Issue: 2001/70

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Ralph Chami

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 May 2001

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451849158.001

ISBN: 9781451849158

Keywords: altruism, asymmetric information, family business, trust, nonmarket transactions, moral hazard, corporate governance, family businesses, moral hazard problem, business school

Family businesses make up forty percent of the Fortune 500 companies in the US, generate about two-thirds of the German GDP, employ about one-half of the labor force in Britain, and account for the majority of the...

IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs

IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs »

Volume/Issue: 2001/142

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Mohsin Khan , and Sunil Sharma

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 September 2001

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451856255.001

ISBN: 9781451856255

Keywords: IMF-supported programs, ownership, principal-agent, moral-hazard, structural conditionality, moral hazard, capital markets, international capital markets, Asymmetric and Private Information, International Lending and Debt Problems

The paper uses finance and agency theory to establish two main propositions: First, that the conditionality attached to adjustment programs supported by the IMF is justified. Second, that ownership of programs by t...

Conditional Lending Under Altruism

Conditional Lending Under Altruism »

Volume/Issue: 2004/100

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Alex Mourmouras , and Peter Rangazas

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 June 2004

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451852431.001

ISBN: 9781451852431

Keywords: altruism, time consistency, Samaritan&;amp;#x2019;s dilemma, poor country, poor countries, moral hazard, International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, International Lending and Debt Problems,

We analyze how the altruism of an international financial institution (IFI) towards its lowincome member countries (LICs) alters the effectiveness of its loans. We study IFI loans to a credit-constrained LIC. The I...

IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention
			: An Analytical Framework

IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention : An Analytical Framework »

Volume/Issue: 2006/156

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Jun Kim

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 June 2006

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451864168.001

ISBN: 9781451864168

Keywords: program design, debtor moral hazard, global game, member country, current account balance, short-term debt, Noncooperative Games, Asymmetric and Private Information, International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, International Lending and Debt Problems,

This paper presents an analytical framework for considering the role of IMF-supported programs in preventing crises, particularly capital account crises. The model builds upon the global games framework to establis...