Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain

Book

Series:: Occasional Papers
Author(s):: Teresa Daban Sanchez, Steven Symansky, Gian Milesi-Ferretti, Enrica Detragiache, and Gabriel Di Bella
Publisher:: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Published Date:: November 2003
DOI:: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781589062160.084
ISBN:: 9781589062160
ISSN:: 0251-6365
Page:: 46

Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit from more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies.

Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain

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Back Matter

Chapter

I Overview

Author(s):: Teresa Daban Sanchez, Steven Symansky, Gian Milesi-Ferretti, Enrica Detragiache, and Gabriel Di Bella
Published Date:: November 2003

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Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain

I Overview

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