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Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation

Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation »

Source: Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation

Volume/Issue: 2012/204

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Kurt Annen , and Luc Moers

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 August 2012

ISBN: 9781475505542

Keywords: Aid Effectiveness, Aid Fragmentation, Donor Competition, Donor Coordination, humanitarian aid, aid coordination, foreign investment, Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General,

This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient ev...

Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation

Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation »

Volume/Issue: 2012/204

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Kurt Annen , and Luc Moers

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 August 2012

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781475505542.001

ISBN: 9781475505542

Keywords: Aid Effectiveness, Aid Fragmentation, Donor Competition, Donor Coordination, humanitarian aid, aid coordination, foreign investment, Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General,

This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient ev...

Ambiguity, Transparency, and Institutional Strength

Ambiguity, Transparency, and Institutional Strength »

Source: Ambiguity, Transparency, and Institutional Strength

Volume/Issue: 2004/115

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): S. Erbas

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 2004

ISBN: 9781451853896

Keywords: risk, Knightian uncertainty, vertical and horizontal integration, institutions, probability, probabilities, investors, investment decisions, expected value, Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General

Institutional transparency makes future contingencies more easily predictable for investors. Greater transparency can be achieved through vertical and horizontal integration of policy rules, which may result in low...

Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline?

Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline? »

Source: Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline?

Volume/Issue: 2006/123

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Ashoka Mody , and Stefania Fabrizio

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 May 2006

ISBN: 9781451863833

Keywords: budget institutions, electoral rules, government fragmentation, government ideology, ethnic fractionalization, voter turnover, fiscal institutions, fiscal performance, fiscal discipline, Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General

The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporar...

Ambiguity, Transparency, and Institutional Strength

Ambiguity, Transparency, and Institutional Strength »

Volume/Issue: 2004/115

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): S. Erbas

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 2004

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451853896.001

ISBN: 9781451853896

Keywords: risk, Knightian uncertainty, vertical and horizontal integration, institutions, probability, probabilities, investors, investment decisions, expected value, Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General

Institutional transparency makes future contingencies more easily predictable for investors. Greater transparency can be achieved through vertical and horizontal integration of policy rules, which may result in low...

Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline?

Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline? »

Volume/Issue: 2006/123

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Ashoka Mody , and Stefania Fabrizio

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 May 2006

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451863833.001

ISBN: 9781451863833

Keywords: budget institutions, electoral rules, government fragmentation, government ideology, ethnic fractionalization, voter turnover, fiscal institutions, fiscal performance, fiscal discipline, Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General

The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporar...