Back Matter

Back Matter

Editor(s):
Carlo Cottarelli, and Martine Guerguil
Published Date:
December 2014
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    Index

    Note: Page numbers with f, t, b, and p indicate figures, tables, boxes and panels respectively.

    • accountability processes 141–3

    • accounts, consolidation of 141–2

    • alternative financing vehicles, cost of 210–11

    • Andersson, L. 64, 64t

    • Argentina 2; breach of constraint corrective actions 123 ζ central/ subnational government gross debt of 1621, 165p; corporate income tax, features of 44t; direct federal loans to states in 169t; education spending by 26f, 49 t; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 183–4; fiscal balances in 166p; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; fiscal responsibility laws (FRLs) in 141b; Fiscal Solvency Law of 108–9; indirect public loans to states 170t; information on 3t; infrastructure spending by 52t; institutional constraints on 951, 119ζ PIT tax, features of 45 ζ public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; social protection centralization 51t; stat< debt by holders in 171 p; subnational financing framework overview 159t; subnational fiscal crises in 199t, 204f; tax arrangements in 41 t; tax revenue by government levels in 19f, 39–40t; tax revenue structure of 20f; VAT/sales tax arrangements, features of 46t

    • auditing 142–3

    • Australia 2; balanced budget rules and 7; breach of constraint corrective actions 123t; central government spending by 23–4 f; central/subnational government gross debt of 162t, 165p; corporate income tax in, features of 44t; direct federal loans to states in 169t; education spending by 26f, 49t; expenditure financing decomposition 32f; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 184–5; fiscal balances in 166p; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; fiscal responsibility laws (FRLs) in 141b; fiscal transfers in, magnitude of 67, 68f; health care decentralization/harmonization 47t; information on 3t; infrastructure spending by 28–9f, 52t; institutional constraints on 95t, 119t PIT tax, features of 45t; public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; redistribution through fiscal transfers in 73f, 75t, 80t, 86–7; social protection centralization 51 t; subnational financing framework overview 159t; subnational fiscal crises in 200t, 203f, 204f; tax arrangements in 41 t; tax revenue by government levels in 19f, 39–40t; tax revenue structure of 20f; transfers and vertical fiscal imbalance 31 f; VAT/sales tax arrangements, features of 46t

    • Australian Commonwealth Grants Commission 147

    • Austria 2; breach of constraint corrective actions 123t; central government spending by 23–4f; central/subnational government gross debt of 162t, 165p; consolidation of accounts in 142b; credit rating in 175f; debt allocation/ tax capacity of 160f; debt management agency of 9; direct federal loans to states in 169t; education spending by 26f; expenditure financing decomposition 32f; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 185; fiscal balances in 166p; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; fiscal responsibility laws (FRLs) in 141 b; information on 3t; infrastructure spending by 28–9f; institutional constraints on 95t, 119t; public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; social protection centralization 51 t; sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, change in 229f; subnational financing framework overview 159t; tax revenue by government levels in 19f, 39–40t; tax revenue structure of 20f; transfers and vertical fiscal imbalance 31 f

    • Austrian Stability Program 7

    • Autonomous Communities’ Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy 145

    • Bayoumi, T. 62, 64t, 65, 66, 71, 74–5, 74t, 76, 84–5

    • Belgium 2; breach of constraint corrective actions 123–4t; central government spending by 23–4f; central/subnational government gross debt of 162t, 165p; corporate income tax in, features of 44t; credit rating in 175f; debt allocation/tax capacity of 160f; education spending by 26f, 49t; expenditure financing decomposition 32f; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 185–6; fiscal balances in 166p; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; fiscal responsibility laws (FRLs) in 141 b; health care decentralization/harmonization 47t; High Fiscal Council of Finance (HFCF) and 110–11, 111f; information on 3 t; infrastructure spending by 28–9f, 52t; institutional constraints on 95t, 120t; PIT tax, features of 45t; public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; social protection centralization 51 t; sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, change in 229f; subnational financing framework overview 159t; tax arrangements in 41 t; tax revenue by government levels in 19f, 39–40t; tax revenue structure of 20f; transfers and vertical fiscal imbalance 31 f; VAT/ sales tax arrangements, features of 46t; vertical imbalances in 5

    • Blue-Red bond scheme 180b

    • Bohn, H. 106

    • borrowing constraints 214–15

    • Brazil 2; breach of constraint corrective actions 124t; central/subnational government gross debt of 162t, 165p; consolidation of accounts in 142b; corporate income tax in, features of 44t; education spending by 26f, 49t; expenditure financing decomposition 32f; federalizing of state debts in 209–10b; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 186; fiscal balances in 166p; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; fiscal responsibility laws (FRLs) in 93b, 140b; indirect public loans to states 170t; information on 3t; infrastructure spending by 52t; institutional constraints on 95t, 107, 120t; PIT tax, features of 45t; public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; social protection centralization 51 t; state debt by holders in 171 p; subnational financing framework overview 159t; subnational fiscal crises in 200t, 204f; subnational net debt in 108f, 215f; tax arrangements in 421; tax revenue by government levels in 19f, 39–40t; tax revenue structure of 20f; transfers and vertical fiscal imbalance 31f; VAT/sales tax arrangements, features of 46t

    • Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law 140b

    • budgetary functions, distribution of 13–56; described 13; European Union (EU) budget 33–6; expenditure policies 22–9, 37, 47–54t; introduction 13–14; revenue responsibilities 14–22, 36–7; tax arrangements, features of 41–6t; tax revenues by levels of government 39–40t; transfers 29–30, 32–3, 38; vertical fiscal imbalances (VFI) 30–2, 38

    • budget classifications, use of common 148–50

    • budget execution 140–1

    • budget formulation 136–9; macroeconomic/fiscal projections 138–9; medium-and long-term fiscal objectives 136–8

    • Budget Stability Law (Spain) 108

    • Cabasés, F. 107

    • Canada 2; balanced budget rules and 7; breach of constraint corrective actions 125 t; central government spending by 23–4f; central/subnational government gross debt of 162–3t, 165p; corporate income tax in, features of 44t; credit rating in 175f; debt allocation/ tax capacity of 160f; direct federal loans to states in 169t; education spending by 26f, 49t; expenditure financing decomposition 32f; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 186–7; fiscal balances in 166p; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; fiscal transfers in, magnitude of 67, 69f; health care decentralization/ harmonization 47t; information on 3t; infrastructure spending by 28–9f, 52t; institutional constraints on 95t, 120t; PIT tax, features of 45t; public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; redistribution and risk-sharing studies of 64t; redistribution through fiscal transfers in 73f, 75t, 79–80t, 86–7; social protection centralization 51t; state government ratings in 176f; subnational financing framework overview 159t; tax allocation system in 17; tax arrangements in 42t; tax revenue by government levels in 19f, 39–40t; tax revenue structure of 20f; transfers and vertical fiscal imbalance 31 f; VAT/ sales tax arrangements, features of 46t; vertical imbalances in 5; yield spreads on government bonds 178f

    • central and subnational governments, financing of 158–91; country case studies 183–91; debt and fiscal imbalances, allocation of 158, 160, 160f, 161f; in European Union (EU) 178–81, 180–1 b; financing linkages between 160, 165–6, 167–8t, 169–70t, 169–72, 171p, 172b; instruments and costs of 172–7, 173–4f, 175f, 176f, 178f; introduction to 158; overview of, across countries 159t

    • central budget: centralization and 4; European Union (EU) 34–5; fiscal transfers and 60; as insurance against macroeconomic shocks 61–3; risk-sharing and 6; roles of 11; size of 233

    • central government: defined 2; financing of, through taxes 4–5; vertical transfers by 5–6

    • centralization: central budget and 4; of consumption taxes 4–5; of corporate/ personal income taxes 4, 16; of custom duties 22; debt/fiscal balances and 158–60, 159t, 160f; of expenditure policies 22–9; of financial transaction taxes (FTTs) 16; stabilization/risk-sharing and 62–3

    • centralized fiscal policies

    • centralized fiscal policies, role of, in federations 2, 4–6

    • central to subnational government financial support 207–9, 209–10b; direct federal loans and 208–9; emergency federal transfers and 209; federal guarantees and 207; indirect financing through banks and 207–8

    • central transfers: macroeconomic shocks and 5–6; for redistribution 5

    • Charter of Budget Honesty 140b

    • Clemens, J. 106

    • Cohesion Fund 34

    • common shocks 60, 63

    • conditionality, fiscal crises resolution and 211–14; absence of 211; direct administrative controls 212, 213–14b; enforcement of 212, 214; policy 211–12

    • constraints see subnational fiscal policy, constraints on

    • consumption-smoothing 61

    • cooperative approaches 96

    • coordination, institutional arrangements for 143–8

    • coordination failure, subnational fiscal policy constraints and 91–2

    • corporate income tax (CIT) 16, 18; features of 44t

    • corrective actions 101; defined 100

    • country-specific growth shocks: consequences of 227; correction measures 227–9, 228f; lessons learned from 225–30; prevalence of 225–7, 226f; risk sharing and 234–42, 236f, 237–8f, 240f; sovereign CDS spreads and 229–30, 229–30f

    • crises resolution mechanisms 204–11; alternative financing costs 210–11; financial support from central to subnational level 207–9, 209–10b; preset crisis resolution frameworks 205, 206–7b; state debt restructuring 205

    • crisis resolution frameworks 205, 206–7b

    • cross-border credit markets 234–5

    • custom duties 22

    • decentralization: in education policies 26, 49–50t; financial activity taxes (FATs) and 22; fiscal efficiency and 13; fiscal federalism theory and 23–4, 23–4f; health care policy and 25, 47–8t; infrastructure spending 52–4t; spending vs. revenue 29–32; of tax powers 14–17; top-down model of 92

    • decentralized fiscal policies 6

    • Decressin, J. 64t, 65

    • deficit bias 91, 91 b; subnational fiscal policy constraints and 91

    • direct administrative controls 212, 213–14b

    • direct controls 96

    • direct financing 179

    • early warning systems 90

    • Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) 151

    • education spending 25–6, 49–50t

    • enforcement mechanisms, EU 105

    • euro area budget 242

    • euro area fiscal crisis, lessons from 10–11, 224–50; country-specific growth shocks and 225–30, 226f, 228f, 229–30f; fiscal discipline, proper incentives for 231–2; gaps exposed by 225–30; government failures and, addressing 230–1; introduction to 224–5; mitigating contagion 242–4; pros/cons, further fiscal integration 244–8, 246t, 247f; risk reduction and 230–4; risk sharing and 234–42, 236f, 237–8f, 240f, 249–50; transitional considerations 232–4

    • euro area fiscal crisis, response to 216–19; financial support mechanisms 216–18, 217t; fiscal framework 218–19

    • Euro-bills 180b

    • European Commission 32

    • European Debt Agency (EDA) 180 b

    • European Economic Community (EEC) 33

    • European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 216

    • European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) 216

    • European Safe Bonds (ESBies) 180–1 b

    • European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 216–17, 218, 232

    • European Union (EU) 1; budget 33–6; central budget 34–5; centralized borrowing proposals in 180–1 b; fiscal and budgetary management practices of 150–2; harmonization and 8–9; public financial management (PFM) requirements 135t; spending policies of 35, 36f; supranational financing arrangements in 178–81; supranational rule framework 101–5, 116–18

    • European Union (EU) budget 33–6; history of 33–4; revenues of 34–5; spending policies of 35, 36f

    • European Union (EU) supranational rule framework 101–5, 116–18; enforcement mechanisms of 105; expenditure benchmarks 117; features of 103–5, 104f; medium-term objectives (MTO) 117; multi-step approach with 104f; number of countries with constraints 102 f; sixty percent debt rule 117; structural balance rule 118; three percent budget balance rule 116; types of constraints 101–3

    • ex ante constraints 90, 106, 152–3, 219, 227, 229, 234

    • Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) 116

    • expenditure benchmarks 117

    • expenditure policies, centralization/ harmonization of 22–9; education 25–6, 49–50t; health care 25, 47–8t; infrastructure spending 27–9, 52–4t; social protection 26–7, 51 t; spending responsibilities, distribution of 22–4

    • Eyraud, L. 32

    • Federal Council of Fiscal Responsibility 146

    • federal government: core functions of 2, 4; defined 2

    • federations: study samples of 2, 3t; tax and spending in 2–6

    • Feld, L. A. 177

    • Finance Commission of India 147

    • financial activity taxes (FATs) 22

    • financial management tools 8

    • financial sector taxation 22

    • financial transaction taxes (FTTs) 16, 22

    • Finland, sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, change in 229f

    • fiscal aggregate, constraints and 97–100, 98t

    • fiscal and budgetary management, soundness of: accountability processes for 141–3; budget execution 140–1; budget formulation 136–9; common budget classifications and 148–50; coordination and 143–8; European Union (EU) practices of 150–2; features of 134, 134f; framework for 133–6, 134f; institutional arrangements/ standards for 134–6

    • fiscal autonomy (FA), constraints and 93–4, 93f

    • Fiscal Coordination Law 146

    • fiscal crises resolution mechanisms 204–11; central government financial support as 207–9, 209–10b; cost of alternative financing as 210–11; overview of 204–5; pre-set crisis resolution frameworks as 205, 206–7b; state debt restructuring as 205

    • fiscal federalism, tax administration and 15b

    • fiscal framework, strengthening 215–16

    • fiscal indicators 139

    • fiscal responsibility laws (FRLs) 140–1 b

    • fiscal risk sharing arrangements 235

    • fiscal rules: constraints and 94–6; cooperative approach to 96; direct controls and 96; distribution of, in EU federations 99f, 101–5; imposed by center vs. direct controls 114; origin of 95f; presence of 94–5, 95t

    • Fiscal Solvency Law (Argentina) 108

    • fiscal spillovers 62

    • fiscal transfers: magnitude of 68–70f; roles of 60

    • fiscal transfers, to smooth regional shocks 60–87; Bayoumi and Masson two-step approach 84–5; central budget to enhance insurance against 61–3; data description/sources used 67, 68–70f, 71, 86–7; design issues with 62; empirical approaches used 83–5; estimates based on equation 71, 72–3f, 74–6, 74t, 75t; individual components role in 77–81, 79–80t; interstate trade spillovers and 62; introduction to 60–1; moral hazard issues with 62–3; one-step estimation method for 66–7; redistribution and risk-sharing in 63–5, 64t; Ricardian households and 62; risk-sharing and 61; Sachs and Sala-i-Martin approach 83–4; scale economies and 61–2; study findings 81–2; Von Hagen two-step approach 84

    • Follette, G. 106

    • Forum of Federations 2

    • France: redistribution and risk-sharing studies of 64t; sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, change in 229f

    • Friedman, M. 61

    • general government, defined 2

    • Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 149

    • Germany 2; breach of constraint corrective actions 125t; central government spending by 23–4f; central/subnational government gross debt of 163t, 165p; corporate income tax in, features of 44t; credit rating in 175f; debt allocation/ tax capacity of 160f; direct federal loans to states in 169t; education spending by 26f, 49t; expenditure financing decomposition 32f; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 187; fiscal balances in 166p; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; fiscal responsibility laws (FRLs) in 141 b; health care decentralization/harmonization 47t; information on 3t; infrastructure spending by 28–9f, 53t; institutional constraints on 95t, 120t; PIT tax, features of 45t; public debt composition in 172b; public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; social protection centralization 51 t; sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, change in 229f; state debt by holders in 171 p; state government ratings in 176f; subnational debt in 110, 110f; subnational financing framework overview 159t; subnational fiscal crises in 201t, 204f; tax arrangements in 42t; tax revenue by government levels in 19f, 39–40t; tax revenue structure of 20f; transfers and vertical fiscal imbalance 31 f; VAT/sales tax arrangements, features of 46t; yield spreads on government bonds 178f

    • Goodhart, C. 64–5, 64t, 76

    • Goods and Services Tax (GST) 21

    • Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 149

    • Great Depression 4

    • Great Recession 1

    • harmonization 8; limitations of 17b

    • Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) 21

    • health care: decentralization/harmonization of 47–8t; spending 25

    • High Council of Finance 145

    • High Fiscal Council of Finance (HFCF) 110–11

    • horizontal spillovers, subnational fiscal policy and 91 b

    • idiosyncratic macroeconomic shocks 60, 63

    • income convergence 77

    • India 2; breach of constraint corrective actions 126t; central/subnational government gross debt of 163t, 165p; consolidation of accounts in 142b; corporate income tax in, features of 44t; debt allocation/tax capacity of 160 f; direct federal loans to states in 169t; education spending by 26f, 50t; expenditure financing decomposition 32f; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 187–8; fiscal balances in 166p; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; indirect public loans to states 170t; information on 3t; infrastructure spending by 53t; institutional constraints on 95t, 107, 121t; PIT tax, features of 45t; public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; state debt by holders in 171 p; subnational financing framework overview 159t; subnational fiscal crises in 201t, 204f; tax allocation system in 17; tax arrangements in 421; transfers and vertical fiscal imbalance 31 f; VAT/ sales tax arrangements, features of 46t

    • infrastructure spending 27–9, 52–4t

    • Inman, R. P. 106

    • institutional constraints 95f

    • insurance, through private capital markets 235

    • inter-governmental tax assignment criteria 14–17; central taxation of mobile bases 15–16; features of 16–17; fiscal federalism and 15b; harmonization and 17b; inter-regional equalization 16; overview 14–15; progressive taxation instruments 16; risk-sharing/countercyclical policies 16

    • International Public Sector Accounting Standard (IPSAS) 149

    • Ireland, sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, change in 229f

    • Italy: redistribution and risk-sharing studies of 64t; sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, change in 229f

    • Joumard, I. 114

    • Kongsrud, P. M. 114

    • local government, defined 2

    • Lusynian, L. 32

    • Lutz, B. 106

    • macroeconomic indicators 138–9

    • market discipline, fiscal policy constraints and 96–7

    • Masson, P. 62, 63, 64, 64t, 65, 66, 71, 74–5, 74t, 76, 84–5

    • Mean Group (MG) estimator 67

    • medium-term objectives (MTO) 117

    • Melitz, J. 64t, 65

    • Mexico 2; central/subnational government gross debt of 163t, 165p; corporate income tax in, features of 44 t; debt allocation/tax capacity of 160f; education spending by 26f, 50 t; expenditure financing decomposition 32f; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 188–9; fiscal balances in 166p; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; fiscal responsibility laws (FRLs) in 140–1 b; health care decentralization/harmonization 47t; indirect public loans to states 170t; information on 3t; infrastructure spending by 28–9f, 53t; institutional constraints on 95t, 121 t; PIT tax, features of 45t; public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; social protection centralization 51 t; state debt by holders in 171 p; subnational financing framework overview 159t; subnational fiscal crises in 201 t, 204f; tax arrangements in 43t; tax revenue by government levels in 19f, 39–40t; tax revenue structure of 20f; transfers and vertical fiscal imbalance 31 f; VAT/sales tax arrangements, features of 46t

    • Miran, S. 106

    • National Commission of Local Administration 145

    • National Council of Accounting Harmonization (CONAC) 148

    • natural resource taxes 22

    • negotiated fiscal rule vs. cooperative approach 114, 115t

    • Netherlands, sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, change in 229f

    • “no bailout” clause 227, 231–2

    • Obstfeld, M. 64t, 65, 66, 76

    • one-step estimation method, redistribution and risk-sharing 66–7, 75–6

    • optimal taxation principle 16

    • Organic Law on budget stability and financial sustainability 141 b

    • Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 18, 28, 28f, 33, 39t

    • Peri, G. 64t, 65, 66, 76

    • personal income tax (PIT) 16, 21; features of 45t

    • Pesaran, H. 66

    • policy conditionality, fiscal crises resolution and 211–12

    • pooled debt instruments 243–4

    • Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator 66, 67, 71, 75–6, 75t

    • Portugal, sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, change in 229f

    • Poterba, J. 106

    • public financial management (PFM) systems 133

    • rainy day fund 6, 99–100, 179, 181, 239–41

    • redistribution 63

    • redistribution and risk-sharing studies 64t; Bayoumi and Masson approach 62, 64t, 65, 71, 74–5, 74t, 84–5; Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator approach 75–6, 75t; Sachs and Sala-i-Martin approach 63–4, 64t, 83–4; Von Hagen approach 64–5, 64t, 84

    • regional shocks, smoothing with fiscal transfers 60–87; see also fiscal transfers, to smooth regional shocks

    • revenue responsibilities, distribution of 14–22; inter-governmental tax assignment criteria for 14–17; tax revenue structure 18–22

    • revenue sharing agreements, transfers and 32–3

    • Ricardian equivalence 62

    • risk reduction, euro area fiscal crisis and 230–4; fiscal discipline measures 231–2; national level government failures 230–1; transitional considerations 232–4

    • risk-sharing: Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha approach to 249–50; banking union creation and 239; capital market movements and 239; central budget and 6; country-specific growth shocks and 234–42; crisis management measures and 238–9; described 61; in euro area 235–9, 236f, 237–8f, 240f; fiscal, role for 239; increasing options for 238–42; rationale for 234–5

    • Rodden, J. A. 112

    • Rueben, K. 106

    • Sachs, J. 63–4, 63t, 65, 83–4

    • Sala-i-Martin, X. 63–4, 63t, 65, 83–4

    • sales tax 21–2; features of 46t

    • sanctions, defined 100

    • scale economies 61–2

    • Securities Markets Program (SMP) 217

    • sixty percent debt rule 117

    • Smith, S. 64–5, 64t, 76

    • social protection spending 26–7, 51 t

    • South Africa 2; central/subnational government gross debt of 163t; corporate income tax in, features of 44t; education spending by 26f, 50t; expenditure financing decomposition 32f; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 189–90; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; indirect public loans to states 170t; information on 3t; infrastructure spending by 53t; institutional constraints on 95t, 121 t; PIT tax, features of 45t; public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; state debt by holders in 171p; subnational financing framework overview 159t; subnational fiscal crises in 202t, 204f; tax arrangements in 43t; transfers and vertical fiscal imbalance 31 f; VAT/sales tax arrangements, features of 46t

    • South African Financial and Fiscal Commission 147–8

    • Spain 2; breach of constraint corrective actions 126t; Budget Stability Law and 108, 109f; central government spending by 23–4f; central/subnational government gross debt of 164t, 165p; corporate income tax in, features of 44t; credit rating in 175f; debt allocation/tax capacity of 160f; education spending by 26f, 50t; expenditure financing decomposition 32f; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 190; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; fiscal responsibility laws (FRLs) in 141 b; health care decentralization/ harmonization 47t; information on 3t; infrastructure spending by 28–9f, 54t; institutional constraints on 95t, 107, 121–2t; PIT tax, features of 451; public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; social protection centralization 51t; sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, change in 229f; state debt by holders in 171 p; subnational financing framework overview 159t; subnational fiscal crises in 202t, 204f; tax arrangements in 43t; tax revenue by government levels in 19f, 39–40t; tax revenue structure of 20f; transfers and vertical fiscal imbalance 31f; VAT/sales tax arrangements, features of 46t

    • spending responsibilities, distribution of 22–4

    • Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 231

    • Stability Council 145–6

    • state debt restructuring 205

    • state government, defined 2

    • structural balance rule 118

    • subnational debt, crises handling of 9–10

    • subnational fiscal crises 198–220; central government financial support 207–9, 209–10b; conditionality and 211–14, 213–14b; cost of alternative financing and 210–11; crisis prevention measures post crises and 214–16; euro area crisis, response to 216–19; introduction to 198; magnitude and spillovers of 203–4, 204f; pre-set crisis resolution frameworks and 205, 206–7b; resolution mechanisms for 204–11; state debt restructuring and 205; triggers 198, 199–202t, 203

    • subnational fiscal policy, constraints on 90–127; coordination failure and 91–2; corrective actions and 101, 123–7t; deficit bias and 91; effectiveness of 105–12; EU supranational rule comparison 101–5, 116–18; features of 97–101, 112–13; fiscal aggregate and 97–100, 98t, 99f; fiscal autonomy (FA) of 93–4, 93f fiscal rules and 94–6, 95f 95t; introduction to 90; market discipline and 96–7; reasons for 91–3; sanctions and 100–1; types of 93–7, 114, 115t; vertical/horizontal spillovers and 91 b

    • subnational fiscal targets, constraints on 7–8

    • subnational government entities, defined 2

    • subnational governments (SNGs): constraints on, fiscal targets 7–8; defined 2; financing of (see central and subnational governments, financing of ); tax powers of 17b

    • subsidiarity principle 13

    • Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), auditing by 142–3

    • Sutherland, D. 97

    • Sweden, redistribution and risk-sharing studies of 64t

    • Switzerland 2; balanced budget rules and 7; breach of constraint corrective actions 126–7t; central government spending by 23–4f; central/subnational government gross debt of 164t, 165p; corporate income tax in, features of 44t; credit rating in 175f; debt allocation/ tax capacity of 160f; education spending by 26f, 50t; expenditure financing decomposition 32f; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 190; fiscal balances in 166p; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; health care decentralization/harmonization 47t; information on 3t; infrastructure spending by 28–9f, 54t; institutional constraints on 95t, 107, 122t; PIT tax, features of 45t; public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; social protection centralization 51 t; subnational financing framework overview 159t; tax arrangements in 43t; tax revenue by government levels in 19f, 39–40t; tax revenue structure of 20f; transfers and vertical fiscal imbalance 31 f; VAT/sales tax arrangements, features of 46t; vertical imbalances in 5

    • tax administration, fiscal federalism and 15b

    • tax arrangements, features of 41–6t

    • tax revenue, structure of 18–22, 39–40t; across government levels 20f; allocation of revenues 19f; corporate income tax (CIT) 18; custom duties 22; financial sector taxation 22; natural resource taxes 22; overview 18; personal income tax (PIT) 21; sales tax 21–2; VAT 21–2

    • Taylor, M. 63, 64, 64t

    • three percent budget balance rule 116

    • transfers 29–30, 31 f; central 5–6; revenue sharing agreements and 32–3; to smooth regional shocks 60–87

    • transparency, improving 216

    • Treaty of Maastricht, 1992 34

    • Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance (TSCG) 105

    • two-step approach, to redistribution and risk-sharing 64–5, 71, 74–5, 84–5

    • unemployment insurance 241–2

    • United Kingdom (UK), redistribution and risk-sharing studies of 64t

    • United States 2; balanced budget rules and 7; breach of constraint corrective actions 127t; central government spending by 23–4f; central/subnational government gross debt of 164t, 165p; Chapter 9 debt restructuring 206–7b; corporate income tax in, features of 44t; credit rating in 175f; debt allocation/ tax capacity of 160f; direct federal loans to states in 169t; education spending by 26f, 50t; expenditure financing decomposition 32f; financial linkages between governments in 167t, 190–1; fiscal balances in 166p; fiscal indicators targeted by 98t; fiscal transfers in, magnitude of 67, 70f; harmonization and 8; information on 3t; infrastructure spending by 28–9f, 54t; institutional constraints on 951, 106, 107f, 122t; PIT tax, features of 45t; public financial management (PFM) systems in 135t; redistribution and risk-sharing studies of 64t; redistribution through fiscal transfers in 72f, 75t, 79t, 86–7; social protection centralization 51t; state debt by holders in 171 p; subnational financing framework overview 159t; subnational fiscal crises in 202t, 204f; tax arrangements in 43t; tax revenue by government levels in 19f, 39–40t; tax revenue structure of 20f; transfers and vertical fiscal imbalance 31 f; VAT/ sales tax arrangements, features of 46t; vertical imbalances in 5

    • VAT tax revenue 21–2; features of 46t

    • vector autoregression (VAR) model 65

    • vertical fiscal imbalances (VFI) 30–2

    • vertical imbalances 5

    • vertical spillovers, subnational fiscal policy and 91 b

    • von Hagen, J. 64–5, 64t, 76, 84, 106

    • Zumer, F. 64t, 65

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