Chapter

CHAPTER 12 Bedfellows, Hostages, or Perfect Strangers? Global Capital Markets and the Catalytic Effect of IMF Crisis Lending

Author(s):
Alessandro Rebucci, and Ashoka Mody
Published Date:
April 2006
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    Author(s)
    Carlo Cottarelli and Curzio Giannini1 

    During the 1990s, the concept of “catalytic official finance” (COF) gained prominence in policy debates. The concept revolves around the idea that the propensity of investors to lend to a country increases when the IMF provides its “seal of approval”—backed up by only limited official financing—on the country’s economic program. COF aims at avoiding, on the one hand, the massive use of public money to bail out private investors and, on the other, the recourse to coercive bailing-in mechanisms. This paper concludes that COF, while possibly useful in other contexts, is less reliable when used to manage capital account crises.

    Chi non può quel che vuol, quel che può voglia2

    —Leonardo da Vinci

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