Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 4
Back Matter

Back Matter

Author(s):
International Monetary Fund
Published Date:
November 2008
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    X. Appendixes
    Appendix I Main Guidelines on Central Bank Autonomy and Accountability

    Objectives and Targets

    Price stability, as the best contribution monetary policy can make to balanced sustainable growth, is the preferable formulation for the primary objective. Consistent with this broad objective, a specific target—which could, for example, involve explicit inflation targets, maintenance of a fixed exchange rate, or monetary aggregate targets—should be established and published. These targets may be determined by the central bank (target autonomy), or determined by the government in agreement with the central bank (instrument autonomy). To facilitate accountability, the target(s) should be easy to monitor. Consideration should be given to explicit, but limited, “escape clauses” in the face of significant exogenous shocks.

    Monetary Policy

    A central bank should determine and implement monetary policy to achieve its target. To this end, the central bank should have authority to determine quantities and interest rates on its own transactions without interference from the government.

    Conflict Resolution

    A clear and open process should be established to resolve any policy conflict between the central bank and the government. Some of the aspects below (e.g., the nature of government representation on the board) are potential channels for such a resolution; another approach is to allow the government to direct or overrule the central bank, but such a power should be constrained to avoid other than exceptional use. It should be absolutely clear to the executive, legislature, and the general public that responsibility for the results lies with the government, not the central bank, if the central bank is overruled, its advice ignored, or its effectiveness is significantly limited by government policies. This may require that both the government and the central bank publish a formal statement to that extent. For instance, in cases where international reserves decline to levels insufficient to conduct international transactions due to factors outside the central bank’s control, it shall make recommendations to the government. If the government does not react within a specified period, the central bank should notify the general public that temporarily it cannot be held accountable for price stability due to factors outside its control.

    Governor

    Nomination and appointment/confirmation of the governor should be by separate bodies to provide some measure of balance, bearing in mind the institutional framework. The term should be longer than the election cycle of the body with the predominant role in selecting the governor. Dismissal should be only for breaches of qualification requirements, or misconduct; lack of performance could also be grounds if clearly defined in terms of the primary objective and specific targets. The latter could be ruled upon according to a suitable and independent judicial procedure, and perhaps be with the consent of the legislature.

    Board

    Composition of the board should ensure a reasonably well-informed and balanced view, but avoid conflicts of interest. Precisely what is reasonable depends in part on the role of the board (decision-making, monitoring, or purely advisory), and whether it is a single or multiple board structure. The highest-level board should include a majority of nonexecutive, nongovernment directors. Indeed, direct government representatives should be eliminated from a policy board and probably also from a monitoring board. If a government representative does participate in a policy board, it should at least be without the right to vote (though it might be with a limited, temporary veto power). As with the governor, nomination and appointment/confirmation should be by different bodies; terms should be longer than the election cycle of the main body in the appointment process, and should be staggered; and dismissal of board members should occur only for breaches of qualification requirements and misconduct, and on performance grounds only if clearly defined. The latter could be ruled upon according to a suitable and independent judicial procedure, and be with the other board members’ prior consent.

    Credit to Government

    If not prohibited, direct credit to the government should be carefully limited to what is consistent with monetary policy objectives and targets. For example, temporary advances and loans could be allowed only if: (i) they are explicitly limited to a small ratio of average recurrent revenue of preceding fiscal years (say, 5 percent); (ii) they bear a market-related interest rate; and ideally (iii) they are securitized by negotiable securities. The central bank should not underwrite and participate as a buyer in the primary market for government securities, except with noncompetitive bids and within the overall limit for credit to government. Indirect credit to the government, that is, buying outright existing government securities held by the market, or accepting them as collateral, should be guided by monetary policy objectives. The central bank should not finance quasi-fiscal activities.

    Exchange Rate Policy

    Basic consistency needs to be ensured between the exchange rate and monetary policy. If exchange rate policy (including choice of regime) is not solely the responsibility of the central bank, the bank should nevertheless have sufficient authority to implement monetary policy within the constraint of exchange rate policy (e.g., in a fixed exchange rate regime, to support the exchange rate as the specific target of monetary policy), and should be the principal advisor on exchange rate policy issues (e.g., as to whether the current regime is most suitable for the fundamental price stability objective). In the event of a conflict with the government on exchange rate issues, the conflict resolution procedures as stated above should come into effect.

    Financial Conditions

    The law should ensure that the central bank has sufficient financial autonomy to support policy autonomy, but with matching financial accountability. Its budget should not be subject to normal annual appropriation procedures (but could be subject to a longer-term appropriation—e.g., on a cycle consistent with the term of the governor). Only realized net profits, after prudent provisioning by the central bank and appropriate allocations to general reserves, should be returned to the government. The government should ensure the solvency of the central bank by transferring interest-bearing negotiable securities if the authorized capital is depleted. The body to which the central bank is accountable should be allowed to ask external auditors and the auditor general to review the central bank’s accounts and procedures.

    Publication and Reporting

    Policy and financial accountability should be clearly established. The central bank should prepare formal statements on monetary policy performance at, say, six-month intervals, without prior approval by the government. Regardless of to whom the bank is directly accountable, these statements should be forwarded to both the executive and the legislature and should be published for the benefit of the public. Annual financial statements audited by external auditors should similarly be forwarded and published. Summary balance sheets should be published more frequently (e.g., on a weekly or monthly basis).

    Sources: Tonny Lybek and JoAnne Morris, “Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management,” IMF Working Paper 04/226 (Washington: IMF, 2004).

    Tonny Lybek, “Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation and Output Performance in the Baltic States, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1995–97,” IMF Working Paper 99/4 (Washington: IMF, 1999), also published in 35(6) Russian and East European Finance and Trade 7 (1999).

    Appendix II The World Bank Operational Manual: Operational Policies—Dealings with De Facto Governments

    These policies were prepared for use by World Bank staff and are not necessarily a complete treatment of the subject. This OP 7.30, dated July 2001, replaces OP 7.30, dated November 1994. Questions may be addressed to the Chief Counsel, Operations Policy.

    • 1. A “de facto government” comes into, or remains in, power by means not provided for in the country’s constitution, such as a coup d’état, revolution, usurpation, abrogation or suspension of the constitution.

    • 2. A decision to make a loan1 to, or to have a loan guaranteed by, a country with a de facto government, or to continue disbursing under existing loans to or guaranteed by such country, or to provide a guarantee in respect of a project in the territories of such country,2 does not in any sense constitute Bank “approval” of the government, nor does refusal indicate “disapproval.” The Bank under its Articles is required to refrain from interfering in the political affairs of any member; moreover, its decisions may not be influenced by the political character of the member country concerned.3

    • 3. In many cases, a de facto government either suspends the constitution or abrogates it. In other instances, the constitution and other basic laws remain partially or wholly in force. In either situation, the Bank when continuing disbursements under an existing loan or making a new loan or issuing a guarantee ascertains that (a) a proper legal framework exists to secure approval of the Bank loan or the Bank guarantee and the related counter-guarantee of the country, to permit the project to be carried out, to allow the project objectives to be achieved and to allow the loan to be repaid or any required payments under the country’s counter-guarantee of the Bank guarantee to be made; and (b) all parties to the agreements with the Bank in respect of the project have taken or will be able to take all actions necessary to carry out their respective obligations under their respective agreements with the Bank. The Bank also ascertains that these obligations are or will be valid and binding.4

    Existing Operations

    • 4. The Bank may not unilaterally suspend disbursements under existing loans5 or suspend or terminate its obligations under guarantees provided by it unless there are grounds for such suspension or termination based on existing agreements. Thus, the Bank deals with a de facto government with respect to loans made by the Bank before the government assumed power, provided that:

      • (a) the Bank is satisfied that the government is in effective control of the country (an issue requiring more careful assessment when two or more political or military factions claim to be in control of the national government);

      • (b) the government generally recognizes the country’s past international obligations;

      • (c) the government states that it is willing and able to assume all of its predecessors’ obligations to the Bank;

      • (d) the government is able to ensure the continued implementation of the relevant project or program; and

      • (e) the government duly authorizes a representative for the purpose of requesting withdrawals.

    New Operations

    • 5. In considering whether to extend a new loan to a country with a de facto government, to make a new loan with the guarantee of such country, or to provide a guarantee in respect of a project in the territories of such country, the Bank first allows a certain time to pass to weigh:

      • (a) whether a new loan or guarantee would expose the Bank to additional legal or political risks associated with the country’s financial obligations and obligations to carry out the project, given the government’s de facto nature;6

      • (b) whether the government is in effective control of the country and enjoys a reasonable degree of stability and public acceptance;

      • (c) whether the government generally recognizes the country’s past international obligations, in particular any past obligations to the Bank (in this regard, the Bank examines the country’s record; one indicator is whether past governments have generally recognized the obligations incurred by the de facto governments that have preceded them);

      • (d) the number of countries (particularly neighboring) that have recognized the government or dealt with it as the government of the country; and

      • (e) the position of other international organizations toward the government.

    Notes

    “Loan” includes credits and grants; “Bank” includes International Development Association (IDA); and “project” includes an adjustment program supported under a Bank loan or guarantee.

    For information regarding Bank guarantees, see World Bank, “Operational Policies—Guarantees,” OP 14.25, June 2002.

    See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, Article IV, Section 10, and IDA Articles of Agreement, Article V, Section 6.

    The issues addressed in this OP may arise in the context of a country emerging from conflict. For a general discussion of the Bank’s assistance to countries emerging from conflict, see World Bank, “Operational Policies—Development Assistance and Conflict,” OP 2.30, January 2001.

    See World Bank, “Operational Policies—Suspension of Disbursements,” OP 13.40, February 1996.

    Agreements between the Bank and its members are governed by international law. International law also prescribes certain principles with respect to de facto governments. Under a general but not unqualified principle of international law, obligations entered into by de facto governments, purporting to be binding on the state, must be honored by successor governments. The qualifications of the general principle may relate to the nature of both the de facto government and the obligation it entered into. For instance, a successor government may question the power of a de facto government that had characterized itself as an interim government to enter into long-term obligations not connected with the immediate needs of the country concerned.

    Appendix III Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism

    I. Objectives

    The objective of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) is to provide a framework that strengthens incentives for a sovereign and its creditors to reach a rapid and collaborative agreement on a restructuring of unsustainable debt in a manner that preserves the economic value of assets and facilitates a return to medium-term viability, thereby reducing the cost of the restructuring process. In order for the SDRM to achieve these objectives, it must be a part of a general effort to strengthen the framework for crisis prevention and resolution, including the policies on lending into arrears and on exceptional access to IMF resources.

    II. Principles

    The design of the SDRM would be guided by the following principles:

    • The mechanism should only be used to restructure debt that is judged to be unsustainable by the debtor. It should neither increase the likelihood of restructuring nor encourage defaults.

    • In circumstances where a member’s debt is unsustainable, the mechanism should be designed to catalyze a rapid restructuring, both in terms of when it is initiated and, once initiated, when it is completed.

    • Any interference with contractual relations should be limited to those measures that are needed to resolve the most important collective action problems.

    • The framework should be designed in a manner that promotes greater transparency in the restructuring process.

    • The mechanism should encourage early and active creditor participation during the restructuring process.

    • The mechanism should not interfere with the sovereignty of debtors.

    • The framework should establish incentives for negotiation—not a detailed blue print for restructuring.

    • The framework needs to be sufficiently flexible—and simple—to accommodate the operation and evolution of capital markets.

    • Since the framework is intended to fill a gap within the existing financial architecture, it should not displace existing statutory frameworks.

    • The integrity of the decision making process under the mechanism should be safeguarded by an efficient and impartial dispute resolution process.

    • The formal role of the IMF under the SDRM should be limited.

    III. Scope of Claims

    • (a) While the mechanism would identify the scope of claims that could potentially be subject to a restructuring (“eligible claims”), whether all or some of these claims would be restructured in a particular case would be determined by the debtor, in light of negotiations with its creditors.

    • (b) For purposes of the mechanism, and subject to (c) below, eligible claims would be limited to rights to receive payments from the specified debtor (as defined in the mechanism): (i) that arise from a contract relating to commercial activities of the specified debtor and (ii) that are neither governed by the laws of the member activating the SDRM, nor subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal located within the territory of that member. Eligible claims would also include claims for payment of judgments resulting from a right to receive payments under a contract that meets criterion (i) above, if the enforcement of such judgment is sought outside of the territory of the member activating the SDRM.

    • (c) For purposes of the mechanism, a specified debtor would comprise the central government of the member activating the mechanism and, subject to consent of the debtor in question, could also include (i) the central bank or similar monetary authority of the member and (ii) any local governments or public entities within the territory of the activating member that are not subject to a domestic statutory debt restructuring framework.

      • (d) Notwithstanding the above, eligible claims would exclude:

      • (i) Claims that benefit from a statutory, judicial or contractual privilege, to the extent of the value of such a privilege unless such a privilege (A) was created after activation and (B) arises from legal enforcement proceedings against a specified debtor;

      • (ii) Guarantees or sureties, unless the underlying claim benefiting from such a guarantee or surety is in default;

      • (iii) Wages, salaries and pensions;

      • (iv) Contingent claims that are not due and payable, unless such contingent claim possesses a market value;

      • (v) Claims held by international organizations that are specified in the amendment.1 (The amendment would authorize the Board of Governors, by an eighty-five percent majority of the total voting power, to amend the initial list of such organizations and claims); and

      • [(vi) Claims held by foreign governments or qualified governmental agencies.]2

    IV. Activation

    Consistent with the principle of sovereignty, the mechanism could only be activated at the initiative of the member whose debt is to be restructured. When activating the mechanism, the member would represent that the debt to be restructured was unsustainable. For purposes of the legal effectiveness of activation, this representation would not be subject to challenge.

    V. Provision of Information

    Upon activation, a procedure would unfold that would require the activating member to provide all information regarding its indebtedness and the indebtedness of all specified debtors (including debt that will not be restructured under the SDRM) to the Dispute Resolution Forum (DRF). The activating member would be expected to present the following information:

    • (i) a list of claims for which restructuring is sought under the SDRM (“SDRM Restructuring List”);

    • (ii) a list of claims for which restructuring is sought outside of the SDRM (“Non-SDRM Restructuring List”); and

    • (iii) a list of claims for which no restructuring is sought.

    Such information shall be published by the DRF. Upon notification to the DRF, a debtor may also modify these lists during the restructuring process.

    VI. Registration and Verification of Claims

    Once the activating member provides the above-mentioned information, a registration and verification process would take place that would enable creditors to be in a position to vote on an aggregated basis for each specified debtor. Only those creditors whose claims are included on a SDRM Restructuring List and who wish to participate in the voting would have to register. Creditors whose claims are on a SDRM Restructuring List, but who fail to register within the specified period would not be entitled to vote, but their claims would be restructured on the terms approved by the required majority of holders of verified claims (“verified claims”). Claims would be considered verified unless challenged. The DRF would have the responsibility for adopting rules regarding the registration and verification process, with the objective of safeguarding the overall integrity and transparency of the process on the one hand, and preserving asset values through a timely process, on the other hand.

    VII. Limits on Creditor Enforcement

    • (a) When, after the date of activation but prior to the certification of a restructuring agreement, a holder of a claim that appears on a SDRM restructuring list has recovered amounts due on the claim through legal proceedings (enforcing creditor), the claim of the enforcing creditor shall be restructured as follows: (i) first, the percentage of reduction offered to all other claims in the same class will be calculated with respect to the claim of the enforcing creditors on the basis of the value of the claim at the time of activation (the notional restructured amount); and (ii) second, the amount recovered through post-activation legal proceedings shall be deducted from the notional restructured amount.

    • (b) Upon the request of an activating member and the approval by creditors holding 75 percent of the outstanding principal of verified claims on a specified debtor, a temporary suspension (stay) would become effective for all enforcement proceedings brought by creditors holding claims on a SDRM Restructuring List involving that specified debtor or its assets. The period of the suspension would be as requested by the activating member and approved by the creditors.

    • (c) Upon the request of an activating member and, upon the approval of holders of verified claims on a specified debtor, the DRF will issue an order to suspend particular enforcement proceedings against a specified debtor or its assets brought by creditors holding claims on a SDRM restructuring list if, in the assessment of the DRF, the proceeding has the potential to undermine a SDRM restructuring; prior to the completion of the registration and verification process, creditor approval will be evidenced by approval of a representative creditors’ committee; thereafter, the issuance of any new order or the continued effectiveness of an existing order will require the approval of creditors holding 75 percent of outstanding principal of verified claims.

    [Although the approach set forth in Section 7 is supported by many Executive Directors, a number of Executive Directors are of the view that a general cessation of payments and a temporary automatic stay should be a feature of the mechanism.]

    VIII. Creditor Committees

    As a means of encouraging active and early creditor participation in the restructuring process, a representative creditors’ committee, if formed, would be given a role under the SDRM to address both debtor-creditor and inter-creditor issues. Consistent with best practices in this area, the debtor would bear the reasonable costs associated with the operation of these committees. The DRF would have the authority to review these costs and limit the amount recoverable from the debtor where they appear to be excessive.

    [Although the approach set forth in Section 8 is supported by many Directors, some Directors expressed the view that costs of creditors’ committees should be borne equally between the debtor and its creditors.]

    IX. General Voting Rules

    Subject to Section 11 below,3 creditor approval of proposals made by a specified debtor regarding: (i) a stay on enforcement, (ii) priority financing, and (iii) the terms of a restructuring agreement would be made by creditors holding 75 percent of the outstanding principal of verified claims. Holders of verified claims who are under the control of a debtor shall not be entitled to vote.

    X. Priority Financing

    As a means of inducing new financing, the SDRM would provide that a specified post-activation financing transaction could be excluded from the restructuring if the extension of such financing is approved by creditors of 75 percent of outstanding principal of verified claims. Where such a decision has been taken, the DRF would be precluded from certifying an agreement that restructured such excluded financing absent the consent of the creditor that had extended the financing in question.

    XI. Restructuring Agreement

    • (a) When a specified debtor proposes a restructuring agreement, it would also be required to provide information to the DRF as to how it has treated or how it intends to treat claims that are not to be restructured under the SDRM, thereby enabling holders of verified claims to make a decision regarding the sovereign’s proposal with the full knowledge of the treatment of other claims.

    • (b) Holders of verified claims would be requested to vote on a proposed restructuring agreement, except for holders of unimpaired claims. For purposes of the mechanism, a creditor would be considered unimpaired if the restructuring of the creditor’s claim was limited to a reversal of any acceleration of the claims in question, provides for the immediate payment of all outstanding interest, and no other default is continuing. Any such unimpaired claim will be deemed to be reinstated despite activation of the SDRM. A separate restructuring agreement would be proposed for each specified debtor. Once certified by the DRF, an agreement would become binding with respect to all registered claims and all claims that appeared on an SDRM Restructuring List but were not registered. Subject to the classification rules below, all holders of eligible claims would have to be offered the same restructuring terms or the same menu of terms.

    • (c) If official bilateral claims are included under the SDRM, they would be subject to mandatory classification.

    • (d) As a means of facilitating a restructuring agreement amongst creditors with different preferences, a debtor would have the option—but not the obligation—of creating different classes of registered claims. In such cases, holders of claims in different classes could be offered different terms. The approval of 75 percent of outstanding principal of verified claims in each class would be a condition for the effectiveness of the overall agreement. Classification could not be used in a manner that would result in the discriminatory treatment of similarly situated creditors.

    XII. Termination

    The SDRM procedure would terminate:

    • (i) automatically upon the certification of all restructuring agreements by the DRF;

    • (ii) by notice of termination given by the central government of the member that had activated the mechanism; or

    • (iii) by an affirmative vote of creditors holding 40 percent of the outstanding principal of verified claims (after completion of the registration and verification process).

    XIII. Dispute Resolution Forum

    • (a) The DRF would be established and organized in a manner that ensures independence, competence, diversity and impartiality. The DRF, whose operations would be financed by the IMF, would be established and organized as follows:

      • (i) First, upon the advice of international organizations (such as UNCITRAL) and professional associations with expertise in insolvency and debt restructuring matters, the Managing Director would designate a selection panel of 7–11 highly qualified judges or private practitioners.

      • (ii) Second, the selection panel would be charged with identifying 12–16 candidates that would constitute the pool from which the DRF panel would be selected when a crisis arises. Although the amendment would specify the qualification criteria (e.g., judicial experience in debt restructuring matters), the nomination process would be an open one. Once selected, this pool would be approved by the Board of Governors by an “up or down” vote. Except for the President of the DRF, all members of the pool would continue to work in their other capacities until impaneled.

      • (iii) Third, when the SDRM is activated, four members of the pool would be impaneled by the President of the DRF. One of these members would be responsible for making initial determinations. The remaining three members would constitute an appeals panel.

    • (b) The responsibilities of the DRF would be limited. It would have no authority to challenge decisions of the Executive Board or make determinations on issues relating to the sustainability of a member’s debt. Its primary functions are summarized as follows:

      • (i) Administrative Functions—this would include notification to creditors, registration of claims and the administration of the verification and voting process. It would also include the certification of decisions taken by the requisite majority of creditors.

      • (ii) Dispute Resolution—the DRF would be charged with resolving disputes that will arise during the SDRM restructuring process and would have exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes during this period. In performing this function, the DRF will be reactive: it will not initiate investigations regarding potential issues, but will merely adjudicate disputes brought by a party. While it could request the parties to provide evidence, the DRF would have no subpoena power.

      • (iii) Suspending enforcement—upon the request of the debtor and upon the approval by creditors or their representatives, the DRF may issue an order that will enjoin specific enforcement actions during the restructuring process when it determines that such enforcement actions could seriously undermine the restructuring process.

    • (c) In order to discharge the above responsibilities, the DRF would have the power to issue rules and regulations, which would enter into force unless overruled by the Board of Governors, by an eighty-five percent majority of the total voting power, within a specified period.

    XIV. Legal Basis of the SDRM and Its Consistency with Domestic Laws

    The SDRM and the DRF could be established through an amendment of the IMF’s Articles, which requires acceptance by three-fifths of the members, having eighty-five percent of the total voting power. Since the amendment will involve the establishment of new treaty obligations that will affect the rights of private parties under domestic legal systems, most countries will need to adopt legislation for acceptance of an amendment or for making the new provisions effective under their internal law. It is for each member to determine the extent to which the adoption of the SDRM would require changes in its domestic laws.

    Notes

    This Appendix has been reprinted from IMF, “Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism” (February 12, 2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2003/040803 (alterations and footnotes in original).

    If this approach is followed, the modalities for restructuring the eligible claims of international organizations that are not on the exclusion list would also need to be addressed.

    Pending outcome on discussions regarding the treatment of official bilateral claims under the SDRM.

    If official bilateral claims are included under the SDRM, they would also vote as a separate class for purposes of a stay on enforcement and priority financing.

    Biographical Sketches

    Biographical Sketches

    Fabian Amtenbrink is an Associate Professor for European Law at the University of Groningen. In addition, he was appointed as fellow at the Center for the Study of Law, Administration, and Society (CRBS). A graduate of the Freie Universität Berlin, he obtained a doctorate in law from the University of Groningen in the Netherlands, and he is a fully qualified lawyer in Germany. A commercial edition of his comparative study on the democratic accountability of the European Central Bank has been published by Hart Publishing, Oxford. He publishes frequently on issues relating to central bank governance and economic and monetary union, as well as on other aspects of European law, including a major textbook on European Union law.

    Patrick Bolton is the Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor of Business at Columbia Business School and Professor of Economics at Columbia University. He specializes in the general area of contract theory and contracting issues in corporate finance and industrial organization. A central focus of his research is on the allocation of control and decision rights to contracting parties when long-term contracts are incomplete. His work in industrial organization focuses on antitrust economics and the potential anticompetitive effects of vertical contracting practices. He is a former managing editor for The Review of Economic Studies, and current editor of The Journal of the European Economic Association. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society, the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Center for Economic Policy Research, and the European Corporate Governance Institute. Mr. Bolton received his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics in 1986 and holds a B.A. in economics from the University of Cambridge and a B.A. in political science from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris. He is the coauthor with Mathias De-watripont of Contract Theory (MIT Press, 2005) and he has co-edited with Howard Rosenthal Credit Markets for the Poor (Russell Sage Foundation, 2005).

    Jeff Breinholt received his B.A. from Yale University in 1985 and J.D. from University of California, Los Angeles in 1988. He is a member of the State Bar of California, and currently serves as the Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Section United States Department of Justice (DOJ), where he heads a team of financial prosecutors dedicated to redressing terrorist financing through criminal prosecutions. A white-collar fraud specialist, he joined the Justice Department in 1990. He is a frequent lecturer on law enforcement and intelligence topics and the author of two books, Counterterrorism Enforcement: A Lawyer’s Guide (DOJ Office of Legal Education, 2004) and Taxing Terrorism, From Al Capone to Al Qaida: Fighting Violence Through Financial Regulation (forthcoming 2006). His other recent publications include “How About a Little Perspective? The USA PATRIOT Act and the Uses and Abuses of History,” in the Texas Review of Law & Politics (Fall 2004) and “Seeking Synchronicity: Thoughts on the Role of Domestic Law Enforcement in Counterterrorism,” in the American University International Law Review (December 2005). He is a Research and Practice Associate at the Syracuse University Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism.

    Robert Peck Christen is the President of the Boulder Institute of Microfinance, whose widely-recognized Microfinance Training Program has trained over 2,000 industry leaders from 130 countries in the latest models and techniques for providing financial services to the world’s poor. Mr. Christen has worked in microfinance for 25 years in over 40 countries, most recently for 6 years as Senior Advisor to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, where he led work on agricultural microfinance, regulation, and supervision, creating transparency in the marketplace and developing microfinance in commercial banks. Mr. Christen founded the MicroBanking Bulletin, the industry financial benchmarking publication, and continues to chair its editorial board. He was a founder of the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) and the Microfinance Management Institute (MMI).

    Hector Elizalde received his law degree from the Catholic University of Chile School of Law and a master’s degree in comparative jurisprudence from New York University School of Law. He is Deputy General Counsel in the Legal Department of the International Monetary Fund.

    Mark Fajfar is a Special Counsel resident in Fried Frank’s Washington, D.C. office, where he is a member of the firm’s corporate, electronic commerce, and technology law practice groups. Mr. Fajfar concentrates his practice on matters involving corporate law, electronic financial services, information security, and e-commerce. His experience includes joint ventures, public and private financings, web-based strategic alliances, and mergers and acquisitions. Mr. Fajfar has spoken on information security and e-commerce and payment matters and coauthored articles in his practice areas for The Legal Times, American Banker, and Business Law Today. Mr. Fajfar received his J.D., magna cum laude, and his M.S.F.S., both in 1992, from Georgetown University. He received his B.A. from Washington University in 1988. He is admitted to the Bar in the District of Columbia.

    François Gianviti studied at the Sorbonne, the Paris School of Law, and New York University School of Law. He obtained a licence ès lettres from the Sorbonne in 1959. He graduated with a licence en droit from the Paris School of Law in 1960 and later obtained a diplôme d’études supérieures du droit pénal et science criminelle in 1961, a diplôme d’études supérieures de droit privé in 1962, and a doctorat d’Etat en droit in 1967. From 1967 to 1969, he was a Lecturer in Law, first at the Nancy School of Law and subsequently at the Caen School of Law. In 1969, Mr. Gianviti obtained the agrégation de droit privé et science criminelle of French universities and was appointed Professor of Law at the University of Besançon. From 1970 through 1974, he was seconded to the Legal Department of the IMF, where he served as Counsellor and, subsequently, as Senior Counsellor. In 1974, he became Professor of Law at the University of Paris XII, where he taught civil and commercial law, banking and monetary law, and private international law. He served as Dean of its School of Law from 1979 through 1985. In 1986, Mr. Gianviti was appointed Director of the Legal Department of the IMF, and from 1987 through 2004 he served as General Counsel of the IMF. He is a member of the Committee on International Monetary Law of the International Law Association and has published books on property and many articles on aspects of French and international law.

    Glenn Gottselig received his B.Comm. and LL.B. degrees from the University of Saskatchewan and an LL.M. from the University of Toronto. He also holds a D.E.A. in International Relations (Economics) from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. Currently, he is Legal Editor in the IMF Legal Department. Before joining the IMF, he worked in private practice and government in Canada and also served as consultant to other international organizations.

    Michael Gruson has been a partner of Shearman & Sterling LLP since 1973 and is now Of Counsel. Practicing in their New York and Frankfurt offices, he has been primarily engaged in the representation of European and Asian banks in the United States and in international securities transactions. He received his legal education in Germany and in the United States (1962, University of Mainz; M.C.L. 1963, Columbia University; LL.B. 1965, cum laude, Columbia University; Dr. jur. 1966, Freie Universität Berlin). Mr. Gruson is a past Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Banking Law and past Chairman of the Subcommittee on Legal Opinions of the Committee on Banking Law, and a past member of the Council of the Section on Business Law of the International Bar Association. He is a member of the Committee on International Monetary Law, Honorary Treasurer of the American Branch of the International Law Association, and a member of the American Law Institute. He has served as a lecturer or visiting professor at various law schools, including the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Columbia University School of Law, the University of Osnabrück, Germany, and Bucerius Law School, Germany, and currently is Visiting Professor at the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, University of London. He is the author or coauthor of a number of books dealing with international banking and the regulation of international financial transactions. Mr. Gruson is also author of many articles on issues of conflict of laws, legal opinions, monetary law, and U.S. and European banking and securities law and has frequently lectured on these topics.

    Anne-Marie Gulde-Wolf is currently an Advisor in the African Department of the IMF, having previously held positions in the Monetary and Financial Systems Department and the European Department. She studied international economics with minors in international law and politics in Tuebingen, Kiel, St. Louis, and Geneva and obtained an M.A. (Economics) from Washington University in 1982 and a Ph.D. (International Economics) from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in 1989. She has written and published extensively on exchange rates and on financial sector issues, and has led financial sector assessments in industrial and developing countries.

    Sean Hagan is General Counsel and Director of the Legal Department of the IMF. Prior to beginning work at the IMF in 1990, Mr. Hagan was in private practice, first in the New York office of Whitman Breed Abbot and Morgan (1986–87) and subsequently in Tokyo at Masuda & Ejiri (1987–90). Mr. Hagan received his J.D. from the Georgetown Law Center (1986) and also holds a master of science in politics of the world economy from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He received his undergraduate degree from the University of London (King’s College).

    Paul Hilbers studied mathematics and econometrics and received his Ph.D. in international economics from the Free University Amsterdam in 1986. He was Assistant Professor at the Free University and subsequently joined the Netherlands Bank. He moved to the IMF in 1996, where he was Deputy Chief of the Financial Systems Surveillance Division and Area Manager for Europe in the Monetary and Financial Systems Department. He joined the Fund’s European Department as an Advisor in the beginning of 2005. He has published extensively on monetary and financial issues.

    Michael H. Krimminger is Senior Policy Advisor to the Director of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) Division of Resolutions and Receiverships, where he is responsible for analysis of banking industry innovations and development of responsive resolution policies to assist the FDIC in resolving failing insured banks and thrifts. Mr. Krimminger focuses principally on contingency planning for resolutions and receiverships, international and large bank resolution issues, financial modernization, payment systems, risk management, derivative and similar financial contracts, and related issues. He also served as Senior Policy Analyst with the FDIC’s Office of Policy Development. Prior to joining that Office, Mr. Krimminger was Acting Assistant General Counsel and Senior Counsel in the Legal Division’s Closed Bank Litigation and Policy Section, which coordinated and developed FDIC legal policies on litigation, bankruptcy, and related receivership issues. Before working with the FDIC, he practiced banking law and litigation in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. Mr. Krimminger is a graduate of the University of North Carolina and received his J.D., with Distinction, from Duke University School of Law. Mr. Krimminger has published several analyses of insolvency issues.

    Nadim Kyriakos-Saad is a Senior Counsel at the IMF and deputy head of the anti–money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) group in the Legal Department. Mr. Kyriakos-Saad specializes in AML/CFT issues, contributing to the design of the IMF’s policy on money laundering and terrorism finance. He has carried out a number of country assessments and technical assistance missions in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Kyriakos-Saad graduated in private law and public law as well as in political science from Saint-Joseph University in Beirut. He holds an LL.M. in international business law and corporate law from Columbia University. He practiced law from 1988 to 1992 at Bahige Tabbarah Law Offices in Beirut and from 1993 to 1998 at Baker & McKenzie in Riyadh. He joined the IMF’s Legal Department in 1998.

    Ross Leckow is Assistant General Counsel in the Legal Department of the IMF. He is presently responsible for the Legal Department’s work in the areas of legal reform and technical assistance in the financial sector, including central banking, banking supervision, bank insolvency, and payments systems. He lectures frequently on issues of international financial law in the United States and abroad. Before joining the IMF in 1990, Mr. Leckow was Legal Counsel with the Export Development Corporation in Ottawa, Canada. Mr. Leckow’s most recent publications include “Law Reform and Financial Stability—the Growing Role of the International Monetary Fund,” in Reconciling Law, Justice and Politics in the International Arena (2004); “Conditionality in the International Monetary Fund,” in Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 3 (2005); and “Bringing the Disenfranchised to the Table: The Lessons of Conditionality,” in The Measure of International Law: Effectiveness, Fairness and Validity (2004).

    Daniel S. Lev took his B.A. degree at Miami University in Ohio in 1955, and his Ph.D. in political science at Cornell University in 1964. A specialist in comparative politics, his research has been primarily in Indonesia and Malaysia, emphasizing the political bases of legal institutions, political change, and Islamic legal institutions.

    Tonny Lybek, a Danish national, is a Senior Economist in the Monetary and Financial Systems Department (MFD) of the IMF. He graduated from Århus University in 1986. After a year of teaching, he joined the Danish Central Bank, where he worked in the Foreign Department (managing international reserves) and the Monetary Policy Department. In 1992 he joined the IMF, where he has worked in the Fiscal Affairs Department, European II Department, and MFD. He specializes in central bank legislation and payment systems, but covers a broad range of financial sector issues.

    Timothy Lyman joined the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) full time in 2005 following many years advising CGAP and various CGAP members on legal and regulatory policy issues in a consulting capacity. He is a co-author of CGAP’s Guiding Principles on Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance. He has worked in community development for over 20 years in the United States and internationally, during much of this time as a partner of the law firm Day, Berry & Howard and president of its affiliated philanthropic foundation, the Day, Berry & Howard Foundation, and, from 1994 to 2005, as principal outside legal counsel to Save the Children/U.S. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Harvard University and a law degree from New York University School of Law.

    Samuel Munzele Maimbo is a Senior Financial Sector Specialist in the World Bank’s South Asia Finance and Private Sector Unit. Since the mid-1990s he has focused on financial sector reforms in developing, emerging, and conflict-afflicted countries. Specific areas of interest have included central and commercial banking reforms, rural finance, microfinance, housing finance, and recently migrant labor remittances, and his publications are reflective of these areas. A Rhodes Scholar, Mr. Maimbo obtained a Ph.D. in Public Administration from the Institute for Development Policy and Management at the University of Manchester, England in 2001; an MBA (Finance) degree from the University of Nottingham, England in 1998; and a bachelor of accountancy degree (with Distinction) from the Copperbelt University, Zambia in 1994. He is also a Fellow of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (FCCA), United Kingdom and a Fellow of the Zambia Institute of Certified Accountants (ZICA).

    Ramanand Mundkur is Counsel in the Legal Department of the IMF. Prior to joining the IMF, Mr. Mundkur worked with the United Nations Compensation Commission in Switzerland and with Arthur Andersen & Co. SC in India. He received B.A. and LL.B. (Honors) degrees from the National Law School of India University in 1994 and an LL.M. degree (with an international finance concentration) from Harvard Law School in 2002. Mr. Mundkur has taught as visiting faculty at the National University of Juridical Sciences in India and published articles on international law.

    Ceda Ogada joined the Legal Department of the IMF as Counsel in 1999 and is currently Senior Counsel in the department, having served previously as Counsel until 2002. Prior to joining the IMF, he held positions with private law firms as well as with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Mr. Ogada holds a B.A. from Dartmouth College and a J.D. from Harvard University.

    Cheong-Ann Png has been Consulting Counsel with the Legal Department of the IMF since 2002, where he has worked on a range of anti–money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism matters, including undertaking and reviewing country assessments and providing technical assistance. Prior to this, he was a solicitor in an international law firm in London, where he specialized in mergers and acquisitions and corporate finance. Mr. Png read law at London University where he obtained LL.B. and Ph.D. degrees and has been admitted to practice both in the United Kingdom and in Singapore.

    Anita Ramasastry has been an Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Shidler Center for Law, Commerce, and Technology at the University of Washington in Seattle since 1996. She previously served as a staff attorney at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, an associate at the law firm of White & Case in Budapest, and an Assistant Professor of Law at the Central European University in Budapest. Professor Ramasastry’s research interests include commercial law, banking and payments systems, and law and development. She has been a visiting professor and Atlantic Fellow in Public Policy at the Center for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary Westfield College, University of London and a visiting scholar at the British Financial Services Authority. She was a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School from 2001 to 2003. Professor Ramasastry is a commissioner on the Washington State delegation to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. She is also the official reporter for the Uniform Money Services Act.

    Richard Rosenberg is Senior Advisor at the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a consortium located in the World Bank of 29 international agencies that support microfinance. After taking his law degree at Harvard, he practiced law in Chicago, and then managed an investment portfolio in Washington. In 1983 he joined the United States Agency for International Development, where he specialized in issues of development finance in Latin America and elsewhere. He has worked with two dozen microfinance institutions, as funder or consultant. He is a core faculty member of the annual Microfinance Training at the International Labor Organization training center in Turin, where he teaches microfinance regulation topics to central bankers. At CGAP, he has been author or coauthor of numerous publications, including a format for appraising microfinance institutions, an audit handbook, policy papers on regulation and supervision of microfinance, and shorter studies on delinquency measurement and interest rates.

    Pierre L. Siklos is Professor of Economics at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, and Director of its Viessmann Centre for the Study of Modern Europe. He is the author of several books, including one on the Hungarian hyperinflation of 1945–46 (Macmillan), The Changing Face of Central Banking (Cambridge, 2002), and Deflation (Cambridge, 2004), the leading textbook on money and banking in Canada, which was co-edited with Richard Burdekin. He has also published numerous articles in leading publications such as the Journal of Econometrics, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Economic Inquiry, and Journal of International Money and Finance, to name a few. Professor Siklos has served as a Visiting Professor at Oxford and the University of California, San Diego, and was an Erskine Fellow at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. In 2000–2001 he was Wilfrid Laurier University’s University Research Professor.

    David A. Skeel, Jr., is the S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. He has written extensively on sovereign debt issues, and is the author of Icarus in the Boardroom: The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate America and Where They Came From (Oxford University Press, 2005); and Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (Princeton University Press, 2001). Professor Skeel has also written commentaries for the New York Times, Financial Times, International Financial Law Review, Los Angeles Times, and a variety of other publications.

    Shinji Takagi is Advisor in the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF. He is currently on leave of absence from Osaka University, where he has been Associate Professor (1990–95) and Professor (1995–present) in the Faculty of Economics. After obtaining his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Rochester in 1983, Mr. Takagi’s first professional appointment was with the IMF, where he worked in the Middle Eastern, Asian, and Research Departments for five years (1983–87, 1989–90) before returning to Japan. He has held numerous professional appointments over the years, including Economist, Bank of Japan (1987–89); Senior Economist, Japanese Ministry of Finance (1992–94); Visiting Scholar, Asian Development Bank Institute (1999–2000); Consultant, World Bank (2000–01); and Visiting Professor of Economics, Yale University (2000–01). Mr. Takagi is the author of over 60 professional publications, and his articles have appeared in such international journals or series as International Economic Review; Journal of Money, Credit and Banking; American Economic Review; International Monetary Fund Staff Papers; Asian Development Review; Journal of Banking and Finance; World Development; Journal of International Development; Princeton Essays in International Finance; and the Review of Economics and Statistics. He serves on the editorial boards of the Journal of Banking and Finance and the International Journal of Finance and Economics.

    Jean-François Thony is Assistant General Counsel at the IMF. Mr. Thony served in the French Judiciary as Examining Judge (juge d’instruction), Deputy Prosecutor (substitut du procureur), and Chief Prosecutor (procureur de la République) before joining the United Nations International Drug Control Programme in early 1991 as Senior Legal Adviser and later Programme Manager of the United Nations Global Program Against Money Laundering. In July 2000, he was appointed as Judge, Court of Appeal of Versailles (France). He joined the International Monetary Fund in July 2002 to serve as Assistant General Counsel in charge of anti–money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism issues. He has published several studies and research papers on the issue of money laundering.

    Lynn Turner served as the Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from his appointment by the SEC Chairman in July 1998 to August 2001. As Chief Accountant, Mr. Turner was the principal advisor to the SEC Chairman and Commission on financial reporting and disclosure by public companies in the U.S. capital markets as well as the related corporate governance matters. Mr. Turner is currently the Managing Director of Research at Glass Lewis & Co. Mr. Turner joined the faculty of Colorado State University where he was a Professor of Accounting and the Director of the Center for Quality Financial Reporting in the College of Business from 2001 to 2004. From June 1996 to June 1998, Mr. Turner was the Chief Financial Officer and Vice President of Symbios, Inc., an international semiconductor and storage manufacturer, where he was responsible for the company’s financial and management reporting, risk management, and budgeting processes. Before joining Sym-bios, Mr. Turner was a partner with Coopers & Lybrand (now PricewaterhouseCoopers), serving as one of the firm’s national SEC review partners. Mr. Turner has received honorary doctorates in business administration from Central Michigan University and Grand Valley State University.

    Eugene N. White is Professor of Economics at Rutgers University and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Most recently, he completed Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry: What Should We Do About Them? (ICMB/CEPR, 2003) with Andrew Crockett, Trevor Harris, and Frederic Mishkin. He has written extensively on stock market booms and crashes, deposit insurance, banking regulation, and war finance. Currently, he is engaged in a study comparing the evolution of the microstructure of the New York, London, and Paris stock exchanges.

    Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., is a Professor of Law at George Washington University (GWU), in Washington, D.C. He received his B.A. degree from Yale University and his J.D. degree from Harvard University. He has written numerous articles on banking law and regulation, and he is the coauthor of a book on corporate law. Before joining GWU’s law faculty in 1986, he was a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. He has appeared as counsel in leading banking cases in the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts. He has testified on issues involving bank regulation before committees of the U.S. Congress and the California legislature. He is a member of the International Editorial Board of the Journal of International Banking Regulation (Henry Stewart Publications, London).

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