- Benedict Clements, Gabriela Inchauste, Nita Thacker, Thomas Dorsey, Shamsuddin Tareq, Emanuele Baldacci, Sanjeev Gupta, and Mark Plant
- Published Date:
- September 2002
|New PRGF||Extended PRGF||All|
|Total revenue and grants||15||20.6||22.0||1.5||16||20.0||20.7||0.7||31||20.3||21.4||1.1|
|Taxes on income|
|Total expenditure and net lending||15||24.0||24.3||0.4||16||23.3||24.3||1.0||31||23.6||24.3||0.7|
|Goods and services||14||8.9||8.8||–0.1||16||7.8||7.8||0.0||30||8.3||8.3||–0.1|
|Wages and salaries||14||5.2||5.0||–0.2||16||5.2||5.3||0.1||30||5.2||5.1||0.0|
|Other goods and|
|Transfers and subsidies||11||4.7||4.8||0.1||12||2.4||2.7||0.2||23||3.5||3.7||0.2|
|Capital expenditure and|
|Under the PRGF2||Under the ESAF3|
|Total revenue and grants||20.3||21.4||1.1||19.4||20.3||0.9|
|Total expenditure and net lending||23.6||24.4||0.8||22.8||23.2||0.3|
|Overall balance (commitment basis)||–3.3||–3.0||0.3||–3.5||–2.9||0.5|
|Overall balance (cash basis)||–3.5||–3.6||–0.1||–3.8||–3.4||0.4|
|Overall balance (cash basis) excluding grants||–6.7||–7.0||–0.4||–6.6||–6.2||0.4|
|Total revenue and grants||21.6||22.3||0.7||24.7||24.5||–0.2|
|Total expenditure and net lending||22.0||23.0||1.0||24.3||24.1||–0.2|
|Overall balance (commitment basis)||–0.4||–0.7||–0.3||0.3||0.2||–0.1|
|Overall balance (cash basis)||–0.7||–1.0||–0.4||0.1||–0.2||–0.3|
|Overall balance (cash basis) excluding grants||–4.0||–4.5||–0.5||–2.7||–2.9||–0.2|
|Total revenue and grants||19.6||20.9||1.3||18.4||19.5||1.2|
|Total expenditure and net lending||24.4||25.1||0.7||22.6||23.0||0.4|
|Overall balance (commitment basis)||–4.8||–A2||0.6||–4.2||–3.5||0.7|
|Overall balance (cash basis)||–4.8||–4.7||0.0||–A.6||–4.0||–0.6|
|Overall balance (cash basis) excluding grants||4.8||4.7||–0.1||4.6||4.0||–0.6|
|Under the PRGF2||Under the ESAF3|
|Decision Point HIPCs|
|Total revenue and grants||19.6||20.4||0.8||18.6||19.4||0.8|
|Total expenditure and net lending||22.0||23.1||1.1||20.8||21.6||0.8|
|Overall balance (commitment basis)||–2.4||–2.7||–0.3||–2.3||–2.3||0.0|
|Overall balance (cash basis)||–2.8||–3.4||–0.6||–3.0||–3.0||0.0|
|Overall balance (cash basis)|
|Total revenue and grants||21.3||22.7||1.4||20.5||21.6||1.1|
|Total expenditure and net lending||25.9||26.2||0.4||25.6||25.3||–0.3|
|Overall balance (commitment basis)||–4.6||–3.5||1.1||–5.1||–3.8||1.3|
|Overall balance (cash basis)||–4.4||–3.8||0.6||–5.0||–4.0||1.0|
|Overall balance (cash basis)|
A survey of key counterparts among national authorities in the countries included in the sample for the review of key features of the PRGF reveals a high degree of consensus that the key features are being implemented in PRGF-supported programs but suggests there is room for further progress (Appendix Table A.4). Officials from nearly half of the PRGF countries included in the Staff Analyses sample (17 of 35) responded to the survey, with most responding to all questions. Overall, the assessment of PRGF-country authorities on progress toward the goal of the PRGF is positive—a majority agree there has been progress on all aspects of the key features of the PRGF included among the survey questions. Agreement is strongest on progress in consistency of the PRGF-supported programs with the PRSP, more poverty-oriented budgets, more focused conditionality, greater emphasis on improved public expenditure management, and improved coordination with the World Bank. Agreement is less strong (but still accounting for a majority of all responses) for fiscal flexibility and greater opportunity for authorities to affect program design. Disagreement (as opposed to a neutral response) is limited to only 5 of the 12 aspects, with multiple responses disagreeing only on the 2 fiscal flexibility questions (accounting for less than one-fourth of responses in each case).
|1. PRGF-supported program is consistent with the government’s underlying poverty reduction strategy [as embodied in the I-PRSP/PRSP].||12.5||75.0||12.5||—||—|
|2. PRGF-supported program allowed increased opportunity to affect the design of the program relative to past programs.||5.9||52.9||35.3||5.9||—|
|3. PRGF-supported program is consistent with the economic goals of the government and other national institutions.||11.8||70.6||11.8||5.9||—|
|4. PRGF-supported program places sufficient emphasis on growth as a means to alleviate poverty.||17.6||64.7||17.6||—||—|
|5. PRGF-supported program places more emphasis on growth as a means to alleviate poverty compared with IMF programs in the past.||47.1||35.3||11.8||5.9||—|
|6. Under PRGF-supported program, budgets have become more poverty-oriented.||11.8||82.4||5.9||—||—|
|7. PRGF-supported program has shown more flexibility in accommodating social spending.||29.4||35.3||17.6||11.8||5.9|
|8. PRGF-supported program has shown more flexibility in accommodating availability of increased external financing.||11.8||52.9||11.8||17.6||5.9|
|9. Structural conditionality included in PRGF-supported program is more focused on the IMF’s core areas of expertise.||18.8||68.8||12.5||—||—|
|10. Streamlining of conditionality under PRGF-supported program has resulted in improved prospects of implementation.||6.3||68.8||31.3||—||—|
|11. PRGF-supported program incorporates greater emphasis on improved management and accountability of public resources.||35.3||58.8||5.9||—||—|
|12. Improved coordination between IMF and World Bank staff has helped improve the design of poverty reduction efforts under the PRGF-supported program.||35.3||58.8||5.9||—||—|
Broad participation and greater ownership
The main elements of the PRGF are drawn from the country’s PRSP.
PRSPs will be produced in a transparent process with broad participation.
Country authorities will produce the PRSPs.
Where relevant, joint staff assessments/staff reports will highlight flexibility in accepting country choices.
Embedding of the PRGF in the overall strategy for growth and poverty reduction
This feature demonstrates how macroeconomic and other policies have been influenced by growth and poverty objectives.
It highlights aspects of the PRGF program that promote private sector development.
The PRGF contribution to the strategy should focus on areas within the IMF’s area of expertise and responsibility.
Budgets that are more pro-poor and pro-growth
This feature reorients government spending toward activities that benefit the poor.
It improves efficiency and targeting of spending in key sectors relevant to growth and poverty reduction.
It stresses tax reforms that simultaneously improve efficiency and equity.
It improves data and monitoring to track expenditures.
Appropriate flexibility in fiscal targets
This feature presents more normative macro-projections to signal financing needs.
Where warranted, it seeks commitments of higher aid flows and builds into the program.
It uses the PRSP to identify contingent expenditures that could be added if more aid were forthcoming.
It indicates how fiscal targets would be modified in the event of key shocks.
More selective structural conditionality
This feature limits conditionality to key measures, central to the success of the strategy.
It confines IMF conditionality to measures in the IMF’s domain: exceptions must be justified.
Emphasis on measures to improve public resource management/accountability
Fiscal policies and objectives should be open to public debate.
Such measures develop transparent monitoring systems to improve efficient delivery of public services.
For HIPCs, they include specific mechanisms for monitoring use of debt relief.
This feature considers selective conditionality on fiscal governance measures.
Social impact analysis of major macroeconomic adjustments and structural reforms
This analysis demonstrates that distributional effects of substantial macro-adjustments or structural reforms have been considered.
It highlights countervailing measures to offset temporary adverse effects on the poor.
The World Bank should lead if technical impact analysis is needed, but PRGF documents should indicate what work was done and how it influenced policies.
The staff analyses draw upon staff reports, letters of intent/memoranda of economic and financial policies, (Interim) Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs/I-PRSPs), and joint staff assessments of PRSPs/I-PRSPs for new PRGF arrangements approved between July 1, 2000, and September 30, 2001, as well as older PRGF arrangements, which have had Board discussion of a review supported by a full PRSP, or at least two reviews, or new annual arrangements during the same period.
This sample includes arrangements and PRSP processes at a variety of stages. Nineteen countries in the sample had new, three-year PRGF arrangements approved. An additional 16 countries had existing ESAF arrangements that had been transformed into a PRGF, under which at least two reviews had been concluded during this 15-month period or a review had been supported by a full PRSP. A shift to an earlier date would pick up essentially pre-PRGF requests and reviews but have little effect on the sample size. Only three new PRGF arrangements were approved in the first half of 2000; two of these are incorporated in the sample on the basis of subsequent reviews. Only one new PRGF-supported program, Sao Tome and Principe, could be added by a shift to an earlier date (discussions were completed for the new program on mission in November 1999, but the Board only approved it in April 2000).
|New PRGF Arrangements July 1,2000–September 30,2001|
|Country||Date Approved||PRGF Arrangements Approved Prior to July 1, 20002|
|1. Armenia||May 23,2001||1. Albania|
|2. Azerbaijan||July 5,2001||2. Bolivia|
|3. Benin||July 17, 2000||3. Burkina Faso|
|4. Cameroon||December 21, 2000||4. Cambodia|
|5. Ethiopia||March 22, 2001||5. Chad|
|6. Georgia||January 12, 2001||6. Gambia, The|
|7. Guinea||May 2, 2001||7. Ghana|
|8. Guinea-Bissau||December 15, 2000||8. Mali|
|9. Kenya||August 4, 2000||9. Mauritania|
|10. Lao PDR||April 25, 2000||10. Mozambique|
|11. Lesotho||March 9, 2001||11. Rwanda|
|12. Macedonia, FYR||November 29, 2000||12. Senegal|
|13. Madagascar||March 1, 2000||13. Tajikistan|
|14. Malawi||December 21, 2000||14. Tanzania|
|15. Moldova||December 15, 2000||15. Uganda|
|16. Mongolia||September 28, 2001||16. Zambia|
|17. Niger||December 14, 2000|
|18. Sierra Leone||September 20, 2001|
|19. Vietnam||April 13, 2001|
Similarly, the stages of the PRSP process vary across countries and reviews. Four reviews (all from 2000) precede the finalization of the I-PRSP, an additional 29 requests or reviews were presented to the Board together with the I-PRSP. Twenty requests or reviews were concluded after the endorsement of the I-PRSP but before the endorsement of the PRSP, 4 reviews were presented to the Board together with the full PRSP, and 5 additional reviews were concluded by the Board after the full PRSP had been endorsed. The stage of the PRGF arrangement and the PRSP process are often out of synchronization, which further complicates the assessment of these programs and their relationship with the PRSP. In contrast to the steady state envisaged in Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility—Operational Issues in which new PRSPs would ideally be accompanied by new PRGF-supported programs, none of the six full PRSPs covered in this sample is associated with a new arrangement approved since July 1, 2000.
The ESAF staff reports included in the study were those that provided the last request for an annual arrangement under the ESAF. Most of these documents were issued to the Executive Board in 1999.
These are referred to in this document as transformed PRGF-supported arrangements/programs.
These comprise new’ PRGF-supported arrangements approved by the IMF Executive Board between July 1, 2000, and September 30, 2001; arrangements approved earlier that have concluded two or more reviews during the same 15-month period; and arrangements supported by both a full PRSP and a review under the arrangement during the same period. Earlier documents are excluded to avoid assessing programs that largely predated the PRGF against these later standards. The cutoff date of September 30, 2001, was selected lo allow adequate lime to assess the documents. See Appendix IV for more details on the sample.
This staff report does not assess PRSPs or I-PRSPs; these are assessed in the parallel joint World Bank-IMF Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach: Main Findings. March 15, 2002, available via Internet: http://www.imr.org/exlemal/np/prspgen/review/2002/031502a.htm; and Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach: Early Experience with Interim PRSPs and Full PRSPs. March 26. 2002, available via Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/np/prspgen/revicw/2O02/032602a.htm.
The third and fourth sub-elements of the broad ownership key feature—(c) PRSPs should be produced in a transparent process with broad participation and (d) PRSPs are to be produced by country authorities—are covered in the staff papers for the parallel Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Approach: Main Findings and Early Experience with Interim PRSPs and Full PRSPs.
Structural but macroeconomic-relevant objectives are, for example, governance and corruption-reducing structural reforms affecting revenues and expenditures and the financial sector (Georgia); reform of the cocoa sector to allow greater private participation and increased efficiency (Ghana); and reallocation of budgetary resources to activities having a direct bearing on the poor (Lesotho). In other cases, the objectives overlap with the macroeconomic targets and assumptions (maintaining price stability, increasing growth, etc.).
Four reviews predate both the I-PRSP and the PRSP and are excluded from this sample.
A selection of these indicators are reported in Table 3. Fiscal projections are considered separately in Section V.
The comparison of projections and assumptions in PRGF-supported programs described in this section compare the medians of the average growth, inflation, current account balance, or level of official transfers over the first three years of the projection period (fewer if three years of projections are not available) against the first three years of the projections in the preceding ESAF-supported program. Comparisons of trends within program projections compare the change between the first projected year with the third for programs under both ESAFs and PRGFs. Medians are used rather than averages for comparisons across countries to avoid giving undue weight to outliers. Where multiple PRGF requests or reviews are included in the sample, the most recent staff report is used. Moldova is excluded from these comparisons because it had no preceding ESAF-supported program; a few other countries are excluded from some calculations where data are not available.
The need for explicit notation of such developments in the PRGF program documents is set out in paragraph 22 of The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)—Operational Issues, December 13, 1999, available via Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/prsp/poverty2.htm, but has been implemented unevenly.
IMF PRGF Review: Submission from HM Treasury/Department for International Development, United Kingdom. See External Comments and Contributions on the Joint Bank/Fund Staff Review of the PRSP Approach, Volume I: Bilateral Agencies and Multilateral Institutions, February 2002, available via Internet: http://www.imf.Org/external/np/prspgen/review/2002/comm/v1.pdf.
Strengthening Country Ownership of Fund-Supported Programs, December 5, 2001, available via Internet: http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/strength/120501.htm, and International Monetary Fund, Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 01/92, September 4, 2001, “IMF Concludes Discussions on Strengthening IMF-World Bank Collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality,” available via Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2001/pnO192.htm.
Summing Up by the Chairman of the Executive Board—Distilling the Lessons from the ESAF Reviews, IMF Executive Board Meeting, July 8, 1998. Status Report on Follow-Up to the Reviews of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, August 30, 1999, available via Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/np/esaf/status/index.htm.
Based on a sample of 32 countries. Figures refer to the average annual increase in real per capita spending between the year that preceded the first ESAF-supported program and 1999.
The transition economies included in the sample are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Georgia, Lao PDR, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam.
Poverty reduction has also been fostered by gender-focused budgets (Tanzania).
Spending increases of 1½ percentage points of GDP were realized in these countries between 1999 and 2000.
For an assessment of public expenditure management systems in 24 heavily-indebted poor countries, and the actions they envisage to help strengthen the tracking of poverty-reducing spending, see the Bank/IMF Board paper, Actions to Strengthen the Tracking of Poverty-Reducing Public Spending in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), March 22, 2002, available via Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/2002/track/032202.htm.
Of the 35 countries in the sample, only 6 had full PRSPs at the end of September 2001.
Additional indicators include primary school enrollment rate, infant mortality, under-five mortality, and the poverty headcount ratio. Data for 2000 are also available for Bolivia, whose PRGF-supported program started in 2001.
See, for example, Vito Tanzi and Ke-young Chu, eds., 1998, Income Distribution and High-Quality Growth (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press); and Vito Tanzi, Ke-young Chu, and Sanjeev Gupta, eds., 1999, Economic Policy and Equity (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
See Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi, 1998, “Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth,” in Hirofumi Shibata and Toshihiro Ihori, eds., The Welfare State, Public Investment, and Growth (Tokyo: Springer).
For an assessment of the evidence on the benefit incidence of government spending, see Ke-young Chu, Hamid Davoodi, and Sanjeev Gupta, 2000, “Income Distribution and Tax, and Government Social Spending Policies in Developing Countries,” The United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, WP No. 214, December.
See, for example, Deon Filmer and Lant Pritchett, 1997, “Child Mortality and Public Spending on Health: How Much Does Money Matter?” Policy Research Working Paper No. 1864 (Washington: World Bank); Karnit Flug, Karnit, Antonio Spilimbergo, and Erik Wachtenheim, 1998, “Investment in Education: Do Economic Volatility and Credit Constraints Matter?” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 55 (April), pp. 465-81; Sanjeev Gupta, Marijn Verhoeven, and Erwin Tiongson, forthcoming, “The Effectiveness of Government Spending on Education and Health Care in Developing and Transition Economies,” European Journal of Political Economy. For a recent study with a more optimistic assessment of the impact of public spending on health outcomes for the poor, see Sanjeev Gupta, Marijn Verhoeven, and Erwin Tiongson, forthcoming, “Public Spending on Health Care and the Poor,” Health Economics.
Education and health spending is rising in these countries, with the exception of Kenya. This rise indicates that the share of spending being allocated to nonwage inputs (including capital outlays) is climbing. A similar picture emerges for the PRGF sample as a whole, where the wage bill is constant as a share of GDP, while education and health care spending is increasing (see Figure 1 and Appendix Table A.1).
For a review of tax incidence studies, see Chu, Davoodi, and Gupta, “Income Distribution and Tax, and Government Social Spending Policies in Developing Countries.”
In some countries (e.g., Moldova and Guinea-Bissau), rates are increasing in light of revenue needs, especially in cases where these rates are low by international or regional standards.
See, for example, George Mackenzie, David Orsmond, and Philip Gerson, 1997, “The Composition of Fiscal Adjustment and Growth: Lessons from Fiscal Reform in Eight Economies,” IMF Occasional Paper No. 149 (Washington: International Monetary Fund); Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti, and Jose Tavares, 1998, “The Political Economy of Fiscal Adjustments,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 1 (Washington: Brookings Institution); and Sanjeev Gupta, and others, “Expenditure Composition, Fiscal Adjustment, and Growth in Low-Income Countries,” IMF Working Paper 02/77 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Substantial foreign inflows (even when highly concessional) can exert pressure on both the real exchange rate and domestic prices. Many countries are currently grappling with the problems stemming from large foreign inflows (Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda).
Post-stabilization countries are defined as those that (1) achieved a cash deficit of less than 2 percent of GDP (after grants) in 1999; (2) had inflation of less than 10 percent in 1999 and projected inflation below 10 percent in 2000–02; and (3) had positive economic growth in 1999. This group comprises Azerbaijan, Benin, Cambodia, Cameroon, Macedonia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda.
Flexibility in this respect is largely similar to that under the last ESAF-supported program when the higher foreign financing for post-stabilization countries under their PRGF-supported programs is taken into account.
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)—Operational Issues, December 13, 1999. These guidelines are also spelled out in Key Features of IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) Supported Programs, August 16, 2000.
Strengthening IMF-World Bank Collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality, August 23, 2001, available via Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/collab/coll.htm. Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs: External Consultations, July 17, 2001, available via Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/collab/econ.htm.
Streamlining Structural Conditionality: Review of Initial Experience, July 10, 2001, available via Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/collab/071001.pdf. International Monetary Fund, PIN No. 01/92, September 4, 2001, “IMF Concludes Discussions on Strengthening IMF-World Bank Collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality.”
Streamlining Structural Conditionality: Review of Initial Experience, July 10, 2001. Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs: External Consultations, July 17, 2001.
In shared areas of responsibility, the lead role between the Bank and the IMF is to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Few, if any, staff reports explicitly discuss cases where the World Bank was not involved. Therefore, in cases where staff reports did not discuss World Bank involvement, the presumption is that the particular conditionality was not supplemented by World Bank conditionality or policy advice.
Measures directly focused on poverty reduction generally fall within the World Bank’s areas of expertise. However, 18 percent of requests for or review of programs supported under the ESAF and 22 percent of those under the PRGF had performance criteria, prior actions, benchmarks, or review topics directly focused on poverty reduction. Most of these related to expenditure allocation.
The issue of governance goes beyond the management of public resources. While this is recognized, other aspects of governance, such as the functioning of the legal system, the enforcement of contracts and corruption are outside the scope of this review. These other aspects of governance can affect macroeconomic performance.
See the World Bank/IMF Board paper, Actions to Strengthen the Tracking of Poverty-Reducing Public Spending in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), March 22, 2002.
Fiscal modules for the ROSC have been completed for 12 of the 35 countries in the PRGF sample. Bank and IMF staff have also conducted assessments of the capacity of public expenditure management systems to track poverty-reducing spending for 20 of the HIPCs in the sample during 2001.
This result occurs in part because in Francophone countries, public accounts are checked in detail for several successive years, so as to verify consistency between treasury balances (stocks) and annual budget outcomes (flows). Therefore, these countries do not present final audited accounts within one year.
In this context, the World Bank and the European Commission have recently launched the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Program to spur greater coordination. In addition, the action plans for strengthening the tracking of poverty-reducing spending in 24 HIPCs (recently prepared in collaboration with Bank and IMF staff) are being integrated with action plans developed through other Bank instruments, and will be used to coordinate donor efforts better. See the joint Bank-IMF Executive Board paper, Actions to Strengthen the Tracking of Poverty-Reducing Public Spending in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), March 22, 2002.
For a review of social policies under IMF-supported programs, including ESAF-supported programs, see Sanjeev Gupta and others, 2000, Social Issues in IMF-Supported Programs, IMF Occasional Paper No. 191 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
It could be argued that the very existence of these countervailing measures—which are motivated by the desire to offset the adverse effects of reforms—may be indicative of the fact that some qualitative, informal PSIA took place but was not reported in PRGF documents.
For an assessment of three full and three interim PRSPs, including their treatment of the linkages between policies and poverty, see Caroline M. Robb and Alison M. Scott, 2001, “Reviewing Some Early Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers,” IMF PDP 01/05, November (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
For further details on the results of a stocktaking exercise of PSIA in 12 PRGF countries, see Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers—Progress in Implementation, September 14, 2001, available via Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/2001/091401.htm.
The recent efforts of World Bank and IMF staff in collaboration with country authorities to design action plans to strengthen PEM capacity in 24 HIPCs are an important step.
The External Relations Department has provided training for CSOs in the past, and the IMF Institute envisages some increase in training for government officials at the Joint Africa Institute.
Recent Occasional Papers of the International Monetary Fund
216. Is the PRGF Living Up to Expectations?—An Assessment of Program Design, by Sanjeev Gupta, Mark Plant, Benedict Clements, Thomas Dorsey, Emanuele Baldacci, Gabriela Inchauste, Shamsuddin Tareq, and Nita Thacker. 2002.
215. Improving Large Taxpayers’ Compliance: A Review of Country Experience, by Katherine Baer. 2002.
214. Advanced Country Experiences with Capital Account Liberalization, by Age Bakker and Bryan Chapple. 2002.
213. The Baltic Countries: Medium-Term Fiscal Issues Related to EU and NATO Accession, by Johannes Mueller, Christian Beddies, Robert Burgess, Vitali Kramarenko, and Joannes Mongardini. 2002.
212. Financial Soundness Indicators: Analytical Aspects and Country Practices, by V. Sundararajan, Charles Enoch, Armida San José, Paul Hilbers, Russell Krueger, Marina Moretti, and Graham Slack. 2002.
211. Capital Account Liberalization and Financial Sector Stability, by a staff team led by Shogo Ishii and Karl Habermeier. 2002.
210. IMF-Supported Programs in Capital Account Crises, by Atish Ghosh, Timothy Lane, Marianne SchulzeGhattas, Aleš Bulíř, Javier Hamann, and Alex Mourmouras. 2002.
209. Methodology for Current Account and Exchange Rate Assessments, by Peter Isard, Hamid Faruqee, G. Russell Kincaid, and Martin Fetherston. 2001.
208. Yemen in the 1990s: From Unification to Economic Reform, by Klaus Enders, Sherwyn Williams, Nada Choueiri, Yuri Sobolev, and Jan Walliser. 2001.
207. Malaysia: From Crisis to Recovery, by Kanitta Meesook, II Houng Lee, Olin Liu, Yougesh Khatri, Natalia Tamirisa, Michael Moore, and Mark H. Krysl. 2001.
206. The Dominican Republic: Stabilization, Structural Reform, and Economic Growth, by Alessandro Giustiniani, Werner C. Keller, and Randa E. Sab. 2001.
205. Stabilization and Savings Funds for Nonrenewable Resources, by Jeffrey Davis, Rolando Ossowski, James Daniel, and Steven Barnett. 2001.
204. Monetary Union in West Africa (ECOWAS): Is It Desirable and How Could It Be Achieved? by Paul Masson and Catherine Pattillo. 2001.
203. Modern Banking and OTC Derivatives Markets: The Transformation of Global Finance and Its Implications for Systemic Risk, by Garry J. Schinasi, R. Sean Craig, Burkhard Drees, and Charles Kramer. 2000.
202. Adopting Inflation Targeting: Practical Issues for Emerging Market Countries, by Andrea Schaechter, Mark R. Stone, and Mark Zelmer. 2000.
201. Developments and Challenges in the Caribbean Region, by Samuel Itam, Simon Cueva, Erik Lundback, Janet Stotsky, and Stephen Tokarick. 2000.
200. Pension Reform in the Baltics: Issues and Prospects, by Jerald Schiff, Niko Hobdari, Axel Schimmelpfennig, and Roman Zytek. 2000.
199. Ghana: Economic Development in a Democratic Environment, by Sérgio Pereira Leite, Anthony Pellechio, Luisa Zanforlin, Girma Begashaw, Stefania Fabrizio, and Joachim Harnack. 2000.
198. Setting Up Treasuries in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union: An Assessment of IMF Technical Assistance, by Barry H. Potter and Jack Diamond. 2000.
197. Deposit Insurance: Actual and Good Practices, by Gillian G.H. Garcia. 2000.
196. Trade and Trade Policies in Eastern and Southern Africa, by a staff team led by Arvind Subramanian, with Enrique Gelbard, Richard Harmsen, Katrin Elborgh-Woytek, and Piroska Nagy. 2000.
195. The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union—Institutions, Performance, and Policy Issues, by Frits van Beek, José Roberto Rosales, Mayra Zermeño, Ruby Randall, and Jorge Shepherd. 2000.
194. Fiscal and Macroeconomic Impact of Privatization, by Jeffrey Davis, Rolando Ossowski, Thomas Richardson, and Steven Barnett. 2000.
193. Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World Economy, by Michael Mussa, Paul Masson, Alexander Swoboda, Esteban Jadresic, Paolo Mauro, and Andy Berg. 2000.
192. Macroprudential Indicators of Financial System Soundness, by a staff team led by Owen Evans, Alfredo M. Leone, Mahinder Gill, and Paul Hilbers. 2000.
191. Social Issues in IMF-Supported Programs, by Sanjeev Gupta, Louis Dicks-Mireaux, Ritha Khemani, Calvin McDonald, and Marijn Verhoeven. 2000.
190. Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization, by Akira Ariyoshi, Karl Habermeier, Bernard Laurens, Inci Ötker-Robe, Jorge Iván Canales Kriljenko, and Andrei Kirilenko. 2000.
189. Current Account and External Sustainability in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, by Donal McGettigan. 2000.
188. Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons from Asia, by Carl-Johan Lindgren, Tomás J.T. Baliño, Charles Enoch, Anne-Marie Guide, Marc Quintyn, and Leslie Teo. 1999.
187. Philippines: Toward Sustainable and Rapid Growth, Recent Developments and the Agenda Ahead, by Markus Rodlauer, Prakash Loungani, Vivek Arora, Charalambos Christofides, Enrique G. De la Piedra, Piyabha Kongsamut, Kristina Kostial, Victoria Summers, and Athanasios Vamvakidis. 2000.
186. Anticipating Balance of Payments Crises: The Role of Early Warning Systems, by Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, and Catherine Pattillo. 1999.
185. Oman Beyond the Oil Horizon: Policies Toward Sustainable Growth, edited by Ahsan Mansur and Volker Treichel. 1999.
184. Growth Experience in Transition Countries, 1990–98, by Oleh Havrylyshyn, Thomas Wolf, Julian Berengaut, Marta Castello-Branco, Ron van Rooden, and Valerie Mercer-Blackman. 1999.
183. Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, by Emine Gürgen, Harry Snoek, Jon Craig, Jimmy McHugh, Ivailo Izvorski, and Ron van Rooden. 1999.
182. Tax Reform in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, by a staff team led by Liam Ebrill and Oleh Havrylyshyn. 1999.
181. The Netherlands: Transforming a Market Economy, by C. Maxwell Watson, Bas B. Bakker, Jan Kees Martijn, and Ioannis Halikias. 1999.
180. Revenue Implications of Trade Liberalization, by Liam Ebrill, Janet Stotsky, and Reint Gropp. 1999.
179. Disinflation in Transition: 1993–97, by Carlo Cottarelli and Peter Doyle. 1999.
178. IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand: A Preliminary Assessment, by Timothy Lane, Atish Ghosh, Javier Hamann, Steven Phillips, Marianne Schulze-Ghattas, and Tsidi Tsikata. 1999.
177. Perspectives on Regional Unemployment in Europe, by Paolo Mauro, Eswar Prasad, and Antonio Spilimbergo. 1999.
176. Back to the Future: Postwar Reconstruction and Stabilization in Lebanon, edited by Sena Eken and Thomas Helbling. 1999.
175. Macroeconomic Developments in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1992–97, by Luis M . Valdivieso. 1998.
174. Impact of EMU on Selected Non-European Union Countries, by R. Feldman, K. Nashashibi, R. Nord, P. Allum, D. Desruelle, K. Enders, R. Kahn, and H. Temprano-Arroyo. 1998.
173. The Baltic Countries: From Economic Stabilization to EU Accession, by Julian Berengaut, Augusto Lopez-Claros, Françoise Le Gall, Dennis Jones, Richard Stern, Ann-Margret Westin, Effie Psalida, Pietro Garibaldi. 1998.
172. Capital Account Liberalization: Theoretical and Practical Aspects, by a staff team led by Barry Eichen-green and Michael Mussa, with Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Enrica Detragiache, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, and Andrew Tweedie. 1998.
171. Monetary Policy in Dollarized Economies, by Tomás Baliño, Adam Bennett, and Eduardo Borensztein. 1998.
170. The West African Economic and Monetary Union: Recent Developments and Policy Issues, by a staff team led by Ernesto Hernández-Catá and comprising Christian A. François, Paul Masson, Pascal Bou-vier, Patrick Peroz, Dominique Desruelle, and Athanasios Vamvakidis. 1998.
169. Financial Sector Development in Sub-Saharan African Countries, by Hassanali Mehran, Piero Ugolini, Jean Phillipe Briffaux, George Iden, Tonny Lybek, Stephen Swaray, and Peter Hayward. 1998.
Note: For information on the titles and availability of Occasional Papers not listed, please consult the IMF’s Publications Catalog or contact IMF Publication Services.