- Jaime Cardoso, and Philip Young
- Published Date:
- January 2002
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The intensity of the imbalances prompted recourse to IMF assistance in 1983 and 1985.
This measure of the fiscal deficit includes the central bank’s quasi–fiscal operational losses. These losses arise, in part, from operations associated with the intermedial ion of foreign loans to finance priority activities, the servicing of debt on behalf of the government, the financing of certain public enterprises, and payments to institutions being liquidated.
ln 1981–90, taxes on international trade and transactions averaged about 5 percent of GDP, representing more than one-third of central government revenues. In 1991–2000, taking into account the increase in foreign exchange commission in 1999–2000, the proceeds of these taxes amounted to about 4 ½ percent of GDP, equivalent to less than one-third of total revenues.
For example, the effectiveness of introducing a value-added tax (VAT) in 1983 was curtailed by administrative resolutions that limited the tax base.
For more details on external developments, see Chapter II.
At the end of 1990, the Dominican Republic’s outstanding public external debt was about US$4.5 billion (some 72 percent of GDP), of which about US$1.5 billion was overdue.
During 1989–90, while oil prices were increasing, prices of ferronickel, the country’s main export item, were declining. This negatively affected government revenues.
The government’s stabilization and reform efforts were supported by an IMF Stand-By Arrangement, approved in August 1991 and extended in July 1993.
Initially, import duties continued to be calculated at an exchange rate somewhat more appreciated than the market rate. In mid-1991, the authorities started to use the market exchange rate for this purpose.
For more details on fiscal developments, see Chapter IV.
This figure partially underestimates the actual consolidated public sector deficit because data on the central bank’s quasifiscal losses are not available for 1990–93.
While the basic reserve requirement has been unchanged since 1991, the authorities have continued to impose temporary reserve requirements in moments of particular tension in the money and exchange rate markets. Until recently, dollar deposits were only subject to reserve requirements when they exceeded three times capital. Currently, they are all subject to a reserve requirement of 10 percent.
Given the absence of institutional arrangements to protect small depositors, the central bank typically took over the assets and liabilities of financial institutions being liquidated. Initially, only small deposits were paid in cash while large deposits were exchanged for central bank certificates with a one-year maturity. Since September 1994, all deposits of liquidated banks have been converted into certificates with maturities ranging from six months to four years, depending on the size of the deposit. The certificates bear an interest rate of 10 percent a year.
In those two years the current account deficit widened to nearly 8 percent and 5 ½ percent of GDP, respectively, partially reflecting a sharp increase in imports associated with the rapid expansion of the economy in 1992 (8 percent) and a decline in some traditional exports.
Agreements on debt restructuring were reached with Paris Club creditors in November 1991 and with commercial banks in February 1994. Bilateral agreements were also signed with a number of countries, including Mexico and Venezuela. For more detail, see Chapter III
President Mejia came to office in August 2000.
This law also established the Commission for the Reform of Public Enterprises (Comisién de Reforma de la Empresa Publica—CREP), which is responsible for managing the reform and transformation of state-owned enterprises.
Although the private capitalization of CDE was a crucial step forward, improvements in the electricity sector as well as in the power supply have been slower than expected because of the lack of a well-established legal and regulatory framework, insufficient competition in the wholesale market, and a deteriorating transmission infrastructure.
The government recently initiated an integrated financial management program, with financial support from the IDB, with the aim of enhancing transparency and accountability in the budget process.
The Capital Markets Law was approved in May 2000, although the establishment of administrative regulations is still pending.
Two of six bills associated with the Market Order Code were approved in March 2000, although as with the Capital Markets Law, the associated administrative regulations are still pending.
The maximum assigned to government stability is 12 points, for corruption 6, law and order 6, democratic accountability 6, and bureaucracy quality 4.
The World Bank Country Study, Dominican Republic: Economic Prospects and Policies to Renew Growth (1985), provides an extensive survey of the trade regime and resulting impediments to economic growth.
In addition to maintaining a multiple currency system, the Dominican Republic also maintained many other exchange restrictions, most notably a limitation on the level of permissible profit remittances.
Initially, the tariff reform was conducted by means of presidential decrees (339–90 and 340–90). These decrees were subsequently ratified by congress in 1993 (Law No, 14–93).
On various occasions the spread between the official and interbank rate has become substantial. Under the draft Monetary and Financial Code, under consideration in congress, the exchange rates would be fully unified through the elimination of all surrender requirements
For further information on the construction of this index, see Trade Liberalization in IMF-supported Programs (1998). This index should be interpreted carefully in the case of the Dominican Republic because it only refers to tariffs paid on imports to the domestic economy; it excludes the tariff system that applies to imports into the free-trade zones.
WTO, Trade Policy Review, 1996
FTZ are considered extraterritorial with respect to the Dominican economy, but they can trade with the “domestic” economy, subject to applicable tariffs and regulations.
Enterprises locating to FTZ are exempt from corporate income tax, construction taxes, fees relating to the registration of loan agreements, charges related to transfers of real estate, and VAT. Furthermore, they are exempt from standard import duties, including duties on materials and equipment used in the establishment and operation of the company. For a full description of the tax incentives offered to enterprises locating in free–trade zones, see Legal Guide to the Free Zones of lite Dominican Republic (Pellerano and Herrera, 1999).
For further details on trade relations between the Dominican Republic and the European Union, see Libra Verde sobre las Relaciones Entre la Unién Europea y los paises ACP en los albores del siglo XXI (European Commission, 1996).
The Dominican Republic experienced another adverse external shock in 1984–85. World sugar prices dropped sharply and import quotas to the United States were reduced substantially. International real interest rates remained high and external financing dried up.
Five member countries (France, Germany, Japan, Spain, and the United States) reached accords with the Dominican Republic.
In the final settlement, just under 35 percent of outstanding principal was made available for the discounted buybacks. The intensity of the imbalances prompted recourse to IMF assistance in 1983 and 1985.
The analysis of fiscal developments in the Dominican Republic is hampered by the poor quality of data. In some years, discrepancies between the above-the-line balance and identified financing are very large. Throughout the paper, it is assumed that negative discrepancies identified mire corded expenditure while positive discrepancies are treated as an accumulation of domestic arrears.
The Banco de Reservas maintains roughly a 100 percent reserve on government deposits in the BCRD. Financing from this bank is equivalent to an expansion of net credit to the nonfinancial public sector by the central bank.
See Chapter I. Stabilization and Structural Reforms.
The result of the 1994 presidential election was disputed, which contributed to a major capital outflow and loss in official reserves. The main political parties resolved the issue by declaring the sitting President Joaquin Balaguer the winner for a shortened two-year term. The constitution was also amended to bar the reelection of a president for consecutive terms.
These price increases coincided with rising world oil prices during the buildup to the Gulf War. Domestic fuel prices were left unchanged, even when world prices fell in early 1991.
In addition to the transfers to public enterprises, current government transfers largely reflect wage payments in the decentralized agencies of the general government.
The first 1.75 percentage points continued to be retained by the central bank while the remainder was transferred to the central government and mainly earmarked to cover external debt service.
Domestic fuel prices had remained unchanged since March 1998. Subsidies for the domestic use of propane gas were preserved.
In August, domestic fuel prices were raised by about 30 percent on average.
The approved law allowed the government to issue bonds for RD$5 billion (about 2 percent of 1999 GDP) with a six-year maturity and a 7 percent interest rate.
In this regard, the government established a domestic debt commission in December 2000 to help evaluate this issue.
The tariff reform was initially announced by decree in 1990 (Law 339–90) and finally set into law in September 1993. An exchange surcharge of 15 percent that was applied to about 40 percent of imports was gradually eliminated by June 1995.
Since then, two additional tariff rates of 0 and 3 percent have been introduced.
The ten tax brackets that existed previously were also unified.
Revenues from taxes on international trade climbed to over 32 percent of total tax revenue in 1999–2000, reflecting the increase in the foreign exchange commission.
The differential for propane is actually a subsidy (that is, it is negative).
The public/private joint venture national refinery (Refidomsa) essentially has monopoly rights to import petroleum products. It obtains its foreign exchange for these imports at the official exchange rate.
In 1998, taxes on business licenses and assets of financial institutions (patentee) were eliminated and taxes on international telephone calls were reduced.
The tariff reform narrowed the tariff structure from nine to five non-zero rates and reduced the maximum tariff rate to 20 percent from 35 percent, almost halving the simple average tariff rate to 11 percent.
The fiscal measures were complemented by a temporary tax amnesty on 1999 tax declarations and on pending tax disputes.
A draft law eliminating 11 taxes with marginal proceeds was presented by the new administration, but the approval by the congress is still pending.
During the stabilization effort of the early 1990s, the president himself coordinated revenue and spending operations
A substantial share of collected revenue, including the petroleum differential and nontax revenues associated with the granting of mining rights, is delivered directly to the national treasury or the office of the presidency.
See Chapter I for a more thorough discussion of this reform.
Percentage of population living in conditions of poverty.
Equation (1) is derived under the assumption that the production function is Cobb-Douglas. Under constant returns to scale, the estimated parameters of inputs equation (1) are equal to the factor shares in production, while the estimated constant is a proxy (up to a scale) of the average productivity growth. Tests indicated that the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale in both the FTZs and the rest of the economy could not be rejected and the estimation of (1) was carried out under the restriction that α1+α2= 1.
All results must be interpreted with caution, given that GDP data use a base year of 1970. The stock of capital was estimated using the perpetual inventory method (see Appendix V). Reasonable changes in depreciation rates (from 4 percent to 6 percent) or in the capital-to-GDP ratio (from 2 ½ to 3) do not affect the results qualitatively, although quantitatively, the coefficient estimates will vary slightly. The intensity of the imbalances prompted recourse to IMF assistance in 1983 and 1985.
These shares are similar to those found by Senhadji (1999) (ranging from 0.52 to 0.72 for Latin American countries).
There are insufficient data on educational attainment to control for this variable.
Some public investment can crowd out private investment, reducing its net contribution.
Given past exchange controls and trade restrictions, the ratio of exports to GDP was seen as a better proxy for openness than the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. *Data sources are described in Table 26. Data are shown in Table 27.
The Monetary and Financial Code currently being discussed in congress would require that the monetary program be submitted to congress.
There is a dual foreign exchange market in the Dominican Republic: all traditional exports, credit card, and telecommunication transactions are subject to surrender requirements (about 15 percent of the total volume of foreign exchange transactions) and the remainder goes through the free market. The BCRD is responsible for providing foreign exchange for the payment of the country’s petroleum import bill and the servicing of the public sector’s foreign debt. The intensity of the imbalances prompted recourse to IMF assistance in 1983 and 1985.
This has been the main practical factor behind the move in industrialized countries away from controlling monetary aggregates and toward controlling interest rates.
In the extreme case of perfect capital mobility (that is, when domestic and foreign securities are perfect substitutes and financial markets are efficient), monetary policy cannot make the differential between domestic and foreign real interest rates different from zero.
The measure of M2 used in this study includes foreign currency–denominated deposits.
The variables are defined in Appendix VI.I..
Another specification, where both the domestic and the foreign interest rates enter the regression separately, was estimated. Results are available upon request.
Alternatively, it has been suggested that the long-run coefficient c reflects money’s own rate of return and it is therefore expected to be positively correlated with M2.
See Appendix VI.2 for a detailed description of the unit root and cointegration tests performed.
The tests were started using a lag (and lead) structure similar to that in Johansen-Juselius (1990). The lag-lead structure necessary to eliminate serial correlation varied across models; one lag and one lead were preferred for all cases except for real M2 and the domestic interest rate where two leads and two lags were preferred. Similarly, for real MI and the foreign interest rate two lags and one lead were preferred. In all cases, however, conscious about Phillips and Loretan’s warning of over-fitting, the number of leads was reduced by one first. Lags were reduced then if necessary. The parameter estimates and their significance, as well as whether the residuals were white noise, were checked every time.
Figures 5–10 have an upper and a lower confidence interval calculated as a Bartlett’s test that is normally distributed. The confidence intervals are wide due to the relatively short sample period. However, note that 100 observations would give a value of ±0.20 for the 95 percent level and about ±0.16 for the 90 percent level. The residuals are well within those bands.
The R2 is reported although in a cointegrated system, estimated with valid conditioning, the R2 is not meaningful as a measure of fit.
The negative and significant real M1 and M2 long-run interest rate semielasticities with respect to the foreign interest rate may indicate that the domestic money function that matters for this version of money demand is the store-of-value function of money. Foreign currencies are not used as means of payment in the Dominican Republic.
As stated earlier, the rapid growth of the economy during the sample period as well as the underdeveloped state of Dominican financial markets also suggest a positive interest rate semielasticity of real M2.
Nadal-De Simone and Razzak (1994) found that increases in the interest rate differential between the United States and Germany, and between the United States and the United Kingdom, appreciated the U.S. dollar during the floating period.
Goldfeld and Sichel (1990) have a fascinating account of problems referring to the interpretation of money demand estimates generated running regressions in levels and in first differences well before the use of cointegration analysis.
However, seven years is already “the long run” for monetary policy.
See the discussion of McCallum and Nelson’s model in Walsh (1998).
It is assumed that the rates of return on domestic and foreign assets are measured in the same units.
This assumption could presumably be justified by the existence of menu costs or, more generally, by the costs of gathering and processing information (Brunner and others, 1983).
See McCallum and Nelson (2000) for a similar argument.
Frankel’s (1991) terminology is used here. In a set of developed and developing countries. Frankel finds that most of the variance in the real interest rate differential is explained by expected changes in the real exchange rate (currency risk) rather than by the slowly changing covered interest rate parity (country risk).
A similar model is solved and simulated in Nadal-De Simone (2001).
The constant term includes the constant risk premium.
The choice of the lag structure always has been an issue. The objective of the lags is to remove serial correlation. With this objective in mind, the lag order was set as the highest significant lag order—using an approximate 95 percent confidence interval—from either the autocorrelation function or the partial autocorrelation function of the first-differenced series. Also the Akaike Information Criterion was used. Every time a lag was eliminated, serial correlation was checked using the Ljung-Box test for white noise. The approach followed in selecting the lags was also followed in testing nonstationarity in the individual series.
Results are available upon request.
The λmax statistic has a sharper alternative hypothesis than the λtrace statistic. In case of conflict, the former is to be preferred to the latter.
Such behavior has been discussed recently in the context of balance of payments crises (Flood, Garber, and Kramer, 1996), For empirical evidence related to this issue in Mexico during the 1994–95 crisis, see Calvo and Mendoza (1996). For evidence on this issue in other countries, see Tanner (2001).
In a monetary framework, a scale variable for money demand should also be included. Most frequently, this variable is GDP. However, this study uses monthly data, for which neither GDP nor industrial production data are available.
Defined in Dominican pesos per U.S. dollar throughout this chapter.
This definition may also be obtained for the more general case of non-zero π*. An even more general definition of EMP (e-αr) where α is reduced-form coefficient that depends on several underlying structural parameters. Under standard assumptions of the monetary approach to exchange rates and the balance of payments, ex should be unity. Subsequently, other authors relaxed these assumptions (see, for example, Weymark, 1998) and found that at might be difficult to obtain. Therefore, α is nonetheless commonly set to unity, as doing so yields an informative indicator (although perhaps not one consistent with a deeper structural model).
This framework also applies to freely floating exchange rates that are subject to a reserve growth target.
All data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, international reserves are defined by series 11.d, gross reserves excluding gold. The monetary base is scries 14. Domestic credit is defined as the difference between the monetary base and net foreign assets (series 14 minus series 11 plus series 16c).
Both EMP and δ are stationary. Hence, the regression does not represent a long-run (cointegrating) relationship.
For example, for the United States, many authors, including Bernanke and Blinder (1992), argue that the stance of the federal Reserve is best measured by the federal Tunds rate: higher interest rates reflect lighter monetary policy. In the context of developing countries, most authors have also used an interest rate to capture the stance of monetary policy. For example, in the case of Asia, several authors, including Radelet and Sachs (1998), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Goldfajn and Baig (1998), and Goldfajn and Gupta (1998) do so.
Results not reported here indicate, however, that Φ and the level of international reserves are negatively cointegrated, suggesting that higher reserve holdings reduce risk and the risk premium.
Since Φt, is nonstationary in levels but stationary in first differences, it is entered accordingly as ΔΦ.
To implement these restrictions, either a Choleski decomposition or a procedure like Benanke’s (1986) may be used. For a review of issues regarding the estimation and identification of vector autoregressions, see also Enders (1995),Chapter V.
An alternative assumption would be for EMP to be contemporaneously determined by both δ and ΔΦ. In this case equation (9) would be rewritten as; vEt = wEt + b21wδt + b23wΦt. Since Φ reflects the opportunity cost of holding money, b23>0. Under this assumption, however, for the system also to be just identified, b31 must be zero in equation (10).
Note that the issue addressed here is similar to that of exchange rate targeting. For example, Edwards and Savastano (1998) also estimate a policy reaction function for Mexico during the mid-1990s. However, they examine the effect of changes in the exchange rate (rather than EMP) on M1 (rather than domestic credit of the central bank).
An IRF is significant if its t-statistic exceeds |2|.
Tanner (2001) finds strong responses of 5 to EMP within two months for Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, and Mexico. For a discussion of such behavior for balance of payments crises, see Flood, Garber, and Kramer (1996).
Such a reduction might reflect a corresponding reduction in the government budget deficit.
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